Doe v. Washoe County School District

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-945
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 13 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANE DOE, as Guardian of J. Doe, a minor No. 24-945 and in her individual capacity, D.C. No. 3:23-cv-00129-ART-CLB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, its Board of Trustees,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

SUSAN ENFELD, WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Anne R. Traum, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 3, 2024 San Francisco, California

Before: BENNETT, BRESS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Plaintiff Jane Doe appeals the district court’s dismissal of her and her minor

son’s claims against Washoe County School District (the District) for lack of Article

III standing. Doe argues that the District retaliated against her son, who is a District

student, after she investigated the District’s policies related to transgender and

gender non-conforming students, established in Administrative Regulation 5161

(AR 5161). She seeks to invalidate AR 5161. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) de novo. Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d

1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007).

1. Standing. Doe argues that the alleged retaliation against her son

establishes Article III standing. The elements of Article III standing are (1) the

plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) a “causal connection between the injury and

the conduct complained of,” and (3) a likelihood, “as opposed to merely

speculat[ion], that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Doe asserts that her son suffered an injury in fact when the District

selectively disciplined her son following her inquiry into AR 5161.1 Even assuming

1 The District argues that Doe forfeited any arguments related to retaliation by failing to assert a retaliation claim below. We conclude that the plaintiff sufficiently Doe plausibly alleged such injury, she did not allege a causal connection between

the retaliation and AR 5161. Additionally, Doe does not explain how the retaliation

would be redressed by invalidating AR 5161. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal for lack of standing.

2. Leave to Amend. Doe challenges the district court’s dismissal without

granting leave to amend. “Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is

clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any

amendment.” Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061

(9th Cir. 2004)). However, a “district court does not err in denying leave to amend

where the amendment would be futile”—that is, where “no set of facts can be proved

under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient

claim or defense.” Id. at 656 (citations omitted).

Doe has not alleged any facts linking AR 5161 to the alleged retaliation or any

other concrete injury. Nor was she able to identify any allegations that would cure

the jurisdictional defects if she was granted leave to amend. Thus, we conclude that

amendment would be futile.

AFFIRMED.

presented this theory of standing below, including because the district court passed on it.