Doe v. Onondaga County

2017 NY Slip Op 4697, 151 A.D.3d 1743, 53 N.Y.S.3d 847
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJune 9, 2017
Docket765 CA 16-02218
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 4697 (Doe v. Onondaga County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Onondaga County, 2017 NY Slip Op 4697, 151 A.D.3d 1743, 53 N.Y.S.3d 847 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Spencer J. Ludington, A.J.), entered July 20, 2016. The order denied the motion of defendants Onondaga County and Onondaga County Department of Social Services to dismiss the complaint against them.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries that she sustained as a result of her placement by defendants-appellants (defendants) in a foster home where she was subjected to sexual abuse. Contrary to defendants’ contention, Supreme Court properly denied their motion seeking dismissal of the complaint against them based upon plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with their demand for a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h. “ Tt is well settled that a plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h [(5)] is precluded from maintaining an action against a [county]’ ” (Legal Servs. for the Elderly, Disabled, or Disadvantaged of W. N.Y., Inc. v County of Erie, 125 AD3d 1321, 1322 [2015]; see Gravius v County of Erie, 85 AD3d 1545, 1545 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 896 [2011]; Kemp v County of Suffolk, 61 AD3d 937, 938 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 703 [2010]). Here, however, plaintiff complied with the statute inasmuch as, after defendants demanded a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, she requested and was granted an adjournment of the hearing. Contrary to defendants’ contention, it was incumbent upon them to reschedule the adjourned hearing (see § 50-h [5]; October v Town of Greenburgh, 55 AD3d 704, 704-705 [2008]; Page v City of Niagara Falls, 277 AD2d 1047, 1048 [2000]; cf. Bernoudy v County of Westchester, 40 AD3d 896, 897 [2007]).

Present — Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Carni, NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.

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Related

Gravius v. County of Erie
957 N.E.2d 1150 (New York Court of Appeals, 2011)
Bernoudy v. County of Westchester
40 A.D.3d 896 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)
Donna October v. Town of Green-Burgh
55 A.D.3d 704 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
Kemp v. County of Suffolk
61 A.D.3d 937 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2009)
Gravius v. County of Erie
85 A.D.3d 1545 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Page v. City of Niagara Falls
277 A.D.2d 1047 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2017 NY Slip Op 4697, 151 A.D.3d 1743, 53 N.Y.S.3d 847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-onondaga-county-nyappdiv-2017.