Doe v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services
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Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 25-3481
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jane Doe is a foreign national who works as a university instructor. See ECF
No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 5. In this suit, she seeks adjudication and approval of her Form I-765,
Application for Employment Authorization, or, alternatively, review of her Form I-485,
Application to Adjust Status. Id., ¶ 4. Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ decision to deny her
employment authorization, which was based on the denial of her I-485. Id., ¶ 3. Because this
litigation contains “highly sensitive and personal information,” and because Plaintiff fears that
public disclosure of her immigration status would expose that status to her employer and could
result in termination or other adverse employment action, damage her professional relationships,
and diminish her future career opportunities, she has moved to proceed under a pseudonym. See
ECF Nos. 2 (Mot.); 2-1 (Mem. in Support of Mot.) at 1–3. The Court will grant the Motion,
subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is
randomly assigned. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall “hear and
determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”); id. 5.1(h)(1) (“Absent statutory
authority, no case or document may be sealed without an order from the Court.”).
1 I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR
5.1(c)(1). This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to
proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need
for such secrecy[] and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to
proceed in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result,
the court must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing
interests in full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting
In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).
2 II. Analysis
At this stage, Plaintiff has succeeded in showing that her privacy concerns outweigh the
public’s presumptive and substantial interest in learning her identity. The Court will address
each of the five factors in turn.
The first and second factors, taken together, support granting the Motion. Plaintiff does
not seek to proceed under a pseudonym “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may
attend any litigation,” but to “preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal
nature” and “avoid retaliatory physical or mental harm.” Id. at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case,
931 F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). In particular, she argues that public identification would:
“(a) expose her immigration status to her employer, (b) create a substantial risk of termination or
other adverse employment action, (c) damage professional relationships, and (d) diminish future
employment opportunities.” Mem. in Support of Mot. at 2. The Court is persuaded that such
risks — including employer scrutiny, potential termination, and damage to professional
relationships and career prospects — are “concrete, imminent, and directly tied to her identity.”
Id. Plaintiff avers in an attached declaration that her employer “faces potential reputational and
legal risks from public association with immigration-related litigation, creating additional
concrete harm from disclosure that extends beyond [her] personal circumstances.” ECF No. 2-2
(Decl. of Jane Doe), ¶ 5. The Court finds that this employer-related risk heightens the likelihood
of adverse employment action against Plaintiff.
As Plaintiff concedes, however, the third factor — “the ages of the persons whose privacy
interests are sought to be protected,” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 97) — weighs against pseudonymity because she is an adult. See Mem. in
Support of Mot. at 3.
3 The fourth factor weighs in favor of pseudonymity. Plaintiff is suing a government
defendant and seeking individualized relief. In such cases, courts have generally favored
pseudonymity. See, e.g., Doe v. Blinken, No. 24-1629, ECF No. 3 (Mem. Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. June
11, 2024) (“When a plaintiff requests individualized relief against a government defendant — as
here, where Doe challenges a yearlong delay in adjudicating his SIV application — the fourth
factor favors pseudonymity.”) (citation omitted); see also Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. State, No.
24-3385, ECF No. 8 (Mem. Op) at 5–6 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024) (fourth factor favors
pseudonymity where plaintiffs sought review of individual benefit denials); J.W. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A]nonymous litigation is more acceptable
when the defendant is a governmental body because government defendants do not share the
concerns about reputation that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with
wrongdoing.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Doe v. ICE, No. 24-617, ECF No. 9
(Mem. Op.) at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (factor supported pseudonymity where “[p]laintiff
allege[d] deficiencies in ICE’s compliance with FOIA solely with respect to his individual
request”).
The fifth factor counsels in favor of pseudonymity because the Government would suffer
no “risk of unfairness” if the Motion were granted. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 327 (quoting
In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97). Plaintiff has already revealed her identity under seal. See
Decl. of Jane Doe, ¶ 2. In such circumstances, this factor tilts against disclosure. See In re
Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 n.1 (explaining that this factor is “not implicated” where defendant
knows plaintiff’s identity); Doe v. ICE, No. 24-617, Mem. Op. at 5 (fifth factor supports motion
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