Doe v. County of San Joaquin

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JANE DOE, No. 2:24-cv-00899 WBS CKD 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 15 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, SAN JOAQUIN SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 16 MICHAEL REYNOLDS (in his individual and official 17 capacities), and PATRICK WITHROW (in his official capacity), 18 Defendants. 19

20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Jane Doe brings ten federal and state law 22 claims against San Joaquin County; the San Joaquin Sheriff’s 23 Office; Deputy Sheriff Michael Reynolds, in both his personal and 24 official capacity; and Sheriff Patrick Withrow in his official 25 capacity. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 6.) These 26 claims center on allegations of serial sexual assault by 27 Reynolds. Defendants now move for partial dismissal. 28 1 I. Facts 2 As required on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 3 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the court assumes the following 4 allegations to be true and draws all reasonable factual 5 inferences in plaintiff’s favor. 6 While employed by the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s 7 Office, plaintiff endured persistent sexual harassment and 8 assault by her supervisor, Sergeant Michael Reynolds. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 9 6, 10-53.) Plaintiff began working for the County in April 2019 10 as an office assistant in the communications department. (Id. ¶ 11 13.) In July 2021, she transferred to a crime analyst position, 12 placing her under Reynolds’s supervisory authority. (Id. ¶¶ 19- 13 21.) 14 Reynolds allegedly began engaging in a disturbing 15 pattern of sexually harassing behavior, including sending 16 plaintiff videos of himself masturbating and images of his erect 17 penis while in uniform and in a Sheriff’s Office vehicle (id. ¶ 18 24), physically accosting her in elevators (id. ¶¶ 37-38), and 19 ultimately sexually assaulting her on multiple occasions (id. ¶¶ 20 47-48.) Plaintiff alleges that Reynolds threatened her with 21 termination, reputational ruin, and violence if she reported his 22 conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41-42.) 23 Plaintiff further alleges that Reynolds’s conduct was 24 enabled by the County’s inadequate policies and practices 25 regarding sexual harassment prevention and response. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 26 68-70, 98-101.) She also alleges that the Sheriff’s Office 27 failed to take disciplinary action against Reynolds or subject 28 him to criminal investigation after learning of his conduct (id. 1 ¶¶ 62-64), and that the office has a practice of requiring 2 employees to follow the chain of command when reporting 3 harassment (id. ¶ 60). 4 At all relevant times, Withrow was the Sheriff of San 5 Joaquin Sheriff’s Office. (Id. ¶ 5.) In that capacity, he was 6 responsible for setting and enforcing policies regarding 7 personnel under his supervision, including Reynolds. (Id.) 8 Plaintiff remains employed by the County but is on 9 disability/injury leave due to the allegations in the complaint. 10 (Id. ¶ 73.) 11 II. Legal Standard 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits 13 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 14 upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 15 court must determine whether, accepting the complaint’s 16 allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 17 plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has alleged “sufficient facts . 18 . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 19 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The claim must be “plausible on 20 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 21 The court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or 22 ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 23 supported by mere conclusory statements.’“ Whitaker v. Tesla 24 Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 26 III. Discussion 27 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s “Monell claims,” 28 arguing that plaintiff fails to establish municipal liability for 1 San Joaquin County or the Sheriff’s Office. See Monell v. Dep’t 2 of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (setting 3 forth municipal liability standard for claims asserted under 42 4 U.S.C. § 1983). (See generally Mot.) The court construes this 5 as a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s two § 1983 claims as asserted 6 against San Joaquin County and the Sheriff’s Office. 7 A. Section 1983 Claim Against Reynolds (Claim 1) 8 Plaintiff’s first claim asserts a § 1983 violation 9 against Reynolds in both his personal and official capacity. 10 (FAC ¶¶ 81-92.) However, as plaintiff seeks only damages against 11 Reynolds (id. ¶¶ 91-92), the court construes this as a claim 12 against Reynolds in his personal capacity only. See Mitchell v. 13 Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“when a plaintiff 14 sues a defendant for damages, there is a presumption that he is 15 seeking damages against the defendant in his personal capacity”). 16 Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim based on 17 Monell is accordingly misplaced. In a personal-capacity suit, 18 the plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability on a government 19 official for actions taken under color of state law. Kentucky v. 20 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Monell liability, on the other 21 hand, applies to municipalities and local governing bodies, not 22 to individuals sued in their personal capacity. See Monell, 436 23 U.S. at 690-91. Therefore, the Monell requirements of an 24 official policy or custom do not apply to plaintiff’s claim 25 asserted against Reynolds in his personal capacity. 26 Accordingly, the first claim, considered as a claim 27 against Reynolds in his personal capacity only, will not be 28 dismissed on Monell grounds. 1 B. Section 1983 Claim Against Withrow (Claim 2) 2 Plaintiff’s second claim asserts a § 1983 violation 3 against Withrow in his official capacity, seeking only injunctive 4 relief. (FAC ¶¶ 93-103.) This claim is properly analyzed under 5 Monell, as official-capacity suits “generally represent only 6 another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 7 officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. 8 Under Monell, plaintiff must demonstrate that a policy 9 or custom of the governmental entity was the moving force behind 10 the constitutional violation. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 11 (1991); Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Here, plaintiff’s allegations 12 implicate two related theories of Monell liability: (1) failure 13 to train, and (2) a custom of failing to punish sexual offenders. 14 (FAC ¶¶ 98-99.) 15 1. Failure to Train 16 “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of 17 rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to 18 train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation 19 omitted). Such a claim requires showing that (1) the training 20 program was inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular 21 officers must perform”; (2) city officials were deliberately 22 indifferent “to the rights of persons with whom the [local 23 officials] come into contact”1; and (3) the inadequacy of the 24 1 See also Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (“To satisfy the 25 statute, a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the 26 rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into 27 contact.’ [] Only then ‘can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under 28 1 training “actually caused” the constitutional deprivation at 2 issue. Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th 3 Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 4 Plaintiff’s claim, insofar as it is premised on a 5 failure to train theory, is deficient for at least two reasons. 6 First, nothing in the complaint suggests that the need to change 7 or implement additional sexual harassment training was “so 8 obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation 9 of constitutional rights,” that Withrow’s inaction as to training 10 amounted to an affirmative policy choice that expressed 11 deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 12 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). While 13 plaintiff alleges a general history of sexual misconduct towards 14 women in the Sheriff’s Office (FAC ¶ 67) and past complaints 15 about Reynolds from other employees (id. ¶ 68), this alone is 16 insufficient to show that the municipality was on notice of a 17 need for more or different personnel training.2 To hold 18 otherwise would risk letting “municipal liability under § 1983 19 collapse into respondeat superior.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan 20 Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 21 Second, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts 22 suggesting that inadequacy of the training actually caused 23

