Doepel v. Jones

Supreme Court

Doepel v. Jones

244 U.S. 305, 37 S. Ct. 645, 61 L. Ed. 1158, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1637

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedJune 4, 1917

DocketNo. 571

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 244 U.S. 305 (Doepel v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Doepel v. Jones, 244 U.S. 305, 37 S. Ct. 645, 61 L. Ed. 1158, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1637 (1917).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice White,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

It' cannot be seriously disputed that if the agreement was made by Fearnow, the original applicant, that he [309]*309would make the homestead entry not for himself but for the benefit of another, would during the time that he was apparently taking the steps to complete the entry pay rent for the land to such other person and when the patent was issued deed the land to such person, such agreement caused that entry to be absolutely void for repugnancy to § 24 of the Act of Congress of May 2, 1890, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81. But as it was expressly stipulated that the facts as to such agreement were true, it must follow necessarily that the entryman derived no right from his entry and transmitted none to his heirs and vested them with no right after his death to complete that which was not susceptible of being completed.

Moreover as it is not disputable that the Land Department in its final ruling against.the contestants placed its action upon the prior cancellation of the homestead entry because of the particular agreement referred to which was the basis of the Barnes contest, it must necessarily result that there is an absence of the essential foundation upon which alone the asserted rights of the plaintiffs in error could possibly rest. But putting this latter view aside, we are of opinion that the court below was clearly right in holding that as the facts were admitted which absolutely destroyed the effect of the original Fearnow homestead entry and therefore caused it to be impossible for that entry to be the generating source of rights in favor of the plaintiffs in error, no .equitable rights arose in their favor growing out of the cancellation of that entry and the'issue of the patent to the defendant in error. It seems superfluous to reason to demonstrate that no equitable right to hold the patentee as a trustee could possibly arise in favor of the plaintiffs in error, since the application to enter upon which they rely was in legal contemplation nonexistent and hence could afford no basis for equitable rights of any character.

Affirmed.

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Mr. Chief Justice White,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

It' cannot be seriously disputed that if the agreement was made by Fearnow, the original applicant, that he [309]*309would make the homestead entry not for himself but for the benefit of another, would during the time that he was apparently taking the steps to complete the entry pay rent for the land to such other person and when the patent was issued deed the land to such person, such agreement caused that entry to be absolutely void for repugnancy to § 24 of the Act of Congress of May 2, 1890, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81. But as it was expressly stipulated that the facts as to such agreement were true, it must follow necessarily that the entryman derived no right from his entry and transmitted none to his heirs and vested them with no right after his death to complete that which was not susceptible of being completed.

Moreover as it is not disputable that the Land Department in its final ruling against.the contestants placed its action upon the prior cancellation of the homestead entry because of the particular agreement referred to which was the basis of the Barnes contest, it must necessarily result that there is an absence of the essential foundation upon which alone the asserted rights of the plaintiffs in error could possibly rest. But putting this latter view aside, we are of opinion that the court below was clearly right in holding that as the facts were admitted which absolutely destroyed the effect of the original Fearnow homestead entry and therefore caused it to be impossible for that entry to be the generating source of rights in favor of the plaintiffs in error, no .equitable rights arose in their favor growing out of the cancellation of that entry and the'issue of the patent to the defendant in error. It seems superfluous to reason to demonstrate that no equitable right to hold the patentee as a trustee could possibly arise in favor of the plaintiffs in error, since the application to enter upon which they rely was in legal contemplation nonexistent and hence could afford no basis for equitable rights of any character.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

244 U.S. 305, 37 S. Ct. 645, 61 L. Ed. 1158, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doepel-v-jones-scotus-1917.

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