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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 JOHN DOE, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01399-TL 12 Plaintiff(s), ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 13 REVATURE LLC et al, 14 Defendant(s). 15
17 This matter is before the Court on the Court’s own motion and the Court’s October 3, 18 2022 minute order. Dkt. No. 3. For the reasons below, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE 19 why his name should remain sealed. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff “John Doe” brings this action against Revature LLC, his former employer, and 22 various individuals associated with Revature, based on claims of employment discrimination 23 arising under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, various federal statutes, 24 and state law for libel or defamation. Dkt. No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated 1 against based on his disabilities, listed as schizoaffective disorder and “bipolar type,” including 2 by Defendants disclosing Plaintiff’s disability to his supervisor and co-workers, making jokes 3 containing sexual innuendo, failing to respond to or take any other action in response to his 4 complaints, and terminating his employment. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff also vaguely alleges that
5 Defendants “began harassing [him],” created a “hostile and abusive work environment,” “made 6 at least 2 adverse training decisions,” and “threatened retaliation on at least 2 occasions,” among 7 other allegations. Id. Plaintiff seeks to recover for lost wages, “front pay” for a two-year 8 employment contract, emotional distress and “time spent pursuing legal remedies,” punitive 9 damages, damages based on libel or defamation, and costs and fees. Id. at 7. The EEOC issued a 10 notice declining to continue its investigation of Plaintiff’s allegations, making no determination 11 about its merits, and informing Plaintiff of his right to sue. Dkt. No. 6-1. 12 Plaintiff proceeds pro se (without legal representation). In support of his motion for leave 13 to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff attached his proposed complaint, which names Plaintiff as 14 an anonymized “John Doe,” but Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
15 other attached exhibits use Plaintiff’s full name. See Dkt. Nos. 1 to 1-5. On October 3, 2022, this 16 Court issued a text-only minute order noting this discrepancy, as well as that Plaintiff has not 17 stated whether he seeks to proceed on an anonymous basis, and directing the Clerk of the Court 18 to temporarily maintain all filings that mention Plaintiff’s name under seal, pending the 19 resolution of the in forma pauperis application and the appearance of Defendants. Dkt. No. 3. 20 Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis afterward. Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff has 21 registered to electronically file in this case. Dkt. No. 7. No Defendant has yet appeared in the 22 action. 23
24 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that a complaint “name all the parties.” 3 This is no mere formality: A plaintiff’s “use of fictitious names runs afoul of the public’s 4 common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile
5 Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s denial of permission 6 for plaintiffs to proceed anonymously). On the other hand, nondisclosure of a party’s identity 7 may be necessary “to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal 8 embarrassment.” Id. at 1067–68 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 9 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). 10 Therefore, a party may preserve his anonymity in a case only “in special circumstances 11 when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s 12 interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068. If the party fears retaliation, a court must 13 further evaluate: “(1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the 14 anonymous party’s fears; (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation; . . . [(4)] the
15 precise prejudice at each stage of the proceedings to the opposing party . . . [; and (5)] the 16 public’s interest in the case . . . .” Id. (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Kamehameha 17 Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming that the 18 anonymous plaintiffs failed to show reasonable fear of severe harm). 19 Relatedly, there is a strong presumption of public access to court-filed documents. Local 20 Civil Rule (“LCR”) 5(g); accord Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 21 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a party must show “compelling reasons” to seal records related to 22 “dispositive” motions, which for these purposes include the complaint and supporting materials. 23 See, e.g., Williams & Cochran, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv., No. 17-cv-
24 1436, 2017 WL 3600417, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017) (“[T]he ‘compelling reasons’ standard 1 applies because the complaint initiates the civil action.”); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 2 (“Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must 3 meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.”). Even if 4 compelling reasons are identified, a sealing order must be narrowly tailored. Kamakana, 447
