Dofflemyer v. Brown

Veterans Claims

Dofflemyer v. Brown

4 Vet. App. 339, 1993 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 86, 1993 WL 61344

CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

DecidedMarch 9, 1993

DocketNo. 90-1078

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 4 Vet. App. 339 (Dofflemyer v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dofflemyer v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 339, 1993 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 86, 1993 WL 61344 (Cal. 1993).

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Opinion

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

On February 12, 1993, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Agreement to Settle Appellant’s Claims for Reasonable Attorney Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Attached to the motion was a settlement agreement executed by the parties which indicated that they have agreed upon an “amicable resolution” of appellant’s request for reasonable attorneys fees under the EAJA. The motion was accompanied by a supporting memorandum to the effect that the statutory authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to conduct litigation in this Court carries with it the authority to compromise and settle such litigation.

The parties are commended for their efforts and for achieving a settlement, which always is preferable to protracted litigation and the expenditure of judicial resources. The agreement of the parties effectively serves to render moot the only issue remaining before the Court. Therefore, the Court will deem the Joint Motion to be one for dismissal and will grant the motion. “When there is no case or controversy, or when a once live case or controversy becomes moot, the Court lacks jurisdiction.” Bond v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 376, 377 (1992).

Accordingly, the Clerk shall enter a voluntary dismissal pursuant to . Rule 42 of this Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.

It is so Ordered.

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ORDER

PER CURIAM.

On February 12, 1993, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Agreement to Settle Appellant’s Claims for Reasonable Attorney Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Attached to the motion was a settlement agreement executed by the parties which indicated that they have agreed upon an “amicable resolution” of appellant’s request for reasonable attorneys fees under the EAJA. The motion was accompanied by a supporting memorandum to the effect that the statutory authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to conduct litigation in this Court carries with it the authority to compromise and settle such litigation.

The parties are commended for their efforts and for achieving a settlement, which always is preferable to protracted litigation and the expenditure of judicial resources. The agreement of the parties effectively serves to render moot the only issue remaining before the Court. Therefore, the Court will deem the Joint Motion to be one for dismissal and will grant the motion. “When there is no case or controversy, or when a once live case or controversy becomes moot, the Court lacks jurisdiction.” Bond v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 376, 377 (1992).

Accordingly, the Clerk shall enter a voluntary dismissal pursuant to . Rule 42 of this Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.

It is so Ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

4 Vet. App. 339, 1993 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 86, 1993 WL 61344, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dofflemyer-v-brown-cavc-1993.

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