Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: November 22, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-03310
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4

5 6 JANE DOE, Case No.19-cv-03310-JSC 7 Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 9 UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 19, 20 10

Defendants. 11

12 Jane Doe brings tort claims against Uber after she was assaulted by a former Uber driver 13 posing as a current Uber driver. Uber and its wholly owned subsidiaries Rasier, LLC and Rasier 14 CA, LLC (collectively “Uber”) move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(6).1 (Dkt. No. 13.) After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing and having 16 had the benefit of oral argument, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to 17 amend. While Plaintiff has plausibly alleged ostensible agency, she has not plausibly alleged that 18 the assailant was acting within the scope of his ostensible agency when he assaulted Plaintiff. Nor 19 has she plausibly alleged that she had a common carrier/passenger relationship with Uber in 20 connection with the assault. 21 BACKGROUND 22 A. Complaint Allegations 23 On August 14, 2018, Jane Doe asked her boyfriend to call an Uber for her as Doe’s phone 24 had low battery. (Complaint at ¶ 49.) Doe’s boyfriend was not with her, so she did not know 25 which driver Uber had assigned to pick her up. (Id.) The car that approached Doe had an Uber 26 27 1 decal on the car’s windshield. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Doe got into the car because she saw the Uber decal 2 and “she believed, perhaps mistakenly, that the driver said her boyfriend’s name when she 3 approached the car.” (Id.) After she entered the vehicle, the driver activated the child-proof locks 4 on the car’s doors, drove to a remote location, and raped and partially strangled Jane Doe. (Id. at ¶ 5 46.) The assailant then began to drive to another location, but Doe escaped and was rescued by a 6 passing motorist. (Id.) 7 Months before Doe’s assault, Uber had learned that the assailant, while an authorized Uber 8 driver, had behaved disturbingly while giving another woman a ride in an Uber. (Id. at ¶ 52.) 9 Upon investigation, the assailant told Uber that he had driven the passenger off her route, flirted 10 with her, and taken her to a horse stable. (Id.) Uber suspended the assailant’s access to the Uber 11 app, thus taking away his ability to sign on and pick up riders as an Uber driver. (Id. at ¶ 53.) 12 However, Uber did not attempt to retrieve the Uber decal that Jane Doe recognized the day she 13 entered the assailant’s car. (Id.) 14 The assailant is currently facing criminal charges that could result in a life sentence. (Id. at 15 ¶ 47.) 16 B. Procedural Background 17 Jane Doe is Plaintiff’s pseudonym. Her complaint pleads two claims for relief: (1) assault, 18 battery, and false imprisonment by ostensible agent, and (2) negligence. Plaintiff filed these state 19 law claims in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff is a 20 citizen of Mexico and alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 6.) 21 Defendants Uber, Rasier, LLC and Rasier CA, LLC filed the underlying Motion to 22 Dismiss on July 24, 2019 based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 13.) The motion is fully briefed and came before the 24 Court for a hearing on September 26, 2019. (Dkt. No. 13, 19, 20.) 25 DISCUSSION 26 Plaintiff contends that Uber is liable based on two theories of liability: first, Uber is 27 vicariously liable for Jane Doe’s assault, battery, and false imprisonment by its ostensible agent, 1 A. The Assault, Battery, and False Imprisonment Claim 2 Plaintiff’s first claim for relief seeks to hold Uber vicariously liable for her assailant’s 3 assault based on ostensible agency. Uber contends that the claim fails because Plaintiff has not 4 alleged facts that plausibly support a finding that the assailant was Uber’s ostensible agent and, 5 even if so, the assailant was acting outside the scope of such agency as a matter of law. 6 1. Ostensible Agency 7 Ostensible agency occurs “when the principal intentionally, or by want of care, causes a 8 third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him.” Cal. Civ. Code 9 § 2300. The principal (Uber) is liable in tort for the acts of ostensible agent (the assailant) when 10 (1) the principal intentionally or carelessly creates the impression that an individual is the 11 principal’s agent; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believes that the individual is the principal’s agent; 12 and (3) the plaintiff is harmed because of her reasonable reliance on such belief. Whitlow v. 13 Rideout Mem’l Hosp., 237 Cal.App.4th 631, 636 (2015). 14 i. Principal Intentionally or Carelessly Creates Impression of Agency 15 The first element of ostensible agency requires the principal to intentionally or negligently 16 allow others to believe the agent has authority. Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, 17 Inc., 59 Cal.App.4th 741, 747 (1997). However, “[o]stensible agency cannot be established by the 18 representations or conduct of the purported agent; the statements or acts of the principal must be 19 such as to cause the belief the agency exists.” J.L. v. Children’s Inst., Inc., 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 20 404 (2009). 21 Although ostensible agency cannot be inferred solely from the actions of the agent, the law 22 does not require the principal to make explicit representations about the agent’s authority. C.A.R. 23 Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000). The 24 agent’s authority can be inferred from the circumstances and can be proved via circumstantial 25 evidence. Id. at 480. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Uber at least negligently allowed others 26 to believe that the assailant was an authorized Uber driver. First, through its advertising, Uber 27 intentionally encouraged its customers to identify the Uber decal as indicating that a driver with a 1 provided the assailant with the Uber decal and then failed to take any action to reclaim the decal 2 after it suspended the assailant’s app access. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 40; 53.) These allegations are 3 sufficient at the pleading stage to support a plausible inference that Uber created the impression 4 that the assailant was Uber’s agent. 5 Uber’s reliance on Emery v. Visa Internat. Serv. Ass’n, 95 Cal. App. 4th 952 (2002), for 6 the proposition that its failure to reclaim the assailant’s Uber decal cannot support ostensible 7 agency as a matter of law is misplaced. There, the court held on summary judgment that the 8 record evidence did not support an inference that Visa had done anything to create an impression 9 that the cheating merchants were Visa’s agents. Id. at 961. The allegations here—made in a very 10 different context—do support such an inference. Further, the opinion sentence on which Uber 11 relies—“[t]he mere display of the [purported principal’s] logo, trade name, or trademark is simply 12 not enough to establish an agency by ratification” id. at 961-62—referred to the evidence being 13 insufficient to support a finding that the foreign merchants were acting for Visa. Again, under the 14 very different and specific circumstances alleged here, the allegations are sufficient to support an 15 inference that Uber negligently created the impression that the assailant was an authorized Uber 16 driver. 17 ii. Plaintiff Reasonably Believes in Agency 18 For the reasons discussed above regarding whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 19 support an inference that Uber’s actions created a belief that the assailant was its agent, Plaintiff 20 has also plausibly alleged that such belief was reasonable. Whitlow, 237 Cal.App.4th at 636. 21 Uber’s insistence that it is not as a matter of law “justifiable to rely on someone’s 22 brandishing of a logo as evidence of an agency” is wrong. (Dkt. No. 13 at 17); see Kaplan, 59 23 Cal.App.4th at 747 (concluding that there was a triable issue of fact as to ostensible agency 24 because the plaintiff indicated that he relied on “[t]he venerable name, Coldwell Banker, the 25 advertising campaign, the logo, and the use of the word ‘member’ to believe that a franchisee was 26 the ostensible agency of Coldwell Banker.” ). 27 Uber’s contention that Plaintiff’s belief was not reasonable because her injuries resulted 1 alleges that it was not a chance encounter, but instead an encounter that arose, at least in part, by 2 Uber by creating an impression that the driver decal connotes safety and authorization and then 3 failing to retrieve the decal from a driver Uber knew to be a danger. The Court must accept these 4 allegations at this stage of the proceedings. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 5 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 iii. Plaintiff was Harmed because of Her Belief in Agency 7 The final element requires Jane Doe to establish that she was harmed because of a 8 reasonable reliance on her belief that the assailant was acting as the agent of Uber. Whitlow, 237 9 Cal.App.4th at 636. 10 Uber argues that Plaintiff’s reliance is inadequately pled because “Uber never made any 11 representations to Plaintiff about any affiliation with the [a]ssailant, meaning there were no such 12 representations on which Plaintiff could rely (let alone rely justifiably).” (Dkt. No. 13 at 16.) As 13 explained above, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that it was unreasonable for 14 Plaintiff to rely on the assailant’s display of the Uber decal. 15 *** 16 Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 17 ostensible agency. 18 2. Scope of Employment 19 Even if the assailant was Uber’s ostensible agent/employee, Uber is only vicariously liable 20 for torts committed within the scope of the ostensible agency. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall 21 Memorial Hospital, 12 Cal. 4th 291, 296 (1995). An employee’s “willful, malicious and even 22 criminal torts may fall within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat 23 superior, even though the employer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or 24 intentional torts.” Id. at 296-97. For the employer to be held liable for such conduct, however, the 25 tort must have been “engendered by” or “arise from” the employment. Id. at 298. “An employer 26 will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to the 27 employee’s work.” Id. The liability requirement that the tort be engendered by or arise from the 1 and in place is not enough.” Id. at 298. Instead, to fall within the scope of employment “the 2 incident leading to injury must be an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment; the risk of tortious injury 3 must be inherent in the working environment; or typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise 4 [the employer] has undertaken.” Id. 5 Another way California approaches the issue is to determine whether the tort was 6 foreseeable from the employee’s duties. Id. at 299. “The employment, in other words, must be 7 such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which 8 liability is sought.” Id. The rule reflects that “losses fairly attributable to an enterprise—those 9 which foreseeably result from the conduct of the enterprise—should be allocated to the enterprise 10 as a cost of doing business.” Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1006 11 (1995). 12 Lisa M. disposes of any argument that the assault here was engendered by or arose from 13 the assailant’s ostensible employment. In Lisa M., a hospital technician completed an ultrasound 14 on a pregnant patient, left the patient’s room, and then returned to the room and sexually assaulted 15 the patient by pretending that his conduct was required to determine the baby’s gender. Lisa M., 16 12 Cal.4th at 298. In determining whether the technician’s conduct fell within the scope of his 17 employment, the court “ask[ed] first whether the technician’s acts were engendered by or an 18 outgrowth of his employment.” Id. at 300 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The 19 court concluded that they were not, reasoning that a “sexual tort will not be considered engendered 20 by the employment unless its motivating emotions were fairly attributable to work-related events 21 or conditions,” id. at 301, and in the circumstances before the court the “the opposite was true.”

22 A technician simply took advantage of solitude with a naïve patient to commit an assault for reasons unrelated to his work. [The 23 technician’s] job was to perform a diagnostic examination and record the results. The task provided no occasion for a work-related dispute 24 or any other work-related emotional involvement with the patient. The technician’s decision to engage in conscious exploitation of the 25 patient did not arise out of the performance of the examination, although the circumstances of the examination made it possible. 26 27 Id. at 301. The court concluded that “the flaw in plaintiff’s case for Hospital’s respondeat superior 1 personal motivations were not generated by or an outgrowth of workplace responsibilities, 2 conditions or events.” Id. at 302. 3 Even if the assailant was an actual Uber employee as opposed to an ostensible agent, and 4 drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the complaint does not plausibly allege that 5 the sexual assault arose from the assailant’s job to drive Plaintiff to her chosen destination. As in 6 Lisa M., the task provided no occasion for a work-related dispute or any other work-related 7 emotional involvement with the passenger. That is, the assailant’s “personal motivations were not 8 an outgrowth of workplace responsibilities, conditions or events.” Id. 9 Lisa M. also disposes of liability under a foreseeability focus. The court concluded that the 10 technician’s assault was not foreseeable from the technician’s duties notwithstanding the 11 physically intimate nature of the work:

12 Here, there is no evidence of emotional involvement, either mutual or unilateral, arising from the medical relationship. Although the 13 procedure ordered involved physical contact, it was not of a type that would be expected to, or actually did, give rise to intense emotions on 14 either side. We deal here not with a physician or therapist who becomes sexually involved with a patient as a result of mishandling 15 the feelings predictably created by the therapeutic relationship, but with an ultrasound technician who simply took advantage of solitude, 16 access and superior knowledge to commit a sexual assault. . . The assault [was] . . . the independent product of [the technician’s] 17 aberrant decision to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties. In the pertinent sense, therefore, [the technician’s] actions were not 18 foreseeable from the nature of the work he was employed to perform.