5 F.3d at 1182. 6 Plaintiff has yet to provide any justification for keeping his name anonymous. Indeed, it 7 is unclear that he even intends to proceed on an anonymous basis, as he has filed papers with this 8 Court that reveal his full name. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. The Court must balance the strong 9 presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings, including the names of parties and 10 court filings in a given case, with the possibility of compelling reasons, such as the protection of 11 Plaintiff from harassment, ridicule, personal embarrassment, or other injuries, that might warrant 12 keeping Plaintiff’s name and related records under seal in this case. The Court also does not 13 know whether Defendants may suffer any prejudice as a result of keeping Plaintiff anonymous 14 and certain records sealed, nor whether Plaintiff—who appears to have been terminated from his
15 former employment with Revature—risks any fear of retaliation if he is named publicly. 16 Finally, the Court has an inherent interest in and power to manage its docket. See, e.g., In 17 re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006) (“District 18 courts have an inherent power to control their dockets.”). The Court seeks to resolve whether 19 Plaintiff will proceed on an anonymous basis or whether certain filings should remain sealed in 20 an efficient manner. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff must inform the Court whether he intends to proceed 22 anonymously. If so, Plaintiff show why he should be permitted to proceed anonymously and why 23 his filings containing his real name should remain sealed. If Defendants appear after the Court’s
24 issuance of an order resolving this issue, and the order results in the continued anonymization of 1 Plaintiff or sealing of certain documents, Defendants may move to name Plaintiff or unseal any 2 or all of the documents. 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 Plaintiff is ORDERED to:
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 JOHN DOE, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01399-TL 12 Plaintiff(s), ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 13 REVATURE LLC et al, 14 Defendant(s). 15
17 This matter is before the Court on the Court’s own motion and the Court’s October 3, 18 2022 minute order. Dkt. No. 3. For the reasons below, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE 19 why his name should remain sealed. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff “John Doe” brings this action against Revature LLC, his former employer, and 22 various individuals associated with Revature, based on claims of employment discrimination 23 arising under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, various federal statutes, 24 and state law for libel or defamation. Dkt. No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated 1 against based on his disabilities, listed as schizoaffective disorder and “bipolar type,” including 2 by Defendants disclosing Plaintiff’s disability to his supervisor and co-workers, making jokes 3 containing sexual innuendo, failing to respond to or take any other action in response to his 4 complaints, and terminating his employment. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff also vaguely alleges that
5 Defendants “began harassing [him],” created a “hostile and abusive work environment,” “made 6 at least 2 adverse training decisions,” and “threatened retaliation on at least 2 occasions,” among 7 other allegations. Id. Plaintiff seeks to recover for lost wages, “front pay” for a two-year 8 employment contract, emotional distress and “time spent pursuing legal remedies,” punitive 9 damages, damages based on libel or defamation, and costs and fees. Id. at 7. The EEOC issued a 10 notice declining to continue its investigation of Plaintiff’s allegations, making no determination 11 about its merits, and informing Plaintiff of his right to sue. Dkt. No. 6-1. 12 Plaintiff proceeds pro se (without legal representation). In support of his motion for leave 13 to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff attached his proposed complaint, which names Plaintiff as 14 an anonymized “John Doe,” but Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
15 other attached exhibits use Plaintiff’s full name. See Dkt. Nos. 1 to 1-5. On October 3, 2022, this 16 Court issued a text-only minute order noting this discrepancy, as well as that Plaintiff has not 17 stated whether he seeks to proceed on an anonymous basis, and directing the Clerk of the Court 18 to temporarily maintain all filings that mention Plaintiff’s name under seal, pending the 19 resolution of the in forma pauperis application and the appearance of Defendants. Dkt. No. 3. 20 Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis afterward. Dkt. No. 4. Plaintiff has 21 registered to electronically file in this case. Dkt. No. 7. No Defendant has yet appeared in the 22 action. 23
24 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that a complaint “name all the parties.” 3 This is no mere formality: A plaintiff’s “use of fictitious names runs afoul of the public’s 4 common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile
