Domingo S. Toledo v. Miriam A. Torres

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedApril 1, 2026
Docket3D2025-0552
StatusPublished

This text of Domingo S. Toledo v. Miriam A. Torres (Domingo S. Toledo v. Miriam A. Torres) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Domingo S. Toledo v. Miriam A. Torres, (Fla. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed April 1, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0552 Lower Tribunal No. 23-457-FC-04 ________________

Domingo S. Toledo, Appellant,

vs.

Miriam A. Torres, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Stacy D. Glick, Judge.

Rafael J. Oropesa, Attorney at Law, P.A., and Rafael J. Oropesa, for appellant.

No appearance, for appellee. 1

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

1 Appellee failed to file an answer brief. MILLER, J.

Appellant, Domingo S. Toledo, challenges an order denying his verified

motion to vacate a default final judgment of dissolution, filed under Florida

Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b). The trial court denied the motion

without an evidentiary hearing on the discrete ground that Toledo had not

first sought relief from the underlying clerical default. Rule 12.540(b)

authorizes the court to grant a party relief from a “final judgment” for several

enumerated reasons, including mistake or misconduct by the adverse party.

See id. (b)(1), (3). And here, Toledo alleged that appellee, Miriam A. Torres,

lulled him into complacency by falsely claiming she had abandoned her

dissolution petition. Indeed, he specifically attested that she told him not to

attend the trial. Under such circumstances, although the underlying default

stands, the merits of the motion to vacate the judgment must be tested in an

evidentiary hearing. See Lazcar Int’l, Inc. v. Caraballo, 957 So. 2d 1191,

1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding “a six-week delay in filing a motion to

vacate a default after receiving notice constitutes a lack of due diligence as

a matter of law”); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Steven Lake Masonry, Inc.,

356 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“[S]wift action must be taken

upon first receiving knowledge of any default.”); see also Sanchez v.

Sanchez, 285 So. 3d 969, 971 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[M]otions filed under

2 rule 12.540(b) are governed by the body of law applicable to rule 1.540(b).”);

In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“A

motion for relief from judgment should not be summarily dismissed without

an evidentiary hearing unless its allegations and accompanying affidavits fail

to allege ‘colorable entitlement’ to relief.” (quoting S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

Welden, 483 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Dynasty Exp. Corp. v.

Weiss, 675 So. 2d 235, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996))). We therefore reverse

and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Reversed and remanded.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Welden
483 So. 2d 487 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1986)
LAZCAR INTERN., INC. v. Caraballo
957 So. 2d 1191 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2007)
In Re Guardianship of Schiavo
800 So. 2d 640 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2001)
Dynasty Express Corp. v. Weiss
675 So. 2d 235 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1996)
Westinghouse Credit v. Steven Lake Masonry
356 So. 2d 1329 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Domingo S. Toledo v. Miriam A. Torres, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/domingo-s-toledo-v-miriam-a-torres-fladistctapp-2026.