Don Angelo Davis v. Joseph Tuggle, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 31, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01695
StatusUnknown

This text of Don Angelo Davis v. Joseph Tuggle, et al. (Don Angelo Davis v. Joseph Tuggle, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Don Angelo Davis v. Joseph Tuggle, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DON ANGELO DAVIS, 2:25-cv-1695-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JOSEPH TUGGLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Don Angelo Davis, a state prisoner, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983 together with a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 636(b)(1). As set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim and plaintiff has not 21 demonstrated he is entitled to proceed IFP. 22 I. In Forma Pauperis 23 Previously, the court denied without prejudice plaintiff’s initial application for leave to 24 proceed IFP indicating he had not received any money from any sources during the past 12 25 months, noting the form used by this district requires a certified copy of plaintiff’s prison trust 26 account statement for the six-month period preceding the filing of his complaint. (ECF Nos. 2, 5.) 27 Plaintiff filed a renewed declaration and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on this 28 court’s form. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff did not, however, properly complete the application because 1 plaintiff indicated he receives money from “other sources” and did not provide the required 2 explanation for that response by describing the source of money, the amount received, and “what 3 you expect you will continue to receive.” (Id. at 1.) In addition, plaintiff’s trust account statement 4 reflects he had $1,409.63 when this action was filed, which tends to indicate he could pay the 5 filing fee and still afford the necessities of life. 6 The court may authorize the commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees” by 7 an individual who submits an affidavit evidencing an inability to pay such fees. 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(a). 1 “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the 9 affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 10 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 335 11 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) 12 (affidavit must “state the facts as to affiant’s poverty with some particularity, definiteness and 13 certainty” (internal quotation omitted)). While § 1915(a) does not require a litigant to demonstrate 14 “absolute destitution,” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339, the applicant must nonetheless show inability to 15 pay the fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 16 Plaintiff has not shown inability to pay the fees because he had $1,409.63 at the relevant 17 time, indicated he receives money from an undescribed source, and has not disclosed the 18 amount(s) received and when, or what he expects to receive in the future. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 19 renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be denied without prejudice. In order to 20 proceed with this case, in addition to filing any amended complaint, plaintiff must either make the 21 showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) through a fully completed IFP application or pay the 22 court costs. 23 II. Screening Requirement 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 26

27 1 If leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, plaintiff will still be required to pay the filing fee but will be allowed to pay it in installments. Litigants proceeding in forma pauperis are not 28 required to pay the administrative fee. 1 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 4 III. Allegations in the Complaint 5 The complaint asserts a single claim concerning a “[t]hreat to safety” in regard to events 6 in the music band room at Folsom State Prison (ECF No. 1 at 1, 3.) Plaintiff had previously 7 written to staff about two specific inmates in the music program “in case of attack.” (Id. at 3-4.) 8 On August 14, 2024, plaintiff was in the music room for band practice and had a dispute with 9 another inmate, who grabbed plaintiff around the neck and held plaintiff off the ground until 10 plaintiff knocked his hand and pushed him away. (Id. at 5-6.) The music staff sponsor saw 11 everything and did not press his alarm button when plaintiff was first attacked. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff 12 felt like the situation was “a set up” as plaintiff had been recently threatened by a security officer 13 being vindictive about a looming lawsuit. (Id.) CDCR has impeded plaintiff from seeking redress 14 by not giving him the name of the staff person known as Jim. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff wrote a grievance containing specific allegations about what had been going on 16 in the band room, and staff favoring certain inmates. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff was interviewed 17 by defendant B. Stambuk, the head of the music program, who stated the music program is a 18 voluntary program which plaintiff is not required to be a part of. (Id. at 8.) 19 Defendants are Joseph Tuggle as Warden, Jeffery Macomber as CDCR Secretary, B. 20 Stambuk, and a Doe defendant. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff seeks damages for harm suffered in the 21 form of emotional distress. (Id. at 13.) 22 IV. Discussion 23 The allegations are insufficient to state a “failure-to-protect” Eighth Amendment violation 24 claim against any defendant. To state such a claim, plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) a 25 prison official’s act or omission was objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was 26 deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 27 (1994); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to be liable under the 28 Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have known of and disregarded a substantial risk of 1 serious harm to the plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. 2 “[S]peculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a 3 sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to [an inmate’s] future health.” Williams v. Wood, 4 223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To be actionable, a prison official’s 5 conduct “must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” 6 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 7 (1976).

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Bluebook (online)
Don Angelo Davis v. Joseph Tuggle, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/don-angelo-davis-v-joseph-tuggle-et-al-caed-2025.