Doe v. United States Department of State

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-1270
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AFAF H. DOE, et al.,

Plaintiffs. v. Civil Action No. 26-1270

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are 49 U.S. visa applicants. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 5. Their applications

were suspended under a January 2026 State Department policy that indefinitely pauses visa

issuances for nationals of 75 countries. Id., ¶¶ 1, 80–81. The Department presents the policy as

part of an ongoing review of visa-vetting procedures, asserting that nationals of the designated

countries “are at a high risk for becoming a public charge,” ECF No. 1-1 (State Dep’t Cable) at

3, and are therefore inadmissible under 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4). Compl., ¶ 4. Plaintiffs contend

that this policy violates the Immigration and Nationality Act by authorizing categorical visa

denials based solely on applicant nationality. Id., ¶¶ 5–7, 9, 78–79, 84.

They seek adjudication of their individual applications, id. at 22; ECF No. 9 (Rev. Mot.)

at ECF p. 6, as well as declarations that the policy is ultra vires and violates the Administrative

Procedure Act, vacatur of the policy, and an injunction barring its enforcement. See Compl. at

22. Plaintiffs concurrently filed a Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym. See ECF No. 7 (Mot.);

ECF No. 7-1 (Mem.). This Court denied that Motion without prejudice for insufficient

evidentiary support. See Minute Order of 4/16/2026. Plaintiffs now renew their request. See

1 Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 1. One Plaintiff establishes sufficient grounds for pseudonymity; the others

do not. The Court will therefore grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Legal Standard

Generally, plaintiffs filing a civil action must identify the parties and file on the public

docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR 5.1(c)(1). This identification requirement reflects the

“presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general

public interest in the openness of governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the

tradition of open judicial proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

A party moving to proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both

demonstrating a concrete need for such secrecy[] and identifying the consequences that would

likely befall it if forced to proceed in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C.

Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity

against countervailing interests in full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven”

balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-

exhaustive factors”:

(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature;

(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.

Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).

2 II. Analysis

At this stage, one Plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating that her privacy and safety

interests outweigh the public’s presumptive and substantial interest in learning her identity. The

remaining Plaintiffs fall short.

Jamaican Plaintiff Michelle Doe (“M. Doe”) states that disclosure could enable her

physically abusive ex-spouse to locate her and her children. See ECF No. 9-1 (Client Quest.) at

6; Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 3; Compl., ¶ 44. Plaintiff Anastasiia Doe (“A. Doe”), a Russian national

residing in Russia, alleges a risk of retaliation stemming from her documented U.S. ties. See

Client Quest. at 2; Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 3. The remaining Plaintiffs, who hail from various

countries, generally invoke emotional, reputational, employment, and pecuniary risks. See

Client Quest. at 1, 3–5, 7–12.

A. Factor 1

The first factor favors pseudonymity for M. Doe and A. Doe, but not for the other

Plaintiffs. This Court has credited concrete safety threats as concerns that exceed “the

annoyance and criticism that may attend litigation” and implicate “matter[s] of [a] sensitive and

personal nature.” Sponsor v. Mayorkas, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023)

(quoting In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326) (finding first factor supported where “[p]laintiff

identifie[d] many threats he . . . already received”); see, e.g., R.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

No. 23-2606, ECF No. 4 (Mem. Op.) at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2023) (descriptions of “severe

violence and threats” favor pseudonymity). Here, M. Doe alleges that her ex-spouse has a

history of physical violence and “will use any information . . . to try to track [her] down.” Client

Quest. at 6. Her family thus does not publicly release “anything personal about [them]selves.”

Id. Because M. Doe has plausibly alleged a risk of physical harm to herself and her children, the

3 first factor favors her pseudonymity. To be sure, she does not attach an affidavit supporting her

claims. Sponsor, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2 (referencing affidavits in support of motion).

“Discovery may [therefore] render [her] concerns unsupported and unwarranted.” Doe v.

Federal Republic of Germany, 680 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2023). At this early stage, however,

the Court finds the claims sufficient to establish that disclosure would pose a risk of harm.

A. Doe presents a closer call. As a Russian national residing in Russia, Client Quest. at 2,

she fears that disclosure could expose her to “adverse consequences,” Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 3,

since “Russians with documented U.S. family ties are routinely targeted.” Client Quest. at 2.

Her claims are thinly supported. Id. at 2 (citing “risks” without specificity). Still, this Court has

recognized the sensitivity of disclosing information that could expose foreign nationals to

retaliation in their home countries. See, e.g., Chang v. Republic of South Sudan, 548 F. Supp. 3d

34, 38 (D.D.C. 2021); cf Asylumworks v. Wolf, 2020 WL 13460835, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,

2020) (crediting “risk of retaliatory harm,” albeit in analysis of second factor). Given her

residence and alleged vulnerability in Russia, factor one slightly favors pseudonymity for A.

