Doe v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 23, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-02865·Unknown

Opinion

JOHN DOE, et al., Case No. 23-cv-02865-EMC (PHK) Plaintiffs, ORDER RESOLVING DISCOVERY v. DISPUTES REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION INC., et al., Re: Dkts. 183, 185, 211, 212 Defendants. This is a putative class action brought by Plaintiffs John Doe, John Doe II, Jane Doe, Jane Doe II, Jane Doe III, Jane Doe IV, and Jane Doe V (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (collectively, “Kaiser”). See Dkt. 44. Plaintiffs allege that Kaiser has unlawfully embedded code in its website, including its patient portal and mobile applications, that allows third-party social media and ad tech companies to intrude upon, read, intercept, and use Plaintiffs’ sensitive personal and medical information without Plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent. Id. Now pending before the Court are the Parties’ joint letter briefs and supplemental status reports regarding disputes as to Kaiser’s responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Requests for Production (“RFPs”) (served on November 6, 2023), Plaintiffs’ responses to Kaiser’s First Set of RFPs (served on March 21, 2024), and Kaiser’s responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of RFPs (served on June 10, 2024). [Dkts. 183, 185, 211-12]. The Court held a discovery hearing regarding these disputes on July 18, 2024. See Dkt. 213. This Order memorializes the verbal rulings made by the Court (incorporated herein by reference) and provides further guidance to the The undersigned has been referred all discovery in this putative class action. See Dkt. 57. With regard to the scope of discovery, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., No. 18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts generally recognize that relevancy for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy for purposes of trial.”) (alteration omitted). While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the scope of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. In evaluating the proportionality of a discovery request, a court should consider “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to the information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The resisting party, in turn, has the burden to show that the discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons why the request at issue is objectionable and may not rely on boilerplate, conclusory, or speculative arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Under the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.”). The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). As part of its inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court’s discretion extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). For example, the Court may limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). This case is still in the precertification stage; Plaintiffs’ class certification motion is due February 7, 2025. See Dkt. 128. Precertification discovery lies entirely within the Court’s sound discretion. Artis v. Deere & Co., 276 F.R.D. 348, 351 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009)). In the context of class certification, discovery should generally be reasonably directed so as to avoid undue burden on the opposing party. Valentine v. Crocs, Inc., No. 22-cv-07463-TNT (PHK), 2023 WL 7461852, at *1 5377745, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2008)). A court in its sound discretion may permit limited and targeted non-burdensome discovery on class certification, where the proponent demonstrates such discovery is in the interests of justice and consistent with the language a

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Doe v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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