Doe v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 30, 2025
Docket23-271
StatusUnpublished

This text of Doe v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Doe v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE, No. 23-271 Agency No. Securities and Petitioner, Exchange Commission v. MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: BEA and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.**

John Doe petitions for review of an order of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (“SEC”) denying his claim for a whistleblower award under Section

21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We have jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. § 78u-6(f), and we deny the petition.

Because whistleblower award determinations are made “in the discretion of

the [SEC],” id., we may set aside the SEC’s determination only if “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or

“unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (2)(E); see

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(f). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ponce v. SEC,

345 F.3d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

The record supports the SEC’s determination that Doe was not entitled to a

whistleblower award because Doe did not provide information to the SEC “that led

to the successful enforcement” of a covered action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b); see

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (defining information that satisfies the “led to”

requirement). The success of the civil action was neither “based in whole or in

part” on Doe’s information, nor did Doe’s information “significantly contribute[]

to the success” of the civil action.

To the extent Doe challenges the sufficiency of the administrative record,

that challenge also fails. Doe has not identified any additional documents or facts

that he believes should be in the evidentiary record. Nor are we aware of any legal

authority requiring the SEC to corroborate a declaration of its lead attorney on the

SEC’s investigation. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the sufficiency of

2 23-271 the administrative record.

Because Doe’s information does not satisfy the “led to” requirement, we

need not address Doe’s other arguments regarding his whistleblower award

application.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 23-271

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Related

Russell Ponce v. Securities & Exchange Commission
345 F.3d 722 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
Doe v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-united-states-securities-and-exchange-commission-ca9-2025.