Doell v. Myers

984 P.2d 266, 328 Or. 635, 1999 Ore. LEXIS 272
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJune 11, 1999
DocketSC S46311; SC S46311, S46312
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 984 P.2d 266 (Doell v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doell v. Myers, 984 P.2d 266, 328 Or. 635, 1999 Ore. LEXIS 272 (Or. 1999).

Opinion

*637 LEESON, J.

In these consolidated ballot title review proceedings, petitioner Lawler, a chief sponsor of a proposed initiative measure, and petitioner Doell, an elector, seek review of a ballot title certified by the Attorney General for that proposed measure. Because both petitioners submitted timely written comments on the draft ballot title as provided by ORS 250.067(1), they are entitled to seek this court’s review of the certified ballot title. ORS 250.085(2). Our task is to determine whether the Attorney General’s certified ballot title complies substantially with the statutory requirements. See ORS 250.035(2) (prescribing content of ballot title for statewide measure); ORS 250.085(5) (prescribing standard of review). We conclude that the caption and result statements substantially comply with the statutory requirements but that the summary is insufficient. Accordingly, we modify the summary and certify the ballot title as modified.

In 1994, the voters approved Ballot Measure 11, codified at ORS 137.700 to 137.707. Those statutes impose mandatory minimum sentences for 21 different felony offenses committed by persons 15 years of age or older. The proposed initiative measure at issue here would repeal Measure 11. The proposed initiative measure provides:

“Section 1: This Act shall be known as the ‘Judicial Discretion Act of 2000.’
“Section 2: ORS 135.240(4) and (5), 137.700, 137.705, 137.707,137.712,138.222(4)(c) and 419C.067 are repealed.
“Section 3: (a) Any person sentenced under any repealed provision of law listed in Section 2 above, shall be resentenced by the Court of conviction in accordance with the Oregon Revised Statutes and the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission that were in effect on March 31,1995, unless the person requests not to be resentenced. The Court shall hold the resentencing hearing as soon as practicable after the effective date of this Act, but not later than 90 days, with priority given to those persons who have been incarcerated the longest pursuant to any repealed statute. Any person resentenced under this subsection shall receive credit for any time served.
*638 “(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person sentenced under any repealed provision of law listed in Section 2 above, who would have otherwise been within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and who did not receive a waiver hearing shall be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, unless waived to a circuit, justice or municipal court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 419C.340 et seq., and unless the person requests not to be resentenced.
“(c) Any person charged or convicted of an offense, the sentence for which is dictated by any repealed provision of law listed in Section 2 above, who has not been sentenced as of the effective date of this Act, shall be sentenced in accordance with the Oregon Revised Statutes and the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission that were in effect on March 31,1995. Any such person who would have otherwise been within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but for a repealed provision of law listed in Section 2 above, shall be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, unless waived to a circuit, justice or municipal court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 419C.340 et seq.
“Section 4: Notwithstanding the repeal of [ORS] 137.707, any person who was entitled to a hearing pursuant to [ORS] 420A.200 et seq. ‘second look’ shall retain the right to such a hearing.”

The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for the proposed initiative measure:

“REPEALS MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN FELONIES, REQUIRES RESENTENCING
“RESULT OF YES’ VOTE: Yes’ vote repeals mandatory minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies, requires resentencing.
“RESULT OF ‘NO’ VOTE: ‘No’ vote retains mandatory minimum sentences for certain violent and other felonies, maintains existing sentences.
“SUMMARY: Laws approved in 1994 as ‘Measure 11’ require minimum sentences for certain violent felonies, conspiracy and attempt to commit certain felonies, committed after April 1, 1995. With limited exceptions, statutes require persons convicted serve full minimum sentence, with no reduction for post-prison supervision, temporary leave. Statutes require persons charged with specified *639 crimes aged 15 to 17 when crime committed be prosecuted as adults. Measure repeals these statutes, requires persons sentenced under them be resentenced under existing sentencing guidelines which provide possibility of shorter sentences.”

Petitioners’ challenges require us to examine all three parts of the Attorney General’s ballot title — the caption, the “yes” and “no” result statements, and the summary.

CAPTION

The caption reasonably must identify the subject matter of the proposed initiative measure in not more than 10 words, ORS 250.035(2)(a), and it must not give “undue attention to one aspect of the proposed measure at the expense of a full description of the general subject of the measure.” Phillips v. Myers, 325 Or 221, 226, 936 P2d 964 (1997). If a proposed initiative measure contains more than one subject, all should be reflected in the caption if possible. See Witt v. Kulongoski, 319 Or 7, 10 n 3, 872 P2d 14 (1994) (so stating).

Petitioner Doell contends that the Attorney General’s caption fails to comply substantially with ORS 250.035(2)(a) because it “does not accurately inform the voters that the chief thrust of this measure is to ehminate mandatory minimum sentences for violent offenders.” (Emphasis in original.) We reject petitioner Doell’s argument for two reasons.

First, the text of the proposed initiative measure makes clear that it has two subjects: eliminating statutory mandatory minimum sentences for specified crimes and

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Related

Earls v. Myers
999 P.2d 1134 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2000)
Dirks v. Myers
993 P.2d 808 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2000)
Garst v. Myers
992 P.2d 451 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1999)
Novick v. Myers
986 P.2d 1 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
984 P.2d 266, 328 Or. 635, 1999 Ore. LEXIS 272, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doell-v-myers-or-1999.