Doe.

The remaining Plaintiffs assert emotional, reputational, professional, pecuniary, and

broad safety harms. See Client Quest. at 1, 3–5, 7–12. Their contentions are generally

attenuated and prospective. See, e.g., id. at 1 (asserting that disclosure would induce “emotional

distress” or cause their family to be “targeted due to their race, ethnicity, and assumptions [by

others]”); id. at 3 (maintaining risks of “unwanted scrutiny,” “financial harassment,” and “scams,

extortion, or social/political suspicion” that attend U.S. immigration ties in Plaintiff’s home

country); id. at 8 (asserting risks of “harm, harassment, or retaliation,” including “social scrutiny,

jealousy, or targeting for financial exploitation” if Plaintiff were “identif[ied] as someone with

4 active U.S. immigration involvement); id. at 9 (similar). Most are framed as harms that “could”

be triggered by disclosure, rather than consequences established with any degree of certainty. Id.

at 3–5, 7–12. Indeed, several Plaintiffs characterize their interests as “preventative” or expressly

disclaim prior threats or harassment. Id. at 9–12.

While these risks are no doubt concerning for Plaintiffs, they are insufficient to support

the first factor. This Court has held that “speculative and unsubstantiated claims of harm to

[plaintiffs’] reputational or economic interests are insufficient to justify proceeding

anonymously.” John Doe Co. No. 1 v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 195 F. Supp. 3d 9, 22

(D.D.C. 2016) (quotation marks omitted); see also Bird v. Barr, 2019 WL 2870234, at *5

(D.D.C. July 3, 2019) (rejecting one plaintiff’s claims for being “too speculative” compared to

another plaintiff’s evidence of “prior experience”). Where this Court has found the first factor to

support pseudonymity, plaintiffs have alleged particularized threats, specific instances of

violence, or documented retaliation. See, e.g., Molina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-

3417, ECF No. 13 (Mem. Op.) at 1, 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2025) (crediting fears of “physical harm

and harassment” where plaintiffs had previously been arrested and had invoked “high-profile

immigration cases where other litigants . . . faced similar abuse”); Doe v. Blinken, No. 23-2997,

ECF No. 3 (Mem. Op.) at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2023) (citing news coverage of Taliban murdering

“Afghan nationals like [p]laintiff” and threats that plaintiff “already received”) (emphasis

added); Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 23-2606, Mem. Op. at 3 (detailing “severe violence and

threats . . . [plaintiffs] . . . already faced,” such as being ‘taken hostage’ and ‘subjected to various

forms of torture’”). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs assert predictive concerns with thin evidence.

Plaintiffs’ employment-related allegations fail for the same reason. See Client Quest. at 2

(“Public identification would expose my spouse’s . . . employment . . . .”); id. at 5 (“[Disclosure]

5 could negatively affect my family’s employment . . . .”); id. at 9 (“[Disclosure] could lead to

misunderstanding, judgment, or reputational harm among colleagues [and] future

employers . . . .”). Alleged employment ramifications may support pseudonymity when

buttressed by sufficient evidence. Doe v. Lieberman, 2020 WL 13260569, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 5,

2020). But conclusory assertions do not suffice. Contrast Bird, 2019 WL 2870234, at *5 (giving

weight to plaintiffs’ declarations detailing how disclosure could jeopardize their careers), and

Doe v. Benoit, 2019 WL 13079193, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2019) (finding pseudonymity

“justified” where plaintiff adduced “sufficient detail” regarding potential professional harms),

with Thomas v. Power, No. 23-2637, ECF No. 4 (Mem. Op.) at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2023)

(finding first factor unsatisfied where plaintiff “neither describe[d] nor substantiate[d] how

disclosing her identity would in fact harm her professional prospects or reputation”).

To be sure, “courts have varied in how much detail they require” for the first factor. John

Doe Corp. v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 2025 WL 304795, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2025).

“[A]t one end of the spectrum are completely conclusory allegations, which must be

rejected. . . . At the other end are detailed declarations supported by the prior experiences of the

plaintiffs or others.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall on the conclusory end of the spectrum

and thus do not clear the hurdle.

B. Factors 2-5

Factor two tracks the first factor but focuses narrowly on physical and mental harms. In

re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 (supporting pseudonymity where either plaintiff or “innocent

non-parties” would face “risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm”) (quoted source omitted).

