Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedApril 13, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00103
StatusUnknown

This text of Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools (Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools, (D.N.M. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO J. DOE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civ. No. 21-103 SCY/KK

FARMINGTON MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS et al.,

Defendants. ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY AND QUASHING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Proceed Anonymously or Under a Pseudonym (Doc. 16) (“Motion”), filed on April 6, 2021 in response to the Court’s March 23, 2021 Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 13.) In her Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed as “J. Doe” in this lawsuit. (Id.; see Doc. 1-3.) The Court, having reviewed the unopposed Motion, the record, and the relevant law, FINDS that the Motion is well-taken and should be GRANTED as set forth below. The Court further FINDS that its Order to Show Cause should be QUASHED. I. Background On November 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter in state court under the pseudonym “J. Doe.” (Doc. 1-3 at 1.) In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Farmington Municipal Schools and five of its officers and employees for negligence, violations of Title IX and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, civil conspiracy, and “[f]ailure to [r]eport.” (Id. at 8-14.) In support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges that a fellow football team member at Piedra Vista High School raped her on school grounds after a football team dinner, and that Defendants failed to investigate or report the sexual assault, discipline the fellow student, or otherwise protect Plaintiff before or after the assault from a sexually hostile environment at the school. (See generally id.) Defendants removed the case to federal court on February 8, 2021. (Doc. 1 at 1.) On March 23, 2021, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Plaintiff to “either (1) file a properly supported motion to proceed anonymously or under a pseudonym in this lawsuit, or (2) show cause

why she has failed to file such a motion.” (Doc. 13 at 2.) Plaintiff timely filed the present Motion on April 6, 2021 in response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 16.) II. Analysis As a preliminary matter, the Court must address whether it has jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s Motion even though she did not seek leave to proceed anonymously before filing her complaint. In W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2001), the plaintiffs filed suit under pseudonyms without seeking the district court’s leave. Id. at 1172. Without addressing the anonymity question, the district court granted the defendant summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs

had not obtained leave to proceed under pseudonyms. Id. at 1172-73. Inter alia, the Tenth Circuit determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment because it had not granted the plaintiffs leave to proceed under pseudonyms when it made its substantive ruling. Id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court could not correct this jurisdictional defect nunc pro tunc while the case was on appeal. Id. In dicta, the Yocom court stated, “[w]hen a party wishes to file a case anonymously or under a pseudonym, it must first petition the district court for permission to do so.” Id. at 1172 (emphases added). In support of this statement, the court cited to National Commodity & Barter Association v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989). Gibbs, however, did not directly address when a party seeking to proceed anonymously must get permission from the district court. In addition, what Gibbs did say suggests that such permission might properly be obtained after the complaint is filed. See 886 F.2d at 1245 (“In this case, the unnamed plaintiffs have made no request to the district court for permission to proceed anonymously, nor have they otherwise disclosed their identities to the court or to the defendants.”). Reading Yocom in harmony with Gibbs, the Court

does not believe it is bound to a strict reading of Yocom’s dicta. Moreover, the Court notes that it would have been impossible for Plaintiff to strictly comply with Yocom’s dicta in this case because she initially filed suit in state court and Defendants then removed the case to this Court. Thus, Plaintiff had no opportunity to seek this Court’s permission to proceed anonymously before filing her complaint in federal court. In fairness, the Court concludes that Plaintiff must be afforded a reasonable period of time after removal to seek leave to proceed anonymously. Plaintiff filed the present Motion within the time the Court allowed and before discovery has begun. (Docs. 13, 16.) The Court therefore concludes that she has sought leave to proceed

anonymously within a reasonable time after removal and that it has jurisdiction to rule on the Motion. However, Yocom makes clear that Plaintiff must either obtain such leave or proceed in her own name before the Court will have jurisdiction to issue substantive rulings in the case. Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff argues that “the highly sensitive and personal nature of the alleged harm in the case outweighs the public interest in requiring [her] to disclose her identity.” (Doc. 16 at 2.) Plaintiff points out her allegations that she “was sexually assaulted by a classmate, who is facing criminal charges, when she was a minor and still in high school,” and that “the harm she suffered as a result is highly sensitive in nature.” (Id. at 2-3.) Moreover, she adds, “[t]he events at issue in this case all occurred in a small town and Plaintiff fears retaliation, particularly because her sister is still a student at Piedra Vista High School alongside Plaintiff’s alleged rapist.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff observes that allowing her to proceed anonymously will not prejudice Defendants because they know her full name and identity and she “does not seek to shield her identity from defense counsel or this Court.” (Id. at 3.) “Proceeding under a pseudonym in federal court is, by all accounts, an unusual procedure.”

Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 provides that a complaint’s title “must name all the parties,” and Rule 17 states that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), 17(a). The Rules include no exception that would allow competent adults to proceed anonymously or under fictitious names or initials. Yocom, 257 F.3d at 1172; see also Gibbs, 886 F.2d at1245 (“The Federal Rules thus make no provision for suits by persons using fictitious names or for anonymous plaintiffs.”). “Nevertheless, in certain limited circumstances, courts do allow a party to proceed under a pseudonym.” Yocom, 257 F.3d at 1172 (quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Tenth Circuit

has held that a plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously in exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity. The risk that a plaintiff may suffer some embarrassment is not enough. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246.

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Related

Femedeer v. Haun
227 F.3d 1244 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
W.N.J. v. Yocom
257 F.3d 1171 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
B v. Francis
631 F.3d 1310 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
National Commodity And Barter Association v. Gibbs
886 F.2d 1240 (Tenth Circuit, 1989)
Doe v. Cabrera
307 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 2014)
John Doe v. Village of Deerfield
819 F.3d 372 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Rose v. Beaumont Independent School District
240 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Texas, 2007)
Doe No. 2 v. Kolko
242 F.R.D. 193 (E.D. New York, 2006)
Doe v. Shakur
164 F.R.D. 359 (S.D. New York, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Doe v. Farmington Municipal Schools, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-farmington-municipal-schools-nmd-2021.