Doe v. Lawson

579 F. Supp. 1314, 16 Educ. L. Rep. 498, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20276
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 19, 1984
DocketCiv. A. 82-3881-MA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 579 F. Supp. 1314 (Doe v. Lawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Lawson, 579 F. Supp. 1314, 16 Educ. L. Rep. 498, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20276 (D. Mass. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION

MAZZONE, District Judge.

In this action, brought under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (the “Act”), 20 U.S.C. § 1401, et seq., the parents of a severely handicapped child challenge a proposed change of his educational placement. That change, which the Town of Holbrook proposed and the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (the “Bureau”) has approved, calls for the plaintiffs’ son Steven to be placed in a program operated by a seven-town special education collaborative called CHARMMS, rather than at the South Shore Center for Brain Injured Children (the “Center”), which Steven has attended for the past seven years. The parents contend that Steven will not receive an “appropriate” education at CHARMMS and, consequently, Holbrook’s plan to place him there violates the Act. Under the Act, states that receive funds are required to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), I make the following findings and rulings.

Steven Doe 1 is an 11-year-old boy who suffers from acquired encephalopathy. He is severely retarded. His mental age, as measured on the Bayley Scale of Infant Development, is approximately four months, according to an evaluation conducted in 1981. He is legally blind and has a profound hearing loss. He lives with his parents in Holbrook. Since 1975 Steven has been enrolled in a day program at the Center, at Holbrook’s expense and, until 1981, with that Town’s approval. He has made some progress in the years that he has been there. He can now sit unassisted, hold his head up, reach out for toys and play at the same time, and hold a spoon and feed himself.

Holbrook first proposed in June, 1981, that Steven be placed in the CHARMMS program at the Town Hill School, rather than at the Center. Steven’s parents rejected this plan, and on two days in June and July, 1982, the Bureau heard testimony on the question whether the town’s plan to place Steven in the program at CHARMMS would provide an appropriate education to Steven. In a decision issued on August 18, 1982, the Bureau concluded that the CHARMMS program would provide an appropriate education, and approved the plan to change Steven’s placement. By com *1316 plaint filed on December 21, 1982, the parents sought judicial review of the Bureau’s decision. The Court heard argument on the matter on January 11, 1984. The evidence consists of the testimony before the Bureau’s hearing officer and an affidavit submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs by Elizabeth M. Connors, Director of the Center.

The plaintiffs contend that this Court should overturn the Bureau’s decision for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs allege that the decision is incorrect as a matter of law because the staffing of the CHARMMS program where Steven is to be placed does not comply with Massachusetts’ certification requirements. Second, Steven’s parents argue that the Bureau’s decision that the CHARMMS program would provide an appropriate education for Steven was not supported by the evidence. I consider each of these contentions in turn. In so doing, I bear in mind that, although my review of the Bureau’s decisions is governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), I must give “due weight” to the Bureau’s decision, and recognize that the Act’s review provisions are not “... an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).

1. Does the CHARMMS program meet state certification requirements?

The plaintiffs argue that the Bureau’s decision is incorrect as a matter of law because the hearing officer erred in concluding that the staffing levels at CHARMMS met the state requirements. Specifically, they contend that the program in which Steven is to be placed does not employ enough qualified “teachers” within the meaning of that term set out in Massachusetts Department of Education regulations. Mass.Admin.Code Tit. 603 § 502.4(b) provides that:

In each program the number of children for each teacher shall not exceed eight, and for each teacher with an aide, shall not exceed twelve.
The testimony at the administrative hearing makes clear that the CHARMMS program satisfies this regulation. There is no dispute that Cheryl Mambro, the associate teacher of the class at issue, is a “teacher” within the meaning of the regulation quoted above, as she is state-certified in special needs teaching. See Mass.Admin.Code Tit. 603, § 1005.1. The head teacher, Jackie Chados-Kramer, is a licensed practical nurse who is not certified as a special needs teacher. She is a “teacher” within the meaning of the regulations, however, as she benefits from a statutory exception enacted for collaborative employees who remain employed by a collaborative in the same position they held prior to August 8, 1981. 1982 Mass.Act. c. 132, § 2. The CHARMMS class also employs two aides. Therefore, even if Ms. Chados-Kramer were not counted as a “teacher,” the class would still meet the requirements of the regulations, since it has only eight (or, counting Steven, nine) students, a qualified teacher, and two aides. Therefore, I conclude that the CHARMMS class where the proposed plan would place Steven meets the staffing requirements called for by state regulations.

2. Is the CHARMMS placement appropriate?

In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Congress' purpose in passing the Act was to require participating states to “maximize the potential of handicapped children ‘commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.’ ” ' Id. at 189-90, 102 S.Ct. at 3042, quoting opinion below, 483 F.Supp. 528 at 534. Instead, the Court held that the Act was intended simply to provide a “basic floor or opportunity” to handicapped children, requiring participating states to provide “access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Id. 458 U.S. at 201, 102 S.Ct. at 3048. Still, the court held that it is not enough that the state provide some servic *1317 es; the Act requires that the state provide that level of educational services sufficient to confer some educational benefit on the handicapped child.

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Related

Doe v. Lawson
745 F.2d 43 (First Circuit, 1984)

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Bluebook (online)
579 F. Supp. 1314, 16 Educ. L. Rep. 498, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-lawson-mad-1984.