IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Dominick D. Jones, Sep 22 2025, 8:56 am Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
September 22, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-2608 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D03-2001-F1-3
Opinion by Chief Judge Altice Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur.
Altice, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 1 of 15 Case Summary [1] Dominick D. Jones appeals his convictions for three counts of Level 1 felony
child molesting, and one count of Level 4 felony child molesting, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence. He also challenges the trial court’s deprivation
of his good time credit and claims that his 120-year aggregate sentence is
inappropriate under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions that the trial
court calculate the amount of pretrial credit days that Jones is owed and to issue
a revised sentencing order that reflects the same.
Facts and Procedural History [3] When Victim 1 1 was five years old in 2011, her mother (Mother) began dating
Jones. Several months later, Jones moved in with Mother and her children,
including Victim 1, who considered Jones a “father type figure.” Transcript Vol.
II at 179.
[4] Sometime in 2013, Jones moved from Mother’s Elkhart home. In 2014, Jones
and Mother had a son (Child) together. While Jones initially had nothing to do
with Child, he became involved after Child turned two.
1 The victim in this case is identified only as “Victim 1” in the affidavit for probable cause, the charging informations, at trial, and by both parties in their appellate briefs. We do the same.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 2 of 15 [5] In June 2018, Child started frequent overnight visits with Jones. As Child was
uncomfortable going alone, Victim 1—who was nearly twelve years old—also
went on the visits. Over the course of nearly a year, Jones touched Victim 1
inappropriately “[a]lmost every time” she went to his house. Transcript Vol. IV
at 225. On one occasion, Jones entered the bathroom while Victim 1 was
showering and touched her breasts and vagina with his hand. He also
penetrated Victim 1’s vagina with his fingers. On several occasions, Jones
touched Victim 1’s vagina with his mouth and penetrated her vagina with his
tongue. Jones also penetrated Victim 1’s vagina with sex toys.
[6] On March 28, 2019, Victim 1 told Mother about the incidents and stated that
she no longer wanted to go to Jones’s residence because he was “touching [her
in] places that [she] didn’t want to be touched.” Transcript Vol. II at 183.
Mother took Victim 1 to the hospital the next morning, where Dr. Donald
Zimmer conducted a sexual assault examination. Victim 1 reported to Dr.
Zimmer that Jones had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions over a one-
year period. On the day of the examination, Victim 1 stated that she had not
had contact with Jones for the previous two months. DNA evidence was not
collected because of the amount of time that had passed since the last assault.
[7] Dr. Zimmer noted that Victim 1’s hymen was not intact, that she tested positive
for bacterial vaginosis, and that he would not have expected to see a disrupted
hymen or that type of infection in a female of Victim 1’s age. Dr. Zimmer
testified that a disrupted hymen could be “absolutely indicative of penetration.”
Transcript Vol. IV at 78-79. A forensic interview was conducted on April 3,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 3 of 15 2019, where Victim 1 reported that Jones used penis-shaped purple and black
sex toys during some instances of abuse.
[8] At some point thereafter, police officers obtained a search warrant for Jones’s
residence. During the search, Jones informed them of the location of a box of
sex toys. Officers found items including artificial penises and vaginas in a room
next to the main bedroom.
[9] On April 24, 2019, Jones voluntarily came to the police department and spoke
with detectives. He stated that no one should have known about the contents of
his box of sex toys unless they were “snooping around his home.” Transcript
Vol. III at 86. Jones also claimed that he had never used the sex toys, it was a
“fantasy thing,” and that there was “no way” that Victim 1 could have
described the contents of the box. Id. at 86-87, 122. Detectives sent three of the
sex toys from the box for DNA testing. The results showed that there was
limited support for the exclusion of DNA belonging to Jones or Victim 1 on one
of the sex toys. The quantity of DNA on the other items was insufficient for
further analysis.
[10] Victim 1 attended eight therapy sessions between January 2020 and April 2021.
She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and the therapist noted
that Victim 1 was so traumatized that she no longer wanted to shower or bathe.