19 Id. at 302-03. The same is true of the allegations here, even more so given that the work duties do 20 not involve any physical contact whatsoever. The assault was the independent product of the 21 assailant’s aberrant decision to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties. 22 Indeed, California “courts have rarely held an employee’s sexual assault or sexual 23 harassment of a third party falls within the scope of employment.” Daza v. Los Angeles Cmty. 24 Coll. Dist., 247 Cal. App. 4th 260, 268-69 (2016) (holding that guidance counselor’s alleged 25 sexual assault of student not within counselor’s scope of employment and collecting cases). While 26 California courts “have imposed vicarious liability based on ‘the unique position of police officers 27 with their ability to arrest and use deadly force,’ coupled with their ‘substantial degree of 1 authority’ and the use of that authority over the . . . plaintiff,” id. at 269, those circumstances are 2 not and cannot be alleged here. 3 Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2010), does not require a different result. First, it 4 is not apparent that the court held that the immigration officer was acting within the scope of his 5 employment when he sexually assaulted the plaintiffs. In holding that the officer was acting 6 within the scope of his employment, the court relied on a case involving a loan broker and a 7 fraudulent loan application—not a sexual assault. Id. at 949 (discussing Inter Mountain 8 Mortgage, Inc. v. Sulimen, 78 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440 (2006)). Second, the actual holding of the 9 court was that the government could not be liable for the officer’s sexual assault. Id. at 949-50 10 (holding that “the torts for which the plaintiffs may be compensated by [the officer’s] employer 11 are the infliction of emotional distress and interference with their civil rights” rather than “sexual 12 misconduct”). Third, Xue Lu is arguably analogous to the law enforcement sexual assault context 13 given the power and authority an immigration officer has over immigration applicants. The facts 14 alleged here are not. 15 The Court recognizes that Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 184 F.Supp.3d 774, 784 (N.D. 16 Cal. 2016), reached a different conclusion, at least at the 12(b)(6) stage. This Court respectfully 17 disagrees that such a holding can be squared with Lisa M. and the test it applies to sexual assault 18 by employees on third parties. While the Court accepts as true that passengers expect Uber to 19 perform background checks on its drivers to mitigate the risk of assault, including sexual assault, 20 the same expectation is no doubt true, if not truer, for hospital employees left alone with patients 21 in physically vulnerable positions. Further, that Uber encouraged passengers to feel safe in an 22 Uber as part of its disruption of the taxi industry is just another way of saying that Uber 23 passengers are in a vulnerable position. But Lisa M. holds that such vulnerability cannot be a 24 basis for finding that a sexual assault assailant was acting within the scope of his employment. 25 Lisa M. at 313-314; see also Xue Lu, 621 F.3d at 950 (“The liability of a private employer in 26 California does not turn on the vulnerability of the victim but on the extent to which the tort of the 27 employee is incident to his employment.”). 1 Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has not 2 plausibly alleged facts that support a finding that the assailant was acting within the scope of his 3 ostensible employment when he assaulted Plaintiff. The first claim for relief must therefore be 4 dismissed. 5 B. Common Carrier Negligence 6 Plaintiff’s second claim is for common carrier negligence. Under California law 7 “[e]veryone who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or messages, excepting only 8 telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry.” Cal. Civ. Code § 9 2168. “Hence, a common carrier within the meaning of Civil Code § 2168 is any entity which 10 holds itself out to the public generally and indifferently to transport goods or persons from place to 11 place for profit.” Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507 (1992). A 12 common carrier owes passengers “the utmost care and diligence for safe carriage, must provide 13 everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” 14 Cal. Civ. Code § 2100. They are “responsible for any, even the slightest, negligence and are 15 required to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under all the 16 circumstances.” Orr v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 208 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1472 (1989). 17 Uber first insists that it is not a common carrier because of conditions that are placed on 18 who can use and be connected with drivers via the app; it argues that this process is not the 19 “general” and “indifferent” treatment necessary to support a finding that Uber is a common 20 carrier. The Court disagrees. Common carrier liability can attach even for transportation services 21 that are “of possible use to only a fraction of the population.” Huang v. The Bicycle Casino, Inc. 4 22 Cal.App.5th 329, 339 (2016) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because a 23 genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a casino shuttle bus was a common carrier.) In 24 Squaw Valley Ski Corporation v. Superior Court, for example, the court held that a ski resort chair 25 lift facility was a common carrier even though it was only accessible to fee-paying members of the 26 public who had ski equipment and chose to avail themselves of the chair lift as a mode of 27 transportation. Squaw Valley Ski Corporation v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1510 (1992). 