5 Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s denial of permission 6 for plaintiffs to proceed anonymously). On the other hand, nondisclosure of a party’s identity 7 may be necessary “to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal 8 embarrassment.” Id. at 1067–68 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 9 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). 10 Therefore, a party may preserve his anonymity in a case only “in special circumstances 11 when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s 12 interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068. If the party fears retaliation, a court must 13 further evaluate: “(1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the 14 anonymous party’s fears; (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation; . . . [(4)] the
15 precise prejudice at each stage of the proceedings to the opposing party . . . [; and (5)] the 16 public’s interest in the case . . . .” Id. (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Kamehameha 17 Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming that the 18 anonymous plaintiffs failed to show reasonable fear of severe harm). 19 Relatedly, there is a strong presumption of public access to court-filed documents. Local 20 Civil Rule (“LCR”) 5(g); accord Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 21 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a party must show “compelling reasons” to seal records related to 22 “dispositive” motions, which for these purposes include the complaint and supporting materials. 23 See, e.g., Williams & Cochran, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv., No. 17-cv-
24 1436, 2017 WL 3600417, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017) (“[T]he ‘compelling reasons’ standard 1 applies because the complaint initiates the civil action.”); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 2 (“Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must 3 meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.”). Even if 4 compelling reasons are identified, a sealing order must be narrowly tailored. Kamakana, 447
5 F.3d at 1182. 6 Plaintiff has yet to provide any justification for keeping his name anonymous. Indeed, it 7 is unclear that he even intends to proceed on an anonymous basis, as he has filed papers with this 8 Court that reveal his full name. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. The Court must balance the strong 9 presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings, including the names of parties and 10 court filings in a given case, with the possibility of compelling reasons, such as the protection of 11 Plaintiff from harassment, ridicule, personal embarrassment, or other injuries, that might warrant 12 keeping Plaintiff’s name and related records under seal in this case. The Court also does not 13 know whether Defendants may suffer any prejudice as a result of keeping Plaintiff anonymous 14 and certain records sealed, nor whether Plaintiff—who appears to have been terminated from his
15 former employment with Revature—risks any fear of retaliation if he is named publicly. 16 Finally, the Court has an inherent interest in and power to manage its docket. See, e.g., In 17 re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006) (“District 18 courts have an inherent power to control their dockets.”). The Court seeks to resolve whether 19 Plaintiff will proceed on an anonymous basis or whether certain filings should remain sealed in 20 an efficient manner. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff must inform the Court whether he intends to proceed 22 anonymously. If so, Plaintiff show why he should be permitted to proceed anonymously and why 23 his filings containing his real name should remain sealed. If Defendants appear after the Court’s
24 issuance of an order resolving this issue, and the order results in the continued anonymization of 1 Plaintiff or sealing of certain documents, Defendants may move to name Plaintiff or unseal any 2 or all of the documents. 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 Plaintiff is ORDERED to:
5 (1) Inform the Court within five (5) days of this Order whether or not he intends to 6 proceed anonymously. 7 (2) Absent a timely response or if Plaintiff informs the Court that he will not be 8 proceeding anonymously, all documents currently under seal shall be unsealed. 9 (3) If Plaintiff informs the Court that he does wish to proceed anonymously, Plaintiff 10 must also SHOW CAUSE why he should be permitted to proceed anonymously, and 11 whether and why any filing containing his name should remain sealed. Plaintiff’s 12 response may not exceed seven (7) pages, including any attachments, and must be 13 filed within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Absent a timely response, the Court 14 will unseal all filings.
15 The Court also warns Plaintiff that, if he is granted continuing permission to proceed 16 anonymously, he will be required to follow Local Civil Rules 5(g) and 5.2 for any documents he 17 wishes to file under seal or redact. This includes filing a motion to seal a document. If Plaintiff 18 chooses to electronically file any papers that contain his real name rather than filing the papers 19 under seal, such filings may be publicly accessible for an indefinite period before they are sealed. 20 Dated this 13th day of October 2022. 21 A 22 Tana Lin United States District Judge 23 24