Doe v. Hebbard

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2021
• Docket: 3:21-cv-00039
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANE DOE, Case No. 21-cv-00039-BAS-AGS

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING IN PART AND 14 JAMES HEBBARD and DOES 1–20, DENYING IN PART 15 Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY 16 AND TO STAY 17 PROCEEDINGS (ECF No. 5);

18 (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 19 UNOPPOSED MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT (ECF 20 No. 7); AND 21 (3) VACATING SCHEDULING 22 ORDER. (ECF No. 6.) 23

24 25 26 27

28 1 Plaintiff Jane Doe is an inmate at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in 2 San Diego, California. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Doe brings this civil rights action against a 3 correctional officer, James Hebbard, alleging that Hebbard sexually assaulted her at the 4 MCC. (Id.) Doe remains in federal custody. She moves to proceed anonymously to 5 prevent humiliation and risk of further injury from the disclosure of her identity. (ECF 6 No. 5.) In a separate motion, Doe requests to add a claim under the Federal Torts Claims 7 Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80, against the United States. (ECF No. 7.) Doe 8 represents that she has exhausted her administrative remedies. (Id.) The Court finds that 9 the motions are suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral 10 argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d). 11 12 I. MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER A FICTITIOUS NAME 13 Doe seeks to prevent the disclosure of her identity for two reasons: (1) her case is 14 about matters of sensitive and personal nature relating to the alleged sexual assault; and 15 (2) a disclosure of her identity would place her at risk of further injury because Doe remains 16 incarcerated at the MCC, where the defendant allegedly assaulted her. (ECF No. 5.) Rule 17 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “all the parties” be named in the 18 title of the Complaint. The default rule in this circuit is “that parties must use their real 19 names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th 20 Cir. 2010). 21 It is thus an exception, and not the norm, for a party to proceed under a fictitious 22 name. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 Two competing interests at stake are “the public’s right to open courts” and “the right of 24 private individuals to confront their accusers.” Kamehameha Sch., 596 F.3d at 1042. 25 Courts may allow a party to keep their identity private when doing so would be “necessary 26 . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.” 27 Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068 (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 28 922 n.1 (9th Cir.1981)). 1 The Court may allow a party to preserve his or her anonymity “when the party’s 2 need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in 3 knowing the party’s identity.” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068. In addition, 4 where a plaintiff seeks to use a fictitious name to shield herself from retaliation, the court 5 must evaluate: (1) “the severity of the threatened harm”; (2) “the reasonableness of the 6 anonymous party’s fears”; (3) “the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation”; 7 (4) “the precise prejudice at each stage of the proceedings to the opposing party”; 8 (5) “whether proceedings may be structured so as to mitigate that prejudice”; and (6) 9 “whether the public’s interest in the case would be best served by requiring that the litigants 10 reveal their identities.” Id. 11 Here, Doe presents a strong reason for the Court to allow her to preserve her 12 anonymity. Doe alleges that she is a victim of sexual assault. Courts have recognized the 13 heightened need for anonymity held by victims of sexual assault. See Doe v. Blue Cross 14 & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ictitious names 15 are allowed when necessary to protect the privacy of . . . rape victims”). Doe’s fear of 16 retaliation is reasonable. Her status as an inmate in the same detention facility where she 17 was allegedly injured places her in a vulnerable position to be subjected to harassment or 18 other form of retaliation. Defendant has not opposed this motion, much less spell out the 19 precise prejudice he would suffer at each stage of the proceedings. The public would not 20 suffer by not knowing Doe’s identity. Doe’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to 21 the defendant and the public’s interest in knowing Doe’s identity. 22 In sum, the Court finds good cause to apply an exception and allow Doe to maintain 23 anonymity in litigating this action. The Court thus GRANTS Doe’s motion to proceed 24 under a fictitious name. (ECF No. 5.) 25 26 II. MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 27 Doe initially sought to stay the proceedings pending the exhaustion of administrative 28 remedies required to bring a claim under the FTCA. (ECF No. 5 at 3–4.) Doe represents 1 ||that the Bureau of Prisons has since denied her administrative claims and she has since 2 ||exhausted her administrative remedies. (ECF No. 7 at 1-2.) Based on Doe’s 3 || representation, the Court DENIES her motion to stay as moot. (ECF No. 5.) 4 5 MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 6 Doe requests the Court’s leave to file an amended complaint adding an FTCA claim 7 || against the federal government. (ECF No. 7.) Doe represents that Defendant Hebbard 8 || does not oppose the motion. (/d.) Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 ||a post-answer amendment may only be filed with the leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 || 15(a)(2). The leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” /d. “The 11 || propriety of a motion for leave to amend 1s generally determined by reference to several 12 || factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the 13 || opposing party.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Republic Airlines, 761 14 || F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985). None of these factors is present here. Thus, the Court 15 || GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the 16 ||Scheduling Order entered on March 1, 2021. (ECF No. 6.) 17 18 || CONCLUSION 19 Plaintiff's motion to proceed under pseudonym and to stay proceedings is 20 || GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff's motion to 21 ||amend complaint and vacate scheduling order is GRANTED. (ECF No. 7.) On or before 22 || April 6, 2021, Doe shall file the proposed amended complaint attached as Exhibit A to her 23 ||motion as her First Amended Complaint. The Court VACATES the Scheduling Order 24 || entered on March 1, 2021. (ECF No. 6.) 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 /\ yy 28 || DATED: March 30, 2021 (ypillg (Haphan 6 How. Cynthia Bashant _,. United States District Judge