Doe v. County of Sacramento

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 10, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01438
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11

12 MARIA DOE, et al, 2:21-cv-01438-MCE-CKD 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. ORDER 15 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 16 Defendants.

17 18 Plaintiffs’ motion to compel (ECF No. 40) is before the court. After review of the parties’ 19 joint statement on the discovery dispute (ECF No. 42), the court finds oral argument to be 20 unnecessary. Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for March 15, 2023 will be vacated. For the 21 reasons set forth below, the undersigned will grant, in part, the motion. 22 I. Background 23 As relevant to the current motion, the plaintiffs allege they were coerced by Sacramento 24 County Sheriff’s Deputy Darryl Roderick into vacating their apartment without legal process. 25 (ECF No. 42 at 5.) Plaintiffs allege Roderick demanded plaintiff Maria Doe “speak English,” 26 refused to provide interpretation, and used threats of force to illegally evict the plaintiffs. (Id.) 27 The defendants who oppose this motion deny that Roderick effected an eviction and allege the 28 plaintiffs moved out of the space after apparently reaching an agreement with Defendant Estrada, 1 the person who had illegally sublet the living space to plaintiffs in violation of a lease with the 2 property owner. (Id. at 6.) 3 The second amended complaint asserts cause of action against the County Defendants for 4 wrongful eviction; deprivation of property without due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as 5 to Roderick); intentional discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 6 interference with rights by threats, intimidation, and coercion in violation of the Bane Act, Cal. 7 Civ. Code § 52.1; discrimination in housing in violation of the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; 8 discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 11135; negligence; 9 and mandamus. (ECF No. 32.) On September 15, 2022, the court granted in part defendants’ 10 motion to dismiss. The court dismissed municipal liability claims against the County and the 11 Sheriff’s Office and denied the motion to dismiss on all other counts. (ECF No. 34.) 12 Through this motion, plaintiffs seek to compel defendants County of Sacramento, 13 Sacramento Sheriff’s Office, and Darryl Roderick (collectively, “defendants”) to produce 14 documents responsive to plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One. Plaintiffs 15 seek further production to their requests numbered 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, as set 16 forth below. 17 II. Legal Standards 18 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 19 needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 20 to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 21 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. … 22 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 23 “A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b)… to 24 produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the 25 following items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). 26 When a party fails to provide discovery and the parties’ attempts to resolve the dispute 27 without court intervention are unsuccessful, the opposing party may seek an order compelling that 28 discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of 1 establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).” Louisiana Pac. 2 Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Institutional Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 3 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In turn, the party opposing the 4 discovery “has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the 5 burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” Id. 6 (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). 7 III. Discussion 8 A. Personnel Records (Requests 14 & 15) 9 Request No. 14 10 All DOCUMENTS relating to training RODERICK. 11 Request No. 15 12 All DOCUMENTS relating to RODERICK’s personnel file, including but not limited to hiring, 13 change in position, performance, complaints, and discipline records. 14 Ruling 15 Defendants produced a responsive timeline of Roderick’s employment and a printout of 16 trainings administered by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”). 17 (ECF No. 42 at 30.) Plaintiffs seek additional training records (such as “policy training morning 18 events”), performance records, and disciplinary records not yet produced. (Id.) 19 Defendants indicated there were no additional “demotion or disciplinary records” being 20 withheld. (ECF No. 42 at 29.) Defendants argue these requests should be limited further because 21 “firearms, force, and a whole of the ordinary training provided to deputies is not relevant to this 22 case.” (Id. at 31.) 23 Defendants’ objections1 based on relevance and scope are overruled. Personnel files, 24 including training records, are discoverable in cases in federal court where officers are alleged to 25 have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Garrett v. City & County of San 26 1 Not all of defendants’ initial objections to the requests at issue in this motion were maintained in 27 the joint statement. Objections asserted in discovery responses but not raised in briefing are waived. See Bingham v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 821CV00836JLSJDEX, 2022 WL 886116, at *3 28 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2022). 