Donahower v. United States

77 F. 153, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2942
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota
DecidedNovember 21, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 77 F. 153 (Donahower v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donahower v. United States, 77 F. 153, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2942 (circtdmn 1896).

Opinion

LOCHREN, District Judge.

The petitioner was United States marshal of the district, appointed in May, A. D. 1890, and holding that office for the term of four years thereafter, and now seeks to recover numerous items of fees and expenses alleged to be due for official services rendered the United States, and expenditures officially incurred by him for the United States, during his incumbency of the said office, all of which items have been disallowed or sus[154]*154pended by the accounting officers of the treasury department. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the cause was referred to H. Harcourt Horn, Esq., to hear the testimony and report the facts to the court. The referee performed that duty, and his report was filed December 20, 1895. The case has been submitted to the court upon briefs by counsel. The referee has, in his report, classified the items of petitioner’s claim into separate groups, designated by letters or numerals; and as this classification is convenient, and has been adopted by counsel in their briefs, I will, in general, refer to such groupings, instead of the specific items.

1. Counsel agree that the petitioner should be allowed certain items not included in the headings hereinafter particularly mentioned, aggregating the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars and twenty-five cents. §450.25

Heading E.

2. The items under this heading aggregate forty-four dollars; comprising the regular charge of fifty cents each for serving eighty-eight subpoenas upon witnesses to testify in the district court on behalf of the United States. These subpoenas were all regularly issued by the clerk of the district court, upon the praecipe of the. then district attorney, and placed in the hands of the marshal for service, without any connivance or procurement on the part of the marshal.It is evident that very many of these subpoenas were unnecessary, and'issued in disregard of the acts of congress which were enacted to prevent such abuses. One example shows the reckless extent to which this abuse was carried: Nine of these subpoenas were for service upon J. W. Vars, a deputy collector of internal revenue, all requiring his attendance at the same term of court, held in the same federal building in which his office was located. While, upon the showing made, it seems clear that the. district attorney was at fault in directing all these subpoenas to issue, contrary to the provisions of the acts of congress, so that, if the claim were made by him for fees for filing the praecipes, it should be disallowed, I am not able to see that the marshal was at fault, in serving these subpoenas. He was merely an executive officer, bound to serve all writs and process placed in his hands for service, and appearing to be issued out of the proper court, and regular in form and purport. It did not rest upon him to determine whether there was or was not occasion for issuing any subpoena or other process. He would have no right to assume to judge of such a matter. His plain and simple duty was to serve the process, and he is entitled to the fees — forty-four dollars —claimed under this heading. §44.09

Heading F.

B. The items under this heading aggregate one hundred and eighty-eight dollars and seventy cents. And each item is for service and mileage, as marshal, in arresting and transporting a prisoner from the place of his arrest to the office of the United States commissioner who issued the warrant, and before whom the warrant was, by' its terms, made returnable, although in each case there was a [155]*155United States commissioner having his office nearer the place of arrest than the office of the commissioner who issued the warrant. In respect to the first item under this heading, No. 165, the service was performed before the passage of the act of March 3, 1893, which was as follows:

“Provided, that it shall he the duty of the marshal, his deputy or other officer. who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant to the nearest circuit court commissioner, or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under the existing laws for a hearing, commitment or taking hail for trial, ami the officer or magistrate issuing the warrant, shall attach thereto a eertiiied copy of the complaint, and upon the arrest of the accused, the return of the warrant, with a copy of the complaint attached, shall confer jurisdiction upon such officer as fully as if the complaint, had originally been made before him; and no mileage shall be allowed ¡my officer violating the provisions hereof.”

All the items under this heading, except the first, were for such service and mileage after the passage-of this act. As to that first ■item, No. 365, I he act has no application, and it should be allowed. In respect to the other items, it appears from the facts stated by the referee that the arrests were made upon warrants issued in each case by a United States commissioner, and in terms returnable before himself. It is not stated that the commissioner issuing the ■warrant in any of these cases attached to such warrant a certified copy of the complaint, which would be necessary to confer jurisdiction upon any nearer commissioner or magistrate before whom the marshal might take the person arrested. Without such certified copy of the complaint attached to the warrant, it would be futile for the marshal to take the arrested person before a nearer commissioner or magistrate, as he would be without jurisdiction to hear the matter. The objects of the act above quoted appear to be to pi-event the incurring of needless expense, as well as the hardship noon persons arrested, by transporting them unnecessary distances. The marshal would have to obey the warrant in its legal effect, and, if no certified copy of complaint was attached, to give jurisdiction to any other commissioner or magistrate, he would — -the warrant so directing — be obliged to take the arrested person before the commissioner who issued the warrant. Any presumption that the commissioner who issued the warrant did his duty as a public officer is offset by the like presumption in favor of the marshal. And, in view of Ihe particularity of the statement of facts by the referee, it is fairly inferable that no certified copies of complaints were attached to these warrants. They were served in the only way in which they could be served, and the marshal should be allowed his fees and mileage, amounting under this heading to one hundred and eighty-eight dollars and seventy cents. $188.70

Heading G-.

4. This heading covers a single item for services and mileage in transporting a prisoner from the office of the United States commissioner to the jail where the warrant, of commitment, made after preliminary examination, directed the petitioner to deliver the prisoner. The only objection made to the item rests on the admitted fact [156]*156that there was a justice of the peace at a locality nearer the place of arrest than the office of the commissioner. The objection is irrelevant.' The act of congress which is quoted above does not deprive the commissioner who issued the warrant of jurisdiction to hold the examination, if, notwithstanding there was a nearer magistrate, the arrested person was in fact brought before such commissioner. It only deprives the marshal, in such case, of his mileage connected with the arrest. If, upon such examination, the commissioner commits the prisoner, the marshal must execute the commitment, and for that is entitled to his fees, including mileage. The marshal should be allowed" the item fifty-five dollars and twenty cents. $55.20

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Swift v. United States
128 F. 763 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, 1904)
Lovering v. United States
117 F. 565 (D. Massachusetts, 1902)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
77 F. 153, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donahower-v-united-states-circtdmn-1896.