Doe v. Doe

92 Misc. 2d 184, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1977 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2526
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1977
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 92 Misc. 2d 184 (Doe v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe v. Doe, 92 Misc. 2d 184, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1977 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2526 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1977).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Bentley Kassal, J.

ISSUE

When do "extraordinary circumstances” and the best interests of the children dictate that custody be awarded to a "psychological” mother rather than a natural father? This is the initial question presented by this action for divorce in which the stepmother seeks custody of two boys, age 15 and I6V2 years, sons of her separated husband.

Another significant issue presented was the proper role of the infants in this proceeding which vitally affects their lives.

THE LAW

It is not possible to consider the custody issues presented here without reference to the recent landmark decision by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys (40 NY2d 543 [hereafter Bennett]). Although that decision dealt specifically with the rights of a natural parent to the return of a child informally placed in foster care, the principles announced are equally applicable to the present situation.

As stated by Chief Judge Breitel: "The State may not deprive a natural parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances.” (Bennett, supra, p 544.) While the court reaffirmed the principle that the natural parent has no absolute right to custody and that the child’s rights and interests are paramount, it held that courts are powerless to supplant and displace the natural parent, absent such extraordinary circumstances drastically affecting the welfare of the child. (Bennett, supra, pp 546-549.)

Consequently, only if the threshold finding of extraordinary circumstances is first made may the court proceed to determine the best interests of the child. (Bennett, supra, p 549.) The best interests of the child, in turn, are not determined merely by the relative backgrounds, characteristics, and affec[187]*187tion of those seeking custody, but the court must also take into account society’s judgment with respect to the values of the family and parenthood. (Bennett, supra, p 549.)

Finally, in determining the best interests of the child some consideration must be given to the wishes of the child, himself, as well as any available psychiatric or psychological expert opinions. (Bennett, supra, pp 546, 549.)

Thus, while extraordinary circumstances may permit the court to intervene in the relationship between the natural parent and the child, these very circumstances do not per se determine to whom the custody of the child should be granted, whether to one of the contending parties or to an independent third party.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. HISTORY AND PRESENT CUSTODY

John married his first wife, Jane, in 1957. Their two boys, Bob and Norm, were born in 1961 and 1962, respectively. In 1968 John separated from Jane and the boys and in 1969, the parties were divorced with Jane being awarded custody of both boys, without any contest by the father although he did know Jane had a drinking problem. At that time, all of them lived in California and John visited his sons on a regular basis.

In 1969, John married his present wife, Mary, and moved to New York. At the time of the marriage, the children spent two weeks with John and Mary and, during the next two • summers, the boys visited them in New York. At the end of the second summer vacation, John and Mary decided, with the boys, that they would remain in New York, which they did in spite of some efforts by Jane. Almost from the first, the boys lived in a small apartment in the same building, separate from John and Mary, which still continues. In 1975, Jane, the natural mother, died.

In June, 1976, after several years of marital problems, John moved out of the apartment he shared with Mary. Since that time, the boys have remained with their stepmother, Mary, who took over their responsibility but who did not legally adopt them because she was unable to obtain the requisite consent of their father. In September, 1976, John commenced this action for divorcé and custody of the two boys.

[188]*1882. FATHER — JOHN

John, 43 years old, is employed as a writer for an advertising agency. He appears to be extremely self-centered, being primarily occupied with his business, personal possessions (such as his boat, bicycle, books, and an automobile) and his own activities. In fact, his conversations with the other three members of the family over the past year and a half, have consisted principally of queries about his physical possessions.

His relationship with his wife, and ofttimes with his sons, appears to range from passiveness to disinterest. Since the boys joined his household and moved to New York, he has exhibited little or no interest in their education, religious training, physical or general well-being. Most decisions with respect to their upbringing were left to Mary. While living together as a family unit, he very often came home late and, while with them, paid little attention to the boys nor did he join in their activities on weekends or vacations. Since he moved out, about IV2 years ago, in spite of apparent sufficient financial means, he has not supported his wife or children. He has made only minimal token attempts to visit or speak with them, which they have rejected, and he was unaware of which schools they attended the past year. In sum, he fails to relate to his children on a mature level and rather than trying to breach the wall that separates him from the boys by engaging on an inter-personal level in pleasant activities with them or giving them presents, his reaction has been hostile in trying to punish and threaten the boys for failing to see him.

Three specific incidents are worth noting in this regard:

1. Although the boys received no financial aid directly from their father, they have been receiving monthly social security survivor payments of $225, as dependents of their deceased mother. At one point, after he moved out of the house, John sent them a note, advising that he was withholding that money as a protest to their decision to stay with Mary and not see him. Eventually, Mary, over John’s objection, arranged with the Social Security Administration that the checks be sent directly to her.

2. The father conceded that his sister, rather than his sons, was the named beneficiary of most of his life insurance.

3. When asked by the court whether he had plans if awarded custody, in view of their hostile and almost obdurate attitude towards him, he was unable to give a response.

[189]*1893. STEPMOTHER — MARY

Mary, 40 years old, is a member of the Bar who has been unemployed for some years but was previously employed as an attorney in various capacities. She also taught elementary school a number of years ago.

This is her third marriage, both prior marriages having terminated in divorce. In addition, while a teenager, she had spent a year and a half living in a Jewish Family Service home.

Mary has had a very disruptive life and appears to rely on the boys for emotional support (which is mutual). While she has undergone various forms of psychotherapy for many years, she is apparently capable of functioning satisfactorily at this time.

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Bluebook (online)
92 Misc. 2d 184, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1977 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2526, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-v-doe-nysupct-1977.