Doe v. Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3401
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JANE DOE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03401 (UNA) v. ) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) JUSTICE, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se initial filing (“Compl.”),

ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The

Court grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, sues the U.S. Department of Justice. See Compl. at 1. This

case begins with two fundamental procedural errors. First, Plaintiff has brought this case under a

pseudonym, but has failed to file a separate motion seeking such relief, in contravention of Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1), 10(a), 17(a), and D.C. Local Civil Rules 5.1(c)(1), 40.7(f). See

Doe v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 680 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2023).

Second, Plaintiff has attempted to open a civil matter by filing a “motion for relief for

failure to investigate,” in lieu of a complaint, which she may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re

Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that a civil action

“must be initiated by complaint and not by motion”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v.

England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint. . . [and] [w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the

plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3).

In any event, and generously construing Plaintiff’s initial filing as a complaint, this matter

still cannot survive. Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s alleged failures to take action on her civil

rights complaints filed with the agency against the state of Texas. See Compl. at 1–3. She contends

that these actions constitute violations of her constitutional rights. See id. at 1.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Although the relief

sought by Plaintiff is not explicit, it is clear enough that she seeks to compel Defendant to

investigate her complaints, see Compl. at 1, 3, but this Court bears no authority to do so. See

Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In both civil and

criminal cases, courts have long acknowledged that the Attorney General's authority to control the

course of the federal government's litigation is presumptively immune from judicial review.”);

Wightman–Cervantes v. Mueller, 750 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[A]n agency's decision

whether to prosecute, investigate, or enforce has been recognized as purely discretionary and not

subject to judicial review.”); Martinez v. U.S., 587 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248–49 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The

FBI’s decision whether or not to investigate the supposed criminal activity reported by Martinez

is a discretionary function[.]”). “[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether

through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute

discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). In fact, 28 C.F.R. § 0.50, explicitly

assigns the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division the exclusive discretionary

function of “reviewing investigations arising from reports or complaints of public officials or

private citizens,” id. at § 0.50(b), and in no way imposes “any mandatory duty to investigate or

prosecute all complaints of civil rights violations,” nor does it provide a right of review in federal court, see Patterson v. Harris, No. 22-697, 2022 WL 16758554, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2022);

Harris v. Holder, No. 15-00270, 2015 WL 794304, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2015) (same), aff’d sub.

nom Harris v. Lynch, 627 Fed. Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: December 15, 2025 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge