Doe v. Shalala
This text of 26 F. App'x 338 (Doe v. Shalala) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
Mary Doe, a human embryo “born” in the United States (and subsequently frozen in which state of eryopreservation her life is presently suspended), individually and on behalf of all other frozen human embryos similarly situated, and the National Association for the Advancement of Preborn Children (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order administratively closing their civil lawsuit challenging the Clinton Administration’s policies regarding federal funding of human stem cell research. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable.
This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 387 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appeal-able interlocutory or collateral order. It merely removes the case from the district court’s active docket until the issue of federal funding for stem cell research is settled by the Bush Administration.
We therefore dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED.
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26 F. App'x 338, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-shalala-ca4-2002.