[11] On January 21, 2020, the State charged Jones with six counts of child molesting
as a Level 1 felony and one count of child molesting as a Level 4 felony.
Count I alleged that Jones penetrated Victim 1’s vagina with his penis and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 4 of 15 Count II alleged that he penetrated her vagina with his fingers. Count III
alleged that Jones forced Victim 1 to perform oral sex on him, Count IV alleged
that he performed oral sex on Victim 1, Count V alleged that he penetrated her
vagina with his penis, Count VI alleged that he penetrated her vagina with a
purple sex toy, and Count VII alleged fondling or touching.
[12] The trial court appointed a public defender to represent Jones. During the
pendency of the case, Jones filed multiple pro se pleadings and motions while
represented by counsel. At some point, the trial court informed Jones that it did
not allow bifurcated representation and that he was “close to being sanctioned.”
Transcript Vol. II at 65-66. The trial court told Jones that it would revoke
pretrial good time credit days if he continued to make pro se filings while
represented by counsel, citing Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 268 (Ind.
2014), as authority for doing so. 2 Approximately one week later, Jones made
another pro se filing along with a “Letter to the Judge.” Appellant’s Appendix
Vol. III at 160-61. In response, the trial court found Jones in direct contempt
and deprived him of sixty days of good time credit. The trial court sanctioned
Jones with the loss of more credit time on several other occasions in light of
Jones’s additional pro se filings.
2 Under Zavodnik, a trial court may impose restrictions on a party for engaging in “abusive litigation practices that create confusion and put an enormous burden on the court, its staff, the clerk and opposing parties.” 17 N.E.3d at 268. Such restrictions include—but are not limited to—striking pleadings under certain circumstances, limiting repetitive motions and the number of words and pages in filings, and limiting the number or length of exhibits. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 5 of 15 [13] Following a three-day jury trial that concluded on January 11, 2024, Jones was
found guilty of child molesting on Counts II, IV, and VI—Level 1 felonies—
and Count VII, a Level 4 felony. The jury found Jones not guilty on Counts I,
III, and V. Jones remained incarcerated and prior to sentencing, the trial court
granted Jones’s motion for a determination of competency and ordered him to
undergo a psychiatric examination.
[14] Thereafter, Jones filed a pro se “Sentencing Statement” and a pro se “second
presentence investigation report.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. IV at 164-188, 189-
195. The trial court once again sanctioned Jones for his pro se filings and
deprived him of an additional thirty days of good time credit.
[15] Jones was determined competent, and on October 10, 2024, the trial court held
a sentencing hearing. The trial court identified as aggravating circumstances
Jones’s criminal history, the significant harm that Victim 1 suffered, the fact
that Jones was in a position of trust, and Jones’s history of drug and alcohol
abuse. The trial court considered Jones’s mental health a mitigating factor and
sentenced him to consecutive sentences of forty years each on Counts II and IV,
thirty years on Count VI ordered to run consecutively to Counts II and IV, and
ten years, all suspended, on Count VII for an aggregate executed sentence of
110 years.
[16] The trial court’s sentencing order and judgment of conviction further provided:
“The Probation Department is directed to . . . subtract any time that the court
deprived the defendant due to his violating court orders with regard to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 6 of 15 continuing correspondence with the court.” Id. at 218. The memorandum
prepared by the Probation Department shows that “Jones has been deprived of
390 days of good time credit as of October 10, 2024.” Id. at 220.
[17] Jones now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficient Evidence [18] Jones claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He
argues that the convictions must be set aside under the incredible dubiosity rule
because Victim 1’s testimony was “inherently improbable or uncorroborated.”
Appellant’s Brief at 26.
[19] A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence warrants a “deferential standard
of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness
credibility[.]’” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).
