Dole v. Drywall Tapers & Finishers Local Union 1976

733 F. Supp. 864, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4836, 1990 WL 33302
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMarch 22, 1990
DocketCiv. A. No. 88-4599
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 733 F. Supp. 864 (Dole v. Drywall Tapers & Finishers Local Union 1976) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dole v. Drywall Tapers & Finishers Local Union 1976, 733 F. Supp. 864, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4836, 1990 WL 33302 (D.N.J. 1990).

Opinion

OPINION

WOLIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Secretary of Labor’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff contends that no issues of fact exist and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant asserts that factual questions remain concerning the characterization of the May 16, 1988 letter sent by Joe Glaab to the local membership, thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument. The Court finds that there are no issues of fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion will be granted and the Court will void the prior election and mandate that a new election, supervised by the Secretary of Labor, be held.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts in this action are undisputed by the parties. Defendant Drywall Tapers and Finishers Local Union 1976 (“the local”) is a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). The local conducted a manual ballot election of officers on Monday, June 13, 1988, which was subject to the provisions of Title IV of the LMRDA (29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83). One of the offices for which the June 13 election was held included the office of Business Manager. Prior to that election, the incumbent Business Manager was Joseph Glaab and the incumbent North Jersey Business Agent was Vergil D. Jones. Both Glaab and Jones were nominated as candidates for the position of Business Manager at a meeting held on Monday, May 9, 1988. On or about May 16, 1988, Glaab sent a letter to all members of the local which was printed at the expense of the local, was on local stationary bearing the logos of the local and the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (“the international), and was mailed at the local’s expense.1

The election for Business Manager was held on June 13, 1988. Glaab received 190 votes, compared to Jones’ 174, and was reelected Business Manager for a three year term. Jones, the unsuccessful candidate, protested the June 13 election by timely letter of June 15, 1988 addressed to William Duval, General President of the International. Duval acknowledged receipt of Jones’ protest by letter dated June 24, 1988. By letter dated August 3, 1988, Du-val denied Jones’ protest. Thereafter, Jones filed a timely complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor Management Standards dated August 19, 1988 in accordance with § 402(a)(2) of the LMRDA (29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2)). The Department of Labor conducted an investiga[866]*866tion of the election which resulted in the filing of the instant action.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hersch v. Allen Products Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986). In making this determination, a court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983), cert. dismd, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment must be granted if no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party. Id. Moreover, if the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Therefore, even when the moving party’s evidence is merely “colorable” or “not significantly probative,” the Court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment contending that, on the undisputed record, there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant, in Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition, does not dispute any of the aforementioned facts. Defendant only disagrees with plaintiff’s contention that, on those facts, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The only issues in dispute between the parties are the legal characterization of the May 16 letter from Glaab to the membership and whether the letter “may have affected” the outcome of the election.

Whether an expenditure of union funds falls within the purview of the statutory provision forbidding such expenditures to promote the candidacy of any person is a matter of law for the Court to decide. Donovan v. Metropolitan Dist. Council of Carp., 797 F.2d 140, 145 (3d Cir.1986). Both parties agreed at oral argument, and the Court so finds, that the proper standard to be applied by the Court is that an expenditure will violate the statute when “the tone, content and timing of the ... publication[ ] ... effectively encourage[d] and endorse[d] the re-election of [the incumbent].” Id. (citations omitted). Defendant also disputes whether the letter “may have affected” the outcome of the election. The Court is satisfied that a sufficient, undisputed, factual record exists on which the Court can decide these issues as a matter of law.

The parties agree that the May 16 letter was sent by the incumbent Business Manager, Joseph Glaab, to the membership of the local one week after the nominations for the June 13 election had been announced. There is no dispute that the letter was printed at the expense of the local, was on local stationary bearing the logos of the local and the international, and was mailed at the local’s expense. The Court has carefully examined the May 16 letter and reviewed the other submissions of the parties. On the basis of this record, the Court finds that the tone, content and timing of that letter effectively encouraged and endorsed the re-election of Glaab as Business Manager.

The Court finds that the tone and content of the letter reveal a eulogistic composition intended as self-laudatory rhetoric.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hudson v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps.
318 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.C. Circuit, 2018)
Chao v. North Jersey Area Local Postal Workers Union
211 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D. New Jersey, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
733 F. Supp. 864, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4836, 1990 WL 33302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dole-v-drywall-tapers-finishers-local-union-1976-njd-1990.