1 Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519, n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (“personnel files are discoverable in federal 2 question cases, including Title VII actions, despite claims of privilege”); Soto v. City of Concord, 3 162 F.R.D. 603, 615 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (personnel files of defendant-officers in excessive force 4 cases contain a variety of relevant information, and are discoverable). Roderick’s personnel file 5 and any additional training records, performance records, and disciplinary records that have not 6 been produced are within the scope of discovery for plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the motion to 7 compel is granted as to Requests 14 and 15. 8 B. Call Records and Use of Interpretation Services (Requests 11, 12, 19, and 20) 9 Request No. 11 10 All DOCUMENTS relating to RODERICK using interpretation or translation services from any 11 source, including but not limited to a professional interpretation service, SHERIFF’S OFFICE 12 personnel, or a member of the public. 13 Request No. 12 14 All DOCUMENTS relating to any call records involving RODERICK which involve or refer to 15 language interpretation or translation, including but not limited to records showing the terms 16 “interpret,” “interpretation,” “translate,” “translation,” “language,” “English,” or “Spanish.” 17 Request No. 19 18 DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all SHERIFF’S OFFICE dispatch or patrol calls during which 19 officers requested or [utilized] interpretation or translation, including the type of call, the location, 20 the district, and the type of interpretation or translation employed. 21 Request No. 20 22 All DOCUMENTS relating to any call records involving SHERIFF’S OFFICE patrol or field 23 officers which refer to language interpretation or translation, including but not limited to records 24 showing the terms “interpret,” “interpretation,” “translate,” “translation,” “language,” “English,” 25 or “Spanish.” 26 Ruling 27 In Request 12, plaintiffs seek CAD records specific to Deputy Roderick relating to 28 language interpretation or translation. In the broader Request 20, plaintiffs seek these documents 1 as to the entirety of the sheriff’s office. Plaintiffs argue these records are relevant to learn the 2 prevalence of calls involving limited English proficiency persons and the adequacy—or 3 inadequacy—of defendants’ response, as relevant to plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under Title 4 VI and Section 11135. (ECF No. 42 at 8-9.) In meet and confer, plaintiffs agreed to limit these 5 requests to the time period April 7, 2015 to present. (Id. at 17.) 6 As to Requests 12 and 20, defendants argue a lack of relevance and, specifically, that the 7 material sought would not tend to show intentional discrimination as required for a Title VI 8 claim. (ECF No. 42 at 11 & 17.) As defendants recognize, though, plaintiffs also proceed on a 9 state law claim under California Government Code section 11135, which prohibits discrimination 10 “under[ ] any program or activity that … receives any financial assistance from the state.” 11 Defendants do not argue that the state law claim requires proof of intentional discrimination, as 12 opposed to a disparate impact. Accordingly, defendants’ relevance objections are overruled as to 13 Requests 12 and 20. 14 As to Requests 19 and 20, defendants argue that producing the computer-aided dispatch 15 (“CAD”) reports as requested would be burdensome due to necessary redaction. (ECF No. 42 at 16 13.) Defendants also state the parties’ protective order currently in effect would be insufficient to 17 protect sensitive private information related to the ongoing prosecution of crimes. (Id.) However, 18 defendants offer no specific evidence of undue burden or expense. Defendants also do not support 19 their claim that the protective order would not adequately protect sensitive information with any 20 further argument or evidence. Defendants do not meet their burden of clarifying, explaining, and 21 supporting their objections with competent evidence. 22 Defendants argue Requests 19 and 20 seek the same records, just worded in a slightly 23 different way. (ECF No. 42 at 25.) Plaintiffs do not claim they seek any different documents. The 24 court will grant the motion to compel as to Request 12 and Request 19, with its specific search 25 terms, both limited to the time period April 7, 2015 to present. To the extent Request 20 is 26 duplicative, the motion to compel is denied. 27 Request 11 seeks the same documents as Request 12 but is broader in that it is not limited 28 to call records. Although defendants argue Request 11 forces them to speculate as to which 1 documents it addresses, the request can reasonably be construed as seeking documents reflecting 2 Roderick’s use of interpretive services, as defendants themselves describe it, from any source. 3 (See id. at 25.) Thus, the motion to compel is granted as to Request 11, limited to the time period 4 April 7, 2015 to present. 5 C. Further Use of Interpretation Services Request (Request 21) 6 Request No. 21 7 All DOCUMENTS relating to COMMUNICATION by or from SHERIFF’S OFFICE patrol or 8 field officers relating to interpretation or translation. 