Dominique Rayvon Bass v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00219-CR

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DOMINIQUE RAYVON BASS, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 1A District Court Newton County, Texas

Trial Cause No. ND20-07603

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dominique Rayvon Bass pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a), (d). After Bass pleaded guilty, consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for eight years. Thereafter, the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years of confinement plus required him to pay a $1,500 fine and $1,125 in attorney’s fees. In three issues, Bass asks whether: (1)

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the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to consider sworn affidavits of non-prosecution and recantations from his alleged victims; (2) his guilty plea to deferred adjudication probation was involuntary due to coercive circumstances, including prolonged detention during COVID-19 and multiple family tragedies; and (3) the imposition of a twenty-year maximum sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of credible evidence of actual innocence. As discussed below, we will dismiss his appeal in part and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified in part.

Background

A Newton County grand jury indicted Bass for the second-degree felony offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact. In exchange for Bass’s guilty plea, the State agreed to drop another charge and recommended that Bass be placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of eight years, among other things. Bass pleaded guilty, and consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision for eight years, required him to complete 120 hours of community service, and imposed a $1,500 fine, among other things. Bass did not appeal the Order of Deferred Adjudication.

The record before us contains a Guilty Plea Memorandum signed by Bass, his attorney, the State’s prosecutor, and the trial court, along with signed Plea Admonishments. The Guilty Plea Memorandum states that the trial court found Bass

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to be competent, he represented to the trial court that he understood all the waivers and pleaded guilty freely and voluntarily, and he judicially confessed to the offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact. It also outlines the terms of the punishment recommendation. On March 4, 2021, the trial court entered an “Order of Deferred Adjudication” pursuant to the plea bargain agreement placing Bass on community supervision for a period of eight years. Bass did not appeal that Order.

After Bass violated multiple conditions of his community supervision, on July 15, 2021, the State filed its first Motion for Adjudication of Guilt. On January 21, 2022, the State filed a second Motion for Adjudication of Guilt adding further factual allegations to those violations of the terms of his community supervision alleged in the original Motion. The new allegations included that he assaulted a correctional officer and caused bodily injury. Then, on September 16, 2024, the State filed its Second Amended Motion for Adjudication of Guilt. The Second Amended Motion included factual allegations regarding Bass’s commission of other crimes and updated amounts owed for violations of other terms of his community supervision. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s Second Amended Motion for Adjudication of Guilt in which Bass pleaded “not true” to the allegations regarding his violations. On May 5, 2025, the trial court revoked Bass’s probation, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years of incarceration. Following the revocation of his probation and adjudication of guilt, Bass appealed.

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Analysis

In issues one and two, Bass essentially attacks his underlying guilty plea by contending the trial court violated his due process rights by excluding evidence of his actual innocence, and his original plea was involuntary. The State counters that Bass’s first two issues are outside of what he is allowed to raise on direct appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.

Typically, “a defendant placed on deferred adjudication community supervision may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding . . . only in appeals taken when deferred adjudication community supervision is first imposed.” Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing prior statute, article 42.12, § 5(b)); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.755(e) (current version of statute stating that defendant’s right to appeal “shall be accorded the defendant at the time the defendant is placed on community supervision[]”); Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 910–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (endorsing general rule outlined in Manuel v. State). “[A]n appellant will not be permitted to raise on appeal from the revocation of his community supervision any claim that he could have brought on an appeal from the original imposition of that community supervision.” Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citation omitted). We have explained that “[a]n appellate court’s review of an order

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adjudicating guilt is generally limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the defendant violated the terms of his community supervision.” See Diamond v. State, 419 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.) (citation omitted). An exception to this general rule is if the original judgment imposing community supervision was void. See Ebiana v. State, 77 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburgh 2002, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted). An involuntary guilty plea will not render the resulting judgment void. See Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citation omitted).

As to Bass’s claims that his plea was involuntary and evidence of actual innocence relates to the original cause in which he received deferred adjudication community supervision, we lack jurisdiction over that issue. See Perez, 424 S.W.3d at 86; Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 319; Hargesheimer, 182 S.W.3d at 910–12; Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661–62. Bass does not argue that the original order placing him on deferred adjudication community supervision was void. See Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 785; Ebiana, 77 S.W.3d at 438. Since Bass’s complaints of the voluntariness of his plea and actual innocence should have been raised when deferred adjudication community supervision was imposed, and he does not assert that the original order placing him on deferred adjudication was void, we lack jurisdiction to consider

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issues one and two on direct appeal. 1 See Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661–62; see also 0F

Perez, 424 S.W.3d at 86; Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 319; Hargesheimer, 182 S.W.3d at 910–12; Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 785; Ebiana, 77 S.W.3d at 438.

In issue three, Bass argues that given credible evidence of actual innocence, the trial court’s sentencing him to twenty years of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Although Bass ties his argument that his punishment was cruel and unusual to evidence of actual innocence, this complaint is about the revocation proceeding and the sentence imposed after his deferred adjudication community supervision was revoked. Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider issue three. See Kahookele v. State, 189 S.W.3d 303, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (remanding in light of Hargesheimer decision for consideration of claim that sentence imposed after revocation of deferred adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty was cruel and unusual).

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “Subject only to a very limited, ‘exceedingly rare,’ and

1 Claims pertaining to actual innocence are typically challenged in a petition for writ of habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., Ex parte Harleston, 431 S.W.3d 67, 70–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 877–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing different types of innocence claims a habeas applicant may try to prove); Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 677–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (same).

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somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality review, a punishment that falls within the legislatively prescribed range, and that is based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment, is unassailable on appeal.” Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (footnote omitted). Indecency with a child by sexual contact is a second-degree felony, which carries a punishment range of confinement from two years to twenty years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33(a); 21.11(d). We hold that Bass’s sentence of twenty years is within the statutory range authorized by the legislature for Bass’s crime and is not cruel and unusual punishment. See id. We overrule issue three.

Modification of Judgment

As discussed above, the length of Bass’s sentence is not cruel and unusual.

Even so, the trial court’s written judgment includes a $1,500 fine that was not contained in the oral pronouncement of sentence. Appellant is entitled to have his sentence, including the assessment of any fines, pronounced in his presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). When a variation between the oral pronouncement of the sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence exists, the oral pronouncement controls. See Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502.

This Court has the power to modify incorrect judgments when we have the necessary information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865

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S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the $1,500 fine.

Additionally, the trial court’s written judgment reflects that Bass needed to pay $1,125 in attorney’s fees, despite being found indigent and appointed counsel in the trial court. Nothing in the record establishes that Bass was no longer indigent, and the trial court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. A defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay “are explicit critical elements” in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs under article 26.05(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g). No trial objection is required to preserve the sufficiency of the evidence for appellate review. Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556. When the evidence does not support the order to pay attorney’s fees, the proper remedy is to delete them from the order. Id. at 557. We likewise modify the judgment to delete the $1,125 in attorney’s fees from the judgment.

Conclusion

Having determined that Bass failed to timely file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order placing him on deferred adjudication community supervision, we lack jurisdiction to consider issues one and two. See Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661– 62; see also Perez, 424 S.W.3d at 86; Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 319; Hargesheimer, 182

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S.W.3d at 910–12. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as it pertains to issues one and two for want of jurisdiction. See Manuel v. State, 981 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1998), aff’d, 994 S.W.2d 658 (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction). Having overruled issue three regarding Bass’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment but modifying the judgment to delete the $1,500 fine and $1,125 attorney’s fee amount, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON

Chief Justice

Submitted on August 17, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 26, 2026 Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.