Dominguez v. Archambeault

District Court, S.D. California·Decided November 2, 2022·No. 3:20-cv-01384·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Ramon Dominguez, Case No.: 20cv1384-JO-AHG

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 Archambeault et al, 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 19 20 On March 26, 2021, Petitioner Ramon Dominguez filed a Third Amended Petition 21 for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking his immediate release from 22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody at the Imperial Regional 23 Detention Facility (“IRDF”). Dkt. 13 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). In his Petition, he sought 24 release from custody on the grounds that conditions at IRDF are punitive and place him at 25 an unreasonable and substantial risk of contracting COVID-19. Id. On July 9, 2021, 26 Respondents Gregory J. Archambeault, Jesus Reyna, Sixto Marrero, Matthew T. Albence, 27 and Chad Wolf filed a response to the Petition. Dkt. 15 (“Response” or “Resp.”). On 28 1 August 5, 2021, Petitioner filed a reply. Dkt. 16. For the reasons discussed below, the 2 Court denies the Petition. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, has been confined in civil immigration 5 custody at IRDF ever since the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) instituted 6 removal proceedings against him in late 2017. Pet. ¶ 33; Resp., Ex. 24. DHS ordered 7 Petitioner’s removal from the United States based on an aggravated felony conviction 8 pursuant to Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Resp., Ex. 9 19. Petitioner filed an appeal of the removal order to the United States Court of Appeals 10 for the Ninth Circuit. Pet. ¶ 33. ICE has not released him from custody pending appeal 11 due to his aggravated felony criminal history. Resp., Exs. 34, 38. 12 On July 20, 2020, Petitioner filed his original petition seeking immediate release 13 from ICE custody for violation of his Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights, and 14 on March 26, 2021, he filed a third amended habeas petition. Dkts. 1, 13.1 In his amended 15 petition, Petitioner asserted that IRDF conditions put him, a medically vulnerable person 16 diagnosed with grade-1 obesity, at extraordinary and unreasonable risk of contracting 17 COVID-19. Pet. ¶¶ 33, 85. He also claimed that IRDF staff created unconstitutionally 18 punitive conditions by conducting unnecessary and unexpected cell checks and unlawfully 19 retaliating against him. Pet. ¶¶ 70–81. Finally, he alleged generally poor conditions of 20 confinement at IRDF, including “mold, rust, and peeling paint in showers” and insufficient 21 toiletries for detainees. Pet. ¶¶ 66–69. 22 On March 30, 2021, shortly after filing his third amended petition, Petitioner 23 received his COVID-19 vaccination. Resp., Ex. 38. 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A district court may issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of a person 3 held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 4 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Because a person detained in civil immigration custody is entitled 5 to Fifth Amendment due process rights, he may seek habeas relief to challenge the 6 constitutionality of his confinement. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). A habeas 7 petitioner may only challenge the confinement itself—the validity of the confinement or 8 its duration—and not the conditions of such confinement. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 9 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016). A civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 10 Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than a habeas petition, 11 is the appropriate vehicle to challenge conditions of confinement that violate a detainee’s 12 constitutional rights. Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that 13 civil rights action is vehicle for civil rights violations whereas a habeas petition challenges 14 the “fact or duration” of confinement); Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927 (“a § 1983 action is the 15 exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are not within the core of 16 habeas corpus”). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 The Court first examines whether Petitioner’s habeas petition is the appropriate 19 vehicle to seek relief from confinement conditions that allegedly present a substantial 20 COVID-19 risk. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927 (“Challenges to the validity of any 21 confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; 22 requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 23 action.”). Here, Petitioner alleged that his confinement is unconstitutional because 24 unsanitary IRDF conditions, such as shared communal areas where social distancing is 25 unfeasible, put him at substantial risk of contracting COVID-19. Pet. ¶¶ 9, 11. His 26 grievances regarding the lack of COVID-19 prevention measures do not challenge the 27 validity of his detention or its duration; instead, they challenge the constitutionality of the 28 unsanitary conditions at IRDF that put him at medical risk. Tucker, 925 F.2d at 332. The 1 Court, therefore, concludes that habeas relief is not appropriate for Petitioner’s claims on 2 these grounds. 3 Alternatively, even if habeas relief were appropriate to address these claims, the 4 Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the conditions at IRDF subjected him to 5 a violation of his constitutional rights. Due process imposes a duty on the government “to 6 assume some responsibility for [the] safety and general well-being” of persons it takes into 7 its custody. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 8 (1989) (citation omitted). The government thus violates due process where a government 9 official affirmatively places individuals, with deliberate indifference to their health or 10 safety, in a position of known danger “which he or she would not have otherwise faced.” 11 Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing DeShaney, 489 12 U.S. at 197, 201). A petitioner in custody must show that government officials 13 unreasonably put him at substantial risk of suffering serious harm. See Castro v. Cty. of 14 Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, Petitioner received his COVID- 15 19 vaccination on March 30, 2021. Resp., Ex. 38. Because Petitioner’s vaccination 16 reasonably reduces his COVID-19 risks, Petitioner fails to show that he faces unreasonable 17 and substantial risk of suffering harm due to his confinement conditions and his medical 18 vulnerability as an obese individual. Sanchez-Rivera v. Archambeault, 2022 WL 3648450, 19 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2022) (denying request to release medically vulnerable petitioner 20 on Fifth Amendment due process grounds because his COVID-19 vaccination reasonably 21 reduced the risk of substantial harm).

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