9 Ruling 10 Like Requests 19 and 20, plaintiffs state this request seeks records that show “how and 11 when Sheriff’s Office field officers make use of interpretation services” as relevant to plaintiffs’ 12 language access-based discrimination claims under Title VI and Section 11135. (ECF No. 42 at 13 24.) Plaintiffs agreed to limit the scope to the time period April 7, 2015 to present. (Id.) 14 Defendants argue seeking office-wide communications “regarding interpretations or 15 translations” is simply too broad or unintelligible, and not relevant to the claims. (Id. at 25.) The 16 court finds the request somewhat vague as to the types of documents sought and plaintiffs do not 17 explain what they seek that is not duplicative of other requests. On the other hand, defendants, 18 rather than plaintiffs, may be in a better position to know the types of documents that show the 19 information sought, or if there are none. The motion to compel is granted in that defendants shall 20 reasonably construe Request 21 as seeking documents showing “how and when Sheriff’s Office 21 field officers make use of interpretation services,” limited to the agreed-upon time period. 22 D. Charges for Interpretation Services (Request 22) 23 Request No. 22 24 All DOCUMENTS relating to the use of or charges for interpretation services by SHERIFF’S 25 OFFICE patrol officers. 26 Ruling 27 Defendants produced the contracts for interpretation services as responsive to Request 22. 28 (ECF No. 42 at 24.) Defendants argue it is unclear what, further, plaintiffs seek. (Id. at 25.) 1 Plaintiffs do not elaborate on what, further, they seek, but state they never agreed to limit their 2 request to simply contracts and that they have repeatedly agreed to more time for defendants to 3 ascertain what documents exist. 4 The court is inclined to grant—at least in part—the motion to compel as to this request. 5 However, the court is not satisfied that adequate meet and confer has occurred. The parties shall 6 promptly meet and confer regarding the types of documents plaintiffs seek and whether plaintiffs 7 will narrow or limit the scope of the request. Defendants shall make a good faith effort to 8 ascertain what documents exist and shall produce responsive documents or a statement that no 9 further responsive documents exist with explanation of the search undertaken. 10 E. Other Complaints (Request 23) 11 Request No. 23 12 All DOCUMENTS relating to [any] complaint or claim against the SHERIFF’S OFFICE based 13 on lack of interpretation or involving an individual who was unable to communicate with the 14 SHERIFF’S OFFICE due to limited English proficiency. 15 Ruling 16 Plaintiffs seek records that will show officers’ failures to provide interpretation during the 17 period from April 7, 2015 to present. (ECF No. 42 at 27.) Plaintiffs state they assume these 18 requested records are stored in computer files subject to electronic search. (Id. at 28.) 19 Defendants respond that the request is patently burdensome because it is directed to the 20 entire sheriff’s office. (ECF No. 42 at 28.) Defendants also argue the complaints plaintiffs seek 21 are not both electronically maintained and searchable in the manner that plaintiffs assume. (See 22 id.) 23 The court is inclined to grant in part the motion to compel as to this request. In assessing 24 reasonableness, though, some courts have limited the time frame of similar requests to three to 25 five years before the events at issue. See, e.g., Bates v. King County, No. C05-1348RSM, 2007 26 WL 1059108, at * 3 (W.D. Wash. April 6, 2007) (limiting request for prior citizen complaints to a 27 period of three years). Here, plaintiffs agreed to limit the request to the time period from April 7, 28 2015 to present, which is a period of almost eight years. Plaintiffs present no legal or factual 1 arguments for the temporal scope of the request in light of defendants’ claimed burden. On the 2 other hand, defendants failed to submit any competent evidence to support their objection based 3 on undue burden. 4 The court is not satisfied that adequate meet and confer has occurred as to this request. 5 The parties shall promptly meet and confer and attempt to resolve the dispute. To the extent 6 defendants continue to assert in good faith that searching for the requested documents is 7 unreasonably burdensome, and to the extent plaintiffs do not agree to reduce the scope 8 accordingly, the undersigned will be available for an informal telephonic conference. The parties 9 are directed to the undersigned’s case management procedures for informal telephonic 10 conferences on discovery disputes, available on the court’s website. 11 F. Request for Attorney Fees 12 If the motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the court may, after giving an 13 opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 37(a)(5)(C). Plaintiffs’ request that defendants pay reasonable attorneys’ fees is denied without 15 prejudice at this time. The court will entertain a renewed request if further meet and confer efforts 16 on the remaining disputes are unsuccessful. 17 IV. Order 18 In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED: 19 1. The hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to compel previously set for March 15, 2023 is 20 vacated. 21 2. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted as to plaintiffs’ Request for Production of 22 Documents, Set One, Requests 11, 12, 14, 15, 19 and 21; within twenty (20) days of 23 the date of this order, defendants shall provide responsive documents or a statement 24 that no further responsive documents exist with an explanation of the search made. 25 3. In all other respects the motion to compel is denied at this time but the parties shall 26 promptly meet and confer further as to Requests 19 and 23; the parties are directed to 27 the undersigned’s case management procedures for informal telephonic conferences 28 on discovery disputes, available on the court’s website. ] 4. Plaintiffs’ request that defendants pay reasonable attorneys’ fees is denied without 2 prejudice to a renewed request if meet and confer efforts are unsuccessful. 3 | Dated: March 10, 2023 Card ft 4 LA g. ae 4 CAROLYN K.DELANEY 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 8.Doe.21ev1438.mtc 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28