M. Doe alleges a demonstrable threat of physical harm to herself and her children. See Client

Quest. at 6. This satisfies the second factor. The remaining Plaintiffs do not allege physical

6 harm. Id. at 8, 10 (disclaiming physical harm); id. at 1–5, 7, 9, 11–12 (omitting reference to

physical harm or generally alleging safety risks). Turning to mental harm, many Plaintiffs allege

potential emotional consequences, stress, or anxiety that would result from proceeding under

their true names. Id. at 1, 3–4, 7–12. But these claims lack detail and evidence. This Court has

previously found mental harm sufficient to support pseudonymity where plaintiffs demonstrated

concrete psychological effects directly linked to disclosure. See, e.g., Emp. #1 v. Dep’t of

Behav. Health, 694 F. Supp. 3d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2023) (“Plaintiff explains that he has already

faced ‘cyber-bullying,’” and its attendant mental harm because defendants had “publish[ed] a

report” tying plaintiff to crime); Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Were the Court

to force the plaintiff to reveal her identity, [it] would risk undermining the psychological

treatment [she] has already undergone” following alleged harm by defendant). Plaintiffs offer no

such evidence here. See, e.g., Client Quest. at 4 (“[Disclosure] would . . . create anxiety and

emotional distress for my family.”). The second factor thus fails for all but M. Doe.

The third factor cuts in the other direction. Pseudonymity is favored where disclosure

could implicate the privacy interests or safety of minors. Blinken, No. 23-2997, Mem. Op. at 4.

Several Plaintiffs specifically reference minor children whose privacy interests could be

implicated by disclosure. See Client Quest. at 1, 5, 10. M. Doe has children, though the record

does not expressly indicate whether they are minors, and another Plaintiff has “nieces and

nephews” in his home country. Id. at 3, 6. If they are minors, this too supports the third factor.

The fourth factor, however, disfavors pseudonymity for all Plaintiffs. “[T]here is a

heightened public interest when an individual or entity files a suit against the government[,]”

particularly in a manner that may “alter the operation of public law both as applied to it and, by

virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward.” In re Sealed Case, 971

7 F.3d at 329. Although Plaintiffs “seek consular adjudication of their individual visa

applications,” Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 6, they also pursue programmatic relief. See Compl. at 22.

They specifically request declarations “that the State Department’s policy . . . exceeds the

authority granted by the INA . . . [and] violate[s] the APA”; vacatur of the policy; a permanent

injunction barring enforcement of the policy; and “a declaratory judgment stating that the

immigrant visa pause is unauthorized and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United

States.” Id. This case therefore implicates a “heightened public interest,” the touchstone of

factor four. Sponsor, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2 (quotation marks omitted); see also Alpha v.

Mayorkas, No. 23-1438, ECF No. 3 (Mem. Op.) at 4 (D.D.C. May 23, 2023).

The fifth and final factor moves the needle toward nondisclosure. A plaintiff

volunteering to disclose her identity mitigates much of the potential “risk of unfairness” to the

defendant. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 23-2606, Mem. Op. at 5 (concluding that plaintiffs’

offer to “disclose [their identities] under seal” satisfied fifth factor) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, “Plaintiffs are willing to disclose their identities . . . to Defendants and the Court under

seal . . . .” Rev. Mot. at ECF p. 7.

In sum, a majority of the five factors support pseudonymity for M. Doe, and the Court

finds that the concrete nature of the risk she faces from disclosure counsels in favor of permitting

her to proceed pseudonymously. The other Plaintiffs stand on less firm ground, with only one or

two factors supporting pseudonymity for each. Although A. Doe has made out a possible threat

of retaliation in Russia, it does not outweigh the heightened public interest implicated here. Nor

do the minor privacy interests raised by several remaining Plaintiffs overcome the default

presumption of openness in litigation.

8 III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Motion as to M. Doe and deny it as to

all other Plaintiffs.

The Court accordingly ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs’ [9] Revised Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym is GRANTED as to M.

Doe, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom

this case is randomly assigned;

2. M. Doe shall use the pseudonym listed in the Complaint in all documents filed in this

action;

3. Plaintiffs’ [9] Revised Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym is DENIED as to all

other Plaintiffs;

4. Within fourteen days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a Notice advising the Clerk of

the Court whether they wish to proceed with filing their Complaint on the public

docket using the pseudonym for M. Doe and real names for all other Plaintiffs. If so,

they shall also file their [9] Revised Motion on the public docket as an exhibit to the

Notice;

5. If Plaintiffs do not file such Notice within fourteen days, the Clerk is directed to

terminate the case.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: May 27, 2026