Don Patrick v. HP Communications, Inc.

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT 11 DON PATRICK, individually and as ) 12 ) Case No.: EDCV 23-00317-CJC (SPx) parent and next friend of BRANDON ) 13 PATRICK, ) ) 14 ) Plaintiffs, ) 15 ) ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO v. ) STATE COURT 16 ) ) 17 HP COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and ) RUDY GAMBOA, ) 18 ) ) 19 ) Defendants. ) 20 ) ) 21 HP COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and ) ) 22 RUDY GAMBOA, ) ) 23 Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) ) 24 v. ) ) 25 ) SUNBELT RENTALS, INC., and ROES ) 26 1 through 50, inclusive, ) ) 27 Third-Party Defendants ) 1 2 On April 5, 2022, Plaintiff Don Patrick, individually and as parent and next friend 3 of B.P., a minor, filed this action against Defendants HP Communications, Inc., and Rudy 4 Gamboa in the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside. (See Dkt. 1-3 Ex. 1A 5 [page 5 of PDF].) The claims involved allegations of negligent driving by Gamboa, an 6 employee, agent, or authorized driver of HP. (See id. [¶¶ 6–13, at pages 6–7 of PDF].) 7 On January 18, 2022, Defendants brought claims against Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., for 8 implied contractual indemnity, apportionment of fault and contribution, equitable 9 indemnity, and declaratory relief. (See id. [page 11 of PDF].) Though styled as “cross- 10 claims,” these claims appear to be in fact third-party claims, since Sunbelt was first 11 brought into the action through claims by Defendants, and Sunbelt thus appears to be a 12 third-party defendant. On February 24, 2023, Sunbelt removed to this Court, invoking 13 diversity jurisdiction. (See Dkt. 1 [Cross-Defendant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.’s Notice of 14 Removal of Civil Action to Federal Court, hereinafter “Notice”].) On March 2, 2023, the 15 Court ordered Sunbelt to show cause why this action should not be remanded for lack of 16 subject matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. 9 [Order to Show Cause Why This Action Should 17 Not Be Remanded for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction].) 18 19 Principles of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously 20 confine their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” 21 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to 22 be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” United States v. Ceja-Prado, 23 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant 24 removing the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court 25 has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly 26 construed against removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th 27 Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 1 subject matter jurisdiction whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors 2 Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district 3 court’s duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ 4 arguments.”). “The court may—indeed must—remand an action sua sponte if it 5 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” GFD, LLC v. Carter, No. CV 12– 6 08985, 2012 WL 5830079, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012). 7 8 The removal statute provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of 9 which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[] may be removed 10 by the defendant or the defendants[] to the district court of the United States for the 11 district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. 12 § 1441(a) (emphasis added). It is textbook law that “[t]hird party defendants (i.e., those 13 joined by defendant, rather than by plaintiff) cannot remove actions to federal court.” 14 Virginia A. Phillips & Karen L. Stevenson, Rutter Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil 15 Procedure Before Trial, California and Ninth Circuit Editions ¶ 2:2256 (Apr. 2022 16 Update); see also Westwood Apex v. Contreras, 644 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting 17 that the statute “preclude[s] removal by third-party defendants to an action”). As the 18 Supreme Court recently explained, “[t]he use of the term ‘defendant’ in related contexts 19 bolsters our determination that Congress did not intend for the phrase ‘the defendant or 20 the defendants’ in § 1441(a) to include third-party counterclaim defendants.” Home 21 Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1749 (2019). “[T]he Federal Rules of 22 Civil Procedure differentiate between third-party defendants, counterclaim defendants, 23 and defendants,” and “in other removal provisions, Congress has clearly extended the 24 reach of the statute to include parties other than the original defendant.” Id. 25 26 Sunbelt defends its removal by citing case law on the “separate and independent” 27 claims doctrine. (Dkt. 17 [Cross-Defendant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.’s Response to Order to 1 || Jurisdiction] at 5.) Sunbelt appears to harken to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), which allows for 2 |}removal of an action involving claims arising under federal law joined with 3 || transactionally unrelated state law claims or with claims made nonremovable by statute. 4 || See Phillips & Stevenson, supra, § 2:2811. The prior wording of the statute labeled the 5 || latter set of nonremovable claims as “separate and independent” claims. See id. That 6 || wording is no longer in the statute, and § 1441(c) applies only when one or more claims 7 under federal law, which is not the case here. In any event, the “separate and 8 ||independent” claims doctrine dealt only with what claims are removable, not who may 9 |}remove. And the who does not encompass third-party defendants, like Sunbelt. 10 11 Accordingly, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California, 12 || County of Riverside. 13 14 15 DATED: March 29, 2023 Ko joe 16 ye 17 CORMAC J. CARNEY 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28