Doe v. Twitter, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedDecember 11, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-00485
StatusUnknown

This text of Doe v. Twitter, Inc. (Doe v. Twitter, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Twitter, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 JOHN DOE, et al., 7 Case No. 21-cv-00485-JCS Plaintiffs, 8 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 DISMISS TWITTER, INC., et al., 10 Re: Dkt. No. 117 Defendants. 11

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Following an interlocutory appeal of this Court’s August 19, 2021 order granting in part 15 and denying in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss, dkt. no. 69 (“August 19 Order”), one claim 16 remains in this case. Presently before the Court is Defendant X Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss 17 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, dkt. no. 117 (“Motion”), in which it contends this remaining 18 claim must be dismissed under Does 1-6 v. Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. 19 denied sub nom. Does v. Reddit, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 2560 (2023).1 The Court finds that the Motion is 20 suitable for determination without oral argument and therefore vacates the hearing scheduled for 21 December 15, 2023. The Case Management Conference scheduled for the same date is also 22 vacated. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.2 23 24 25

26 1 Although Twitter, Inc. has now merged into X Corp., Defendant continues to refer to itself and its platform as “Twitter” for the purposes of this case “for the sake of clarity and simplicity.” 27 Motion at 1 n. 1. The Court does the same. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 A. The First Amended Complaint3 3 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which is the operative complaint, contains 4 detailed allegations describing: 1) Twitter’s platform, business model and content moderation 5 policies and practices (FAC ¶¶ 23-51); 2) the ways Twitter allegedly permits and even aids in the 6 distribution of child pornography on its platform and profits from doing so (FAC ¶¶ 52-84); 3) 7 how pornographic content featuring John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 was created and eventually 8 ended up on Twitter’s platform (FAC ¶¶ 85-100); and 4) Twitter’s response to requests that the 9 pornographic photos and videos containing Plaintiffs’ images be removed from Twitter (FAC ¶¶ 10 101-132). 11 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert the following claims: 12 1) violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 13 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1595(a) based on the allegation that “Twitter knew, or was in reckless 14 disregard of the fact, that through monetization and providing, obtaining, and maintaining [child 15 sexual abuse material (“CSAM”)] on its platform, Twitter and Twitter users received something of 16 value for the video depicting sex acts of John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as minors.” FAC ¶¶ 133- 17 143 (Claim One); 18 2) violation of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(2) and 1595(a), based on the allegation 19 that Twitter “knowingly benefited, or should have known that it was benefiting, from assisting, 20 supporting, or facilitating a violation of 1591(a)(1).” FAC ¶¶ 144-155 (Claim Two); 21 3) violation of the duty to report child sexual abuse material under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2258A 22 and 2258B. FAC ¶¶ 156-163 (Claim Three); 23 4) civil remedies for personal injuries related to sex trafficking and receipt and distribution 24 of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2252A, and 2255, based on the allegations that 25 Twitter was “notified of the CSAM material depicting John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as minors on 26 its platform and still knowingly received, maintained, and distributed this child pornography after 27 1 such notice[,]” causing Plaintiffs to suffer “serious harm and personal injury, including, without 2 limitation, physical, psychological, financial, and reputational harm.” FAC ¶¶ 164-176 (Claim 3 Four); 4 5) California products liability based on the allegedly defective design of the Twitter 5 platform, which is “designed so that search terms and hashtags utilized for trading CSAM return 6 suggestions for other search terms and hashtags related to CSAM” and through use of 7 “algorithm(s), API, and other proprietary technology” allows “child predators and sex traffickers 8 to distribute CSAM on a massive scale” while also making it difficult for users to report CSAM 9 and not allowing for immediate blocking of CSAM material once reported pending review. FAC 10 ¶¶ 177-190 (Claim Five); 11 6) negligence based on allegations that Twitter had a duty to protect Plaintiffs, had actual 12 knowledge that CSAM containing their images was being disseminated on its platform and failed 13 to promptly remove it once notified. FAC ¶¶ 191-197 (Claim Six); 14 7) gross negligence based on the same theory as Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. FAC ¶¶ 198- 15 203 (Claim Seven); 16 8) negligence per se based on the allegation that Twitter’s conduct violated numerous laws, 17 including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1595 (benefiting from a sex trafficking venture), 18 U.S.C. § 18 2258A (failing to report known child sexual abuse material), 18 U.S.C. § 2552A (knowingly 19 distributing child pornography), Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.85 (intentionally distributing non- 20 consensually shared pornography), and Cal. Penal Code § 311.1 (possessing child pornography). 21 FAC ¶¶ 204-26 (Claim Eight); 22 9) negligent infliction of emotional distress. FAC ¶¶ 207-212 (Claim Nine); 23 10) distribution of private sexually explicit materials, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 24 1708.85, based on the allegation that “[b]y refusing to remove or block the photographic images 25 and video depicting him after Plaintiff John Doe #1 notified Twitter that both he and John Doe #2 26 were minors, Twitter intentionally distributed on its online platform photographic images and 27 video of the Plaintiffs.” FAC ¶¶ 213-218 (Claim Ten); 1 intruded into Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy by continuing to distribute the 2 photographic images and video depicting them after John Doe #1 notified Twitter that Plaintiffs 3 were minors and the material had been posted on its platform without their consent.” FAC ¶¶ 219- 4 223 (Claim Eleven); 5 12) invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1. FAC ¶¶ 6 224-228 (Claim Twelve); and 7 13) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”) based on 8 allegations that “Twitter utilized and exploited Plaintiffs for its own benefit and profit” and 9 “Plaintiffs, to their detriment, reasonably relied upon Twitter’s willful and deceitful conduct and 10 assurances that it effectively moderates and otherwise controls third-party user content on its 11 platforms.” FAC ¶¶ 229-234 (Claim Thirteen).

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Doe v. Twitter, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-twitter-inc-cand-2023.