Domingo Maturey v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division

Opinion

                                   NUMBER 13-01-155-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                CORPUS CHRISTI

DOMINGO MATUREY,                                                           Appellant,

                                                   v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE - INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, ET AL.,                         Appellees.

                        On appeal from the 156th District Court

                                    of Bee County, Texas.

                                   O P I N I O N

          Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Castillo

                                  Opinion by Justice Castillo

Appellant Domingo Maturey appeals from the trial court order affirming the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) administrative ruling that he participated in a prison riot and assessing damages against his inmate trust account.  In six issues presented, Maturey alleges errors related to the TDCJ-ID administrative hearing and the evidence supporting the decision.  We affirm. 

Factual Background

Maturey is an inmate incarcerated at the TDCJ-ID prison in Beeville.  On December 20, 1999, a prison riot occurred in the administrative segregation area of the McConnell Unit of that prison.  A TDCJ-ID administrative hearing was held on January 11, 2000, and appellant was found to have participated in the December 20th riot.  He was assigned a pro rata share of the responsibility for the property damage caused by the riot and, as a result, $534.97 was assessed against his inmate trust account. 

Maturey exhausted his administrative remedies through the TDCJ-ID grievance system and then petitioned for district court review of the administrative ruling pursuant to government code section 500.002.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 500.002 (d) (Vernon 1998).  TDCJ-ID filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming that Maturey had failed to timely file suit, but that plea was denied by the trial court.  The trial court found that the evidence supported the TDCJ-ID administrative ruling, and entered final judgment against Maturey on December 19, 2000.  This appeal ensued. 

Analysis

In his brief, Maturey presents six points of error.  As presented, they are:

(1) Appellant complains that there is no substaitial [sic] evidence to support agancy [sic] decision.

(2) Appellant was not presant [sic] at disciplinary hearing.

(3) Appellant did not have the opportunity to show witnesses or evidence at the disciplinary hearing.

(4) Cases were given nearly seventeen days later.  When an allegation is brought forth by an officer, officer has seventy-two hours to present [sic] that case to the inmate.

(5) There is no videotapes, pictures to show as evidence, which at a time of a disturbants [sic] is to be a video cammra [sic] at all times.

(6) Appellant=s case has not been fully investigated properly to the fullest. 

Issue numbers four and six relate to alleged errors made during the TDCJ-ID investigation and do not allege any error made by the trial court.  These issues fail to raise arguable points that we may address.  See Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 500.002(d) (Vernon 1998) (district courts are the forum for reviewing administrative hearings); Tex. R. App. P. 25.1 (appellate courts are the forum for review of district court actions).  Therefore, we overrule these issues. 

Issue number two alleges that the appellant was denied the right to be present at the disciplinary hearing.  Issue number three asserts that appellant was not allowed to present witnesses or evidence at the disciplinary hearing.  We construe both of these points as a challenge to the due process afforded to appellant at the disciplinary hearing. 

However, a prisoner has no absolute or guaranteed due process right to appear at a disciplinary hearing.  Covarrubias v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Div., 52 S.W.3d 318, 325-26 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (citing Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1989)).  Where the prisoner is unable to attend the disciplinary hearing, due process requirements are met, and the hearing may be held without him, provided that Aall of the other requirements of due process that are called for under the circumstances@ are met.  Covarrubias, 52 S.W.3d at 325 (quoting Moody, 864 F.2d at 1181). 

In the present case, the Ahearing information@ section contained in the ADisciplinary Report and Hearing Record@ reflects that Maturey was excluded from the hearing due to his disruptive behavior that posed a threat to unit security at the time that the prison staff attempted to escort him to the disciplinary hearing.  The AService Investigation Worksheet@ states that Maturey was appointed a Acounsel substitute@ who represented Maturey in the hearing.  We defer to the determination of the TDCJ-ID that the inmate=s actions posed a security risk and find that, since there is no guaranteed right to appear at a disciplinary hearing and that Maturey was represented by counsel at the hearing, Maturey=s absence at the disciplinary hearing presents no due process violation.  

The only other due process concern alleged by Maturey is contained in issue number three.  In issue three, Maturey states that he was not allowed to call witnesses or present evidence at the disciplinary hearing.   This claim is not supported by the facts in this case.  The APreliminary Investigation Report@ that was presented at the disciplinary hearing contained Maturey=s statement that he did not leave his cell during the riot and closed the door to the cell when it opened.  The AService Investigation Worksheet@ contains a similar statement by Maturey, indicating that he did not participate in the riot and closed his door instead.  The worksheet further indicates that both Maturey=s statement and the testimony of his witness, a fellow prisoner, were considered at the disciplinary hearing, along with the testimony of the charging officer.  Maturey has made no specific claim that there was other evidence that he wished to present demonstrating his lack of culpability for the damage caused.  Further, he was represented by counsel at the hearing who had the opportunity to call additional witnesses on Maturey=s behalf.  We cannot therefore find that there was a due process violation in this case regarding Maturey=s ability to adduce evidence on his own behalf at the prison disciplinary hearing. 

Accordingly, issues number two and three are overruled. 

Issue numbers one and five both allege a failure of the evidence to support the conviction.  We will therefore consider these two issues together.

A TDCJ-ID inmate is liable for damage he intentionally inflicts on state property.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 500.002(a) (Vernon 1998).  If multiple inmates are involved in causing damage, each inmate is jointly and severally liable for the harm.  Id.  The State=s claims for property damage must be adjudicated through an administrative procedure involving a hearing.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 500.002(c) (Vernon 1998).  The funds in an inmate=s trust fund account may be seized to satisfy the inmate=s liability.  Id. 

After exhausting administrative remedies, an inmate may petition for judicial review of the administrative decision finding him liable for property damages.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 500.002(d) (Vernon 1998).  The district court must follow the rules set forth in chapter 2001 of the government code in reviewing the administrative decision.  Id. 

In reviewing a determination made pursuant to a prison disciplinary hearing, the trial court must apply the Asubstantial evidence@ standard of review.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. 2001.174 (Vernon 2000); Covarrubias, 52 S.W.3d at 321.  We apply that same standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.  Covarrubias, 52 S.W.3d at 321.  The substantial evidence standard requires Aonly more than a mere scintilla@ of evidence to support the agency=s determination of liability.  Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex. 2000).  A court applying this standard may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.  Covarrubias, 52 S.W.3d at 321-22 (citing Tex. Health Facilities Comm=n v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984)). 

In this case, it is undisputed that there was an officer present, Sergeant John Esparza, at the scene of the prison riot.  The Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record contains Sergeant Esparza=s eye-witness description of Maturey=s involvement in the property damage, stating that Maturey exited his cell and caused damage to both cell doors and windows during the prison riot.  The Offense Report filed by Sergeant Esparza contains an identical description of Maturey=s involvement in the riot.  The Service Investigation Worksheet states that Sergeant Esparza was present at the disciplinary hearing and verified the accuracy of his prior written statements.  We find that this testimony constituted substantial evidence to support the trial court=s decision.  See Covarrubias, 52 S.W.3d at 322-23 (eye-witness officer=s testimony constituted substantial evidence to support determination of liability).  Additional evidence in the nature of videotape or photographs was not necessary.  Therefore, we overrule appellant=s first and fifth issues. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

ERRLINDA CASTILLO

Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).

Opinion delivered and filed

this 3rd day of July, 2002.