Dominic P. Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A. Paris, and Unikai Hafenbetrieb, Gmbh

707 F.2d 395, 1984 A.M.C. 1461, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27245
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 31, 1983
Docket81-3637
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 707 F.2d 395 (Dominic P. Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A. Paris, and Unikai Hafenbetrieb, Gmbh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dominic P. Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A. Paris, and Unikai Hafenbetrieb, Gmbh, 707 F.2d 395, 1984 A.M.C. 1461, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27245 (9th Cir. 1983).

Opinion

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge.

Dominic Raffaele, a longshoreman, appeals the dismissal for want of personal *396 jurisdiction of his action for damages. Raffaele seeks to recover for injuries he suffered when a crate fell on him inside a container that he was unloading in Portland, Oregon.

Unikai Hafenbetrieb (Unikai), a German corporation, is a terminal operator in Hamburg, Germany, whose operations included the packing (“stuffing”) of the container unloaded by Raffaele. 1 Raffaele contends that his injuries were the proximate result of Unikai’s negligence in propping a crate inside the container with a piece of dunnage. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Raffaele’s evidence, had he been allowed to present it, would have been sufficient to send the case to the jury on the question of Unikai’s negligence. The only issue on this appeal is whether Unikai— which has no offices in the United States and solicits no business here — had the constitutionally required “minimum contacts” with the State of Oregon for the district court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

This court uses a two-step test in determining whether a state has personal jurisdiction. We first apply the forum state’s long-arm statute and then consider whether application of that statute is consistent with federal due process. Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir.1981). Oregon’s long-arm statute, Rule 4, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 has been interpreted to confer jurisdiction “to the outer limits” of due process. State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 657 P.2d 211 (1982); State ex rel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 207 (1982). 3 Thus, we may proceed directly to determine whether application of the statute is consistent with due process.

Personal jurisdiction over Unikai meets the requirements of due process only if Unikai had certain “minimum contacts” with Oregon “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Internal Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)); accord, Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1977). Unikai’s contacts with Oregon are not so significant as to justify jurisdiction over it for all actions. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-48, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418-419, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). We must decide whether it is fair to assert jurisdiction over Unikai for the limited purpose of this action.

*397 This court applies three criteria in determining whether the due process requirements for exercising limited jurisdiction are met: (1) the nonresident defendant must perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws; (2) the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287.

Unikai relies on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), to support its contention that its activities in Oregon do not satisfy the first criterion. The Supreme Court held in World-Wide Volkswagen that the mere likelihood that a product would find its way into the forum state is not enough to satisfy due process. The Court stated that the defendant’s connection with the forum must be “such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. The Court found it to be a “fortuitous circumstance” that an automobile sold in New York to a New York resident happened to be involved in an accident while passing through Oklahoma. Id. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566. Accordingly, the Court held that the New York automobile dealer and regional distributor could not reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Oklahoma court. The Court distinguished the situation in which a defendant directly or indirectly serves a forum’s market or delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will reach the forum state. In such case, the forum’s court may assert personal jurisdiction. Id. at 297-98, 100 S.Ct. at 567.

Although World-Wide Volkswagen “cut short any trend toward unlimited personal jurisdiction and emphasized that an isolated and unanticipated injury within the foreign state is not sufficient to support in person-am jurisdiction,” Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d at 993, jurisdiction has been found where “under the totality of the circumstances the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called upon to present a defense in a distant forum.” Id. at 993. For example, in Myers v. John Deere Ltd., 683 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.1982), the Eighth Circuit upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose contacts with the forum state were very similar to those of Unikai in the instant case. The defendant in Myers loaded wooden pallets on a freight train in Canada for shipment to Iowa. En route to Iowa, the train stopped at an inspection station in North Dakota, near the international border. Plaintiff, a customs inspector, was injured when he opened the door of the box car containing the pallets and. they fell on him. The defendant did not transact any business in North Dakota, had no agents in North Dakota, and owned no property in North Dakota. The court distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen because the defendant made twelve shipments a year to the United States and knew that the shipments passed through North Dakota.

Similarly, Unikai’s contacts with Oregon distinguish it from those of the defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen because Unikai purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Oregon’s laws. While even one purposeful act with effects in the forum state may be sufficient to support jurisdiction, e.g., Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer,

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707 F.2d 395, 1984 A.M.C. 1461, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27245, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dominic-p-raffaele-v-compagnie-generale-maritime-sa-paris-and-unikai-ca9-1983.