Dominguez-Candelaria v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-1042
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIX DANIEL DOMINGUEZ- No. 25-1042 CANDELARIA, Agency No. A204-619-354 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 11, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, NGUYEN, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Felix Daniel Dominguez-Candelaria petitions for review of a decision by the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of a decision by the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). immigration judge (“IJ”) denying cancellation of removal. Because we lack

jurisdiction, we dismiss the petition.

“To be eligible for cancellation of removal . . . , a noncitizen must meet four

statutory criteria.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 211 (2024); see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1). “An IJ deciding a noncitizen’s request for cancellation of removal

proceeds in two steps. First, the IJ must decide whether the noncitizen is eligible

for cancellation under the relevant statutory criteria. Second, an IJ decides whether

to exercise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen relief in the particular

case.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212–13.

Although we have jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law and fact

arising from the IJ’s application of the statutory criteria to a set of established facts,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 217, the IJ’s exercise of

discretion at the second step is “unreviewable,” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 218; see

also id. at 225 n.4 (“[I]f the IJ decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of

removal at step one, his step-two discretionary determination on whether or not to

grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is not reviewable as a question

of law.”); Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[W]e lack

jurisdiction over purely discretionary determinations, such as the agency’s step-

two determination that it would deny cancellation as a matter of discretion.”).

2 25-1042 Dominguez-Candelaria challenges only “the discretionary determinations of

the [IJ] and . . . the BIA.” Framing his challenge as an issue of law, he argues that

the IJ and BIA “failed to apply the [BIA]’s own precedential standard for assessing

discretionary relief” because they “failed to address two of the most important

discretionary factors in the record.” In particular, he faults the IJ for “fail[ing] to

issue any findings of fact whatsoever regarding the hardship both to . . . himself

and to his lawful permanent resident parents that would result from his removal.”

See C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (including “evidence of hardship

to the [noncitizen] and his family if deportation occurs” among “the factors [the

BIA] ha[s] enunciated as pertinent to the exercise of discretion”).

We can review the agency’s discretionary determination if it “requires

consideration of specific factors,” but not if it “lacks any meaningful standard

against which to judge the . . . decision.” Ruiz v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586, 598–99

(9th Cir. 2025). In C-V-T-, the BIA explained that “there is no inflexible standard

for determining who should be granted discretionary relief, and each case must be

judged on its own merits.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11. Indeed, the BIA “noted both the

undesirability and ‘the difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining any standard in

discretionary matters which may be applied in a stereotyped manner.’” Id. (ellipsis

omitted) (quoting L-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 767, 770 (Att’y Gen. 1949)).

3 25-1042 Because IJs are not required to consider any particular factor in every case,

there is no “meaningful standard” by which we can evaluate a claim that the IJ

failed to consider specific factors. Ruiz, 163 F.4th at 599. Therefore, we lack

jurisdiction to consider Dominguez-Candelaria’s contention that the IJ and BIA

erred in denying cancellation of removal as matter of discretion. See Vilchez v.

Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the court “[did] not have

jurisdiction to review” the IJ’s “determin[ation], in the exercise of his discretion,

that [the noncitizen] did not merit cancellation of removal” notwithstanding

jurisdiction to review the contention “that the agency ‘failed to consider’ certain

[statutory] factors” for cancellation of removal, “such as . . . hardship”).1

PETITION DISMISSED.

1 Because the IJ’s discretionary denial is dispositive, we do not reach Dominguez-Candelaria’s argument that the IJ erred by not making a hardship determination.

4 25-1042