1 In sum, Uber’s status as an app-based transportation network does not preclude it as a matter of 2 law from being held liable as a common carrier. 3 Uber next insists that because Plaintiff never actually became a passenger in an Uber 4 vehicle, it was never a common carrier of Plaintiff and thus, it cannot be held liable under a 5 heightened common carrier negligence theory. In other words, because Plaintiff was never driven 6 by an authorized Uber driver on the day in question, no common carrier liability can attach. 7 Plaintiff counters that the common carrier relationship was created at the time Uber accepted her 8 boyfriend’s ride request on her behalf regardless of whether she actually entered an Uber- 9 authorized vehicle. 10 Under California law, common carrier liability does not attach for injuries to intended 11 passengers who have not yet boarded or attempted to board the common carrier, and it has ended 12 when the passenger has safely exited the carrier. See McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.¸ 13 57 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1018 (1997) (“the heightened degree of care is owed only while passengers 14 are in transitu, and until they have safely departed the carrier’s vehicle”) (internal quotation marks 15 and citation omitted); Marshall v. United Airlines, 35 Cal.App.3d 84, 86-87, 92 (1973) (holding 16 that United Airlines did not have any liability to a plaintiff who had de-boarded her plane and was 17 injured in a stairwell that was not owned by United Airlines even though she was on the way to a 18 United-arranged connecting flight); Orr, 208 Cal.App.3d at 1472 (stating that common carrier 19 liability “is owed while passengers are in transit and until they have safely departed the carrier’s 20 vehicle”). 21 Plaintiff argues that Uber owed her a duty of care as a common carrier as soon as Uber 22 accepted the ride request sent by her fiancé because by doing so, Uber had showed an intent to 23 receive her as a passenger. That theory, however, is unsupported by California caselaw; indeed, it 24 is foreclosed by McGettigan. There, the plaintiff purchased a Bay Area Rapid Transit (“BART”) 25 ticket and rode the train to the end of the line. An operator then told him he could catch a ride on a 26 different BART train on the opposite side of the tracks. At some point, the plaintiff was found 27 injured on the platform next to the tracks. He argued that BART violated its heightened common 1 common carrier liability did not apply in these circumstances because such liability only attaches 2 while passengers are in transit until they have safely departed the carrier’s mode of transportation. 3 57 Cal. App. 4th at 1017. The court explained the reason for the limitation: 4 The passenger while in actual progress upon his journey is exposed to countless hazards, gives himself wholly in charge of the carrier . . 5 . But a rule properly ceases with the reason for it; therefore, as a passenger’s entrance to the carrier’s station is characterized by none 6 of the hazards incident to the journey itself… the carrier is bound to exercise only a reasonable degree of care for the protection of his 7 passengers. 8 Id. (quoting Falls v. San Francisco, 97 Cal. 114, 119 (1893)). Once the plaintiff had exited the 9 BART train the relationship of carrier and passenger terminated, even though the BART operator 10 told him to take a different BART train heading the other direction. If the BART passenger did 11 not have a common carrier/passenger relationship with BART just after departing a BART train 12 and while waiting on a BART platform for another train, then Plaintiff did not have a common 13 carrier/passenger relationship with Uber while waiting outside a business for an Uber to pick her 14 up. 15 The cases Plaintiff relies upon involve very different factual allegations. In Gray v. City 16 and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 319, 323 (1962), the plaintiff was injured while 17 boarding a street car; an analogous situation here would be if Plaintiff had been injured while 18 entering an Uber. Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co., 93 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1051 (2001), merely holds 19 that “the duty of due care does not necessarily end when the passenger alights safely from the 20 carrier's vehicle; it ends only when the passenger is discharged into a relatively safe space.” Here, 21 in contrast, Plaintiff never entered an Uber vehicle. In Ward, a century-old case, the plaintiff was 22 injured on the carrier’s platform by the carrier’s speeding train. Southern Pac. Co. v. Ward, 208 F. 23 385 (9th Cir. 1913). Finally, Plaintiff’s suggestion that her case is more akin to Huang reads too 24 much into that case. The issue there was whether the casino shuttle was a common carrier; the 25 court never analyzed whether there was a common carrier/passenger relationship while the 26 plaintiff was boarding the casino shuttle. 