24 § 1983.’” (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989))). 25 2 See also Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily 26 necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of 27 failure to train” (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997))). 28 1 Reynolds’s conduct. Rather, plaintiff’s allegations suggest that 2 Reynolds acted with a clear disregard for consequences that no 3 training would remediate, as indicated by his alleged comments 4 that plaintiff (a “‘new civilian girl’”), not Reynolds (a 5 “‘seasoned Sergeant’”), would face adverse consequences were she 6 to report Reynolds.3 (FAC ¶ 41.) 7 2. Custom of Failing to Discipline 8 However, plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege a 9 Monell claim under a customary failure to discipline theory. 10 Under this theory, plaintiff must allege a practice that is so 11 “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and 12 well settled city policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 13 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 14 Plaintiff makes several allegations that, taken 15 together, plausibly suggest such a custom. First, she alleges 16 that the Sheriff’s Office failed to take any disciplinary action 17 against Reynolds or refer him to criminal investigation after 18 learning of his conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 62-64.) See Hunter v. County 19 of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) (custom can be 20 inferred from evidence of repeated constitutional violations for 21 which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or 22 3 See also Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 23 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (“There is, however, every reason to assume that police academy applicants are familiar with the criminal 24 prohibition on sexual assault, as everyone is presumed to know the law. There is no basis from which to conclude that the 25 unconstitutional consequences of failing to train police officers not to commit sexual assault are so patently obvious that the 26 County or Baca were deliberately indifferent” (citing United 27 States v. Budd, 144 U.S. 154, 163 (1892))).

28 1 reprimanded). 2 Second, plaintiff alleges that Reynolds is “not the 3 only deputy in the Office known to have accosted women on the job 4 in recent memory” (FAC ¶ 1), that there is a general history of 5 sexual misconduct toward women by County personnel (id. ¶ 67), 6 and that “gender discrimination and accusations of cover-ups to 7 protect peace officers from accusations of wrongdoing has led to 8 public departures by prominent staff” (id. ¶ 1). Specifically, 9 she points to the resignations of two medical examiners who 10 protested the office’s failure to hold law enforcement 11 accountable for misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 100.) These 12 resignations, particularly given the alleged reasons behind them, 13 lend credence to the existence of a widespread custom of failing 14 to punish misconduct. 15 Third, Reynolds’s own alleged comments to plaintiff 16 about “officers stick[ing] together” (id. ¶ 41), and plaintiff’s 17 further allegations that women working for the Sheriff’s Office 18 fear reporting incidents of sexual misconduct against police 19 officers because of a culture of fear and intimidation (id. ¶¶ 20 99-100), further support an inference of a well-settled custom of 21 protecting wrongdoers within the department. 22 At the pleading stage, plaintiff need not prove the 23 existence of such a custom, but merely allege sufficient facts to 24 make the claim plausible. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 25 (9th Cir. 2011); see also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 26 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (no heightened pleading 27 standard for Monell claims). Taking all of plaintiff’s 28 allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her ene nme EE EI EERE IEE III ESE

1 favor, as the court must at this stage, plaintiff has plausibly 2 alleged a custom of failing to punish sexual offenders within the 3 Sheriff’s Office. While further factual development may be 4 necessary to ultimately prove this claim, plaintiff’s allegations 5 are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the 6 | court will not dismiss this claim. 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 8 dismiss (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 9 Dated: August 6, 2024 10 atti A Lh. be— 11 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28