Instead, we respect the fact-finder’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting
evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of
the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780,
783 (Ind. 2024). A conviction for child molesting may stand solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim. See Baxter v. State, 132 N.E.3d 1, 5
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 7 of 15 [20] To convict Jones of Level 1 felony child molest, the State was required to prove
that Jones, when Victim 1 was a child under the age of fourteen, knowingly
performed or submitted to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with her
when he was at least twenty-one years of age. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). To
prove child molesting as a Level 4 felony, the State had to prove that Jones
performed or submitted to fondling or touching of Victim 1 with the intent to
arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either himself or Victim 1. I.C. § 35-42-4-
3(b). “Other sexual conduct” includes acts involving a sex organ of one person
and the mouth of another person and the penetration of the sex organ of a
person with an object. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5. A finger is an object for the
purposes of the child molesting statute. Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 86
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The female sex organ includes the external
genitalia, and the slightest penetration of the female sex organ constitutes child
molesting. Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1288-89 (Ind. 2018).
[21] Jones acknowledges that under the incredible dubiosity rule, “a court will
impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only
when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal,
wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Tillman v. State, 642
N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994). “Application of this rule is limited to cases . . .
where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony [that] is
equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial
evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” Id. Application of the incredible dubiosity
rule is rare. Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 8 of 15 [22] While Jones points to minor inconsistencies between Victim 1’s deposition
testimony and her trial testimony, including the manner in which Jones
touched her and whether Jones got in the shower with her, a witness’s trial
testimony that contradicts earlier pretrial statements does not necessarily render
the testimony incredibly dubious. Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind.
2002).
[23] Victim 1 consistently testified at trial that Jones penetrated her vagina with sex
toys, his fingers, tongue, and penis. Victim 1 also testified that Jones made her
touch his penis with her hand and mouth and explained that Jones penetrated
her vagina with his fingers while she was showering. Victim 1 further testified
that Jones put “his tongue on [her] vaginal area” on at least one occasion while
she was lying on her back wearing only a shirt. Victim 1 also explained how
Jones used a “fake man part” that was “small and purple” that “felt like rubber”
to penetrate her vagina while she laid on a mattress in his guest room.
Transcript Vol. IV at 239-40, 243.
[24] In addition to Victim 1’s testimony, the State presented circumstantial evidence
supporting the allegation that Jones committed the charged offenses.
Specifically, items matching the descriptions of the sex toys that Victim 1
described to the police were found at Jones’s residence. Also, a sexual assault
examination revealed that Victim 1’s hymen was not intact and that she had
contracted bacterial vaginosis—neither of which was common for a female her
age.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 9 of 15 [25] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply in this case. Jones failed to show
that Victim 1’s testimony was inherently contradictory, and her testimony was
corroborated by other testimony and circumstantial evidence. The evidence
was sufficient to support Jones’s convictions.
II. Earned Credit Time [26] Jones argues—and the State concedes—that the trial court improperly deprived
him of earned good time credit. Jones claims that the trial court’s sanction in
revoking his credit time for filing “[pro se] correspondence and motions . . .
despite being represented by counsel” was an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s
Brief at 32.
[27] Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 provides that a defendant is entitled to credit time for
each day spent in confinement awaiting trial or sentencing. When incarcerated
in a penal facility, defendants may be deprived of good time credit for bad
behavior and conduct violations, or if the court determines that a civil claim
brought by a defendant is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. I.C. § 35-50-
6-0.5; I.C. § 35-50-6-5. Pre-sentence jail time credit, however, is a matter of
statutory right, and trial courts generally have no discretion in awarding or
denying such credit. Perry v. State, 13 N.E.3d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[28] Although the trial court cited Zavodnik as authority for denying Jones credit
time for improperly filing pro se motions and other pleadings because he was
represented by counsel, Jones is statutorily entitled to credit time while awaiting
sentencing. Hence, the trial court was without discretion to deprive Jones of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 10 of 15 the credit time as a sanction for filing pro se pleadings and motions while
represented by counsel. We therefore remand this case to the trial court to
calculate the correct amount of credit time to which Jones is entitled and issue a
revised sentencing statement in accordance therewith.
III. Inappropriate Sentence [29] Jones claims that his 120-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate under Ind.
Appellate Rule 7(B). Specifically, Jones argues that his sentence must be
revised because of “his mental health history” and the “comparative sentences
imposed in similar cases.” Appellant’s Brief at 7.
[30] We evaluate inappropriate sentence claims under the following well-
settled standard of review:
We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Our role in reviewing a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for the trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
“Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 11 of 15 a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
[31] In considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence
for the crime. McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When
a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we consider whether there is
anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the
defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our
legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549,
564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The sentence for a Level 1 felony ranges from twenty
to forty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
4(b). The sentence for a Level 4 felony ranges from two to twelve years with an
advisory sentence of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5.
[32] Here, Jones was sentenced to forty years each on Counts II and IV and to thirty
years on Count VI, all Level 1 felonies that were ordered to run consecutively to
each other. The sentences on Counts II and IV were the maximum permitted
under I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b), and the sentence on Count VI was the advisory
sentence for a Level 1 felony. Jones was also sentenced to ten years on Count
VII—four years above the advisory sentence for a Level 4 felony—all
suspended to probation, for an aggregate executed sentence of 110 years.
[33] Here, the evidence established that Jones—whom Victim 1 considered a father
figure—abused her multiple times over the course of nearly one year. Jones
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 12 of 15 penetrated Victim 1 vaginally with his finger, tongue, and sex toys in those
incidents of abuse, and Victim 1 was traumatized to the point that she no longer
wanted to bathe. That Jones occupied a position of trust, which he repeatedly
abused, rendered Jones’s offenses particularly egregious. See, e.g., Baumholser v.
State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that abusing a position
of trust is, by itself, a valid aggravator that may support a maximum sentence),
trans. denied. The nature of Jones’s offenses does not render his sentence
inappropriate.
[34] When examining Jones’s character, we consider a wide range of factors,
including his age, criminal history, background, and past rehabilitative efforts.
Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021). The significance of a criminal
history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in
relation to the current offense. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007).
[35] The record shows that Jones has a lengthy criminal history. Specifically, Jones
was convicted of criminal conversion and visiting a common nuisance in 1998,
and he later violated the terms of his suspended sentence. Jones was convicted
of failure to appear, criminal trespass, resisting law enforcement in 1999, and in
2005, he was convicted of dealing in cocaine and sentenced to twelve years with
two years suspended. Jones’s long and varied criminal history reflects poorly
on his character. See Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005) (criminal
history reflects poorly on character because it reveals that a defendant has not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 13 of 15 been deterred from criminal behavior). Although Jones has not been convicted
of prior sexual offenses, he molested Victim 1 over a prolonged period of time.
[36] The trial court acknowledged Jones’s mental health issues as a mitigating
factor, and although Jones was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2003, he
never sought mental health treatment for his condition. In light of Jones’s
decision not to seek treatment, his mental health issues do not significantly
lessen his moral culpability. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 173 N.E.3d 700, 706-07
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (stating that the defendant’s failure to seek treatment for
known mental health condition did not support a sentencing revision), abrogated
in part on other grounds. Moreover, Jones has not established a nexus between
his mental health issues and the crimes he committed.
[37] Finally, although Jones compares his sentence to those imposed in Couch v.
State, 977 N.E.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, Walters v.
State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied, and Lavoie v.
State, 903 N.E.3d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), those cases do not demonstrate
that his sentence is inappropriate. For instance, the defendant in Couch pleaded
guilty to the charged child molesting offenses and lacked a prior criminal
history. 977 N.E.2d at 1017. The defendant in Walters did not molest his
victim multiple times over the course of nearly a year, 68 N.E.3d at 1099, and
the defendant in Lavoie was convicted on a single count of child molesting,
along with additional offenses. 903 N.E.3d at 136. Because the
appropriateness of a sentence depends on a “myriad of other factors that come
to light in a given case,” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224, Jones has failed to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 14 of 15 demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the specific factors
considered by the trial court that distinguished his offenses from those
committed by the defendants in other cases. In short, Jones’s sentence is not
inappropriate and should not be revised.
[38] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Donald R. Shuler Goshen, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Kelly A. Loy Assistant Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2608 | September 22, 2025 Page 15 of 15