4 Cal. App. 5th. at 338-40. In any event, the Huang 27 plaintiff was injured while attempting to board the shuttle; again, not the facts of this case as 1 Orr v. Pac. Sw. Airlines, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1467 (1989), another case Plaintiff cites, 2 actually shows why Plaintiff’s theory is not supported by California law. In Orr, the plaintiff was 3 injured while proceeding through the security checkpoint at an airport. The court held that the 4 heightened common carrier duty did not apply as the defendant airline had not restricted the 5 plaintiff’s mobility as she “remained free to roam through the terminal at will subject to security 6 screening applicable to passengers and nonpassengers alike.” Id. at 1474. And the plaintiff’s 7 injury occurred in an area not in the airline’s exclusive control. Id. The same is true of the 8 allegations here, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. When Uber accepted 9 Plaintiff’s fiancé’s ride request, Plaintiff was not in Uber’s exclusive control; she was free to go 10 wherever she wanted or to not even attempt to board the Uber vehicle when it arrived. And, as it 11 tragically turned out, she never entered an authorized Uber vehicle. 12 Finally, Plaintiff claims that common carriers can be held liable for the intentional torts of 13 third parties. But in the cases cited by Plaintiff there is no question that the defendant had a 14 heightened common carrier duty as the plaintiff was in transit at the time of injury. See Andrews v. 15 United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (luggage falling out of overhead compartment 16 on an airplane); Berger v. S. Pac. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3 (1956) (plaintiff assaulted by train 17 employee while on train). These cases are of no help to Plaintiff here. 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that plausibly support an inference that 19 Uber had a common carrier/passenger relationship which warranted a heightened duty at the time 20 Plaintiff was assaulted. The second claim for common carrier must therefore be dismissed. Of 21 course, that Plaintiff has not pled common carrier liability does not mean that Uber cannot be 22 liable under an ordinary negligence theory. See Huang, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 341. 23 C. Punitive Damages 24 Finally, Uber moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim as inadequately pled. 25 Under California law, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages in connection with a non- 26 contractual claim if she establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of 27 (1) fraud, (2) oppression, or (3) malice. Cal. Civil Code § 3294(a). For an employer to be liable for 1 employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or 2 ratified the wrongful conduct . . . or [been] personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Id. 3 3294(b). 4 Plaintiff asserts that Uber prioritizes profits over its passengers and failed to take 5 reasonable measures to protect against foreseeable harm caused by the distribution of the Uber 6 decals. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 41.) She insists that such an allegation supports an inference of corporate 7 malice which establishes Jane Doe’s right to punitive damages because “Uber willfully, 8 consciously, and despicably prioritized, and continues to prioritize, profits over the rights and 9 safety of its own passengers.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 20.) 10 In Pacific Gas and Electric Co., the court noted “[p]unitive damages are proper only when 11 the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which 12 decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 24 13 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1173 (2018). The court there held that there was a “triable issue of fact as to 14 malice” related to whether PG&E was liable for a fire which arose when the powerline came into 15 contact with a tree near their property. Id. at 1170. However, the same case held that “mere 16 carelessness… of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.” Id. Though 17 Uber claims that Plaintiff has not adequately pled the malice required for an award of punitive 18 damages, her complaint points to Uber’s “intentional[] fail[ure]” to protect passengers, including 19 Jane Doe. (Dkt. No. 19 at 29; Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶13-41, 52-59.) Intentional failure to retrieve the decal 20 could rise to a level of “extreme indifference” necessary to support an award of punitive damages. 21 Uber has not shown that Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim fails as a matter of law. 22 CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 24 first and second claims for relief with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed 25 within 30 days of this Order. 26 // 27 // 1 This Order disposes of Docket No. 13. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: November 22, 2019 ' ne 4 CQWELINE SCOTT CORL 5 Magistrate Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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