Doe v. Collectco

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided July 27, 2021·No. 2:06-cv-00244·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA * * * JOHN DOE,1 Case No. 2:06-cv-00244-JCM-DJA Plaintiff, v. COLLECTCO, INC., dba COLLECTION COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiff John Doe’s motion to seal (ECF No. 12), motion to reopen case (ECF No. 15), motion to seal attaching a supplement (ECF No. 16), and two motions to seal attaching motions for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 17 and 19). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that the Court should seal the entire record, but that Plaintiff has shown good cause to redact his address and email address and replace his name with “John Doe,” the Court grants his motions to seal (ECF Nos. 12, 15, and 16) in part and denies his motion to seal attaching his motions for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 17 and 19) as moot. The Court finds these matters properly resolved without a hearing. LR 78-1. I. Background. Through his motion to seal and reopen (ECF Nos. 12 and 15), Plaintiff seeks to reopen the case to seal the record and replace his name with “John Doe.” Plaintiff explains that he is protected under California Code of Civil Procedure § 367.3 and California Government Code § 6205 (the “Safe at Home Program”) which allows crime victims to keep their addresses confidential. Plaintiff supplemented his motion (ECF No. 16) a few months later and filed motions for judicial notice of other court decisions sealing or redacting his information (ECF No. 17 and 19). II. Standard. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), the title of every complaint must “include the names of all the parties,” and a plaintiff’s use of a fictitious name may “run[] afoul of the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” Does I through XIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). “The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit permits parties to proceed anonymously “in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity. Does I through XII, 214 F.3d at 1068; see United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We are cognizant ‘that the identity of the parties in any action, civil or criminal, should not be concealed except in an unusual case, where there is a need for the cloak of anonymity’”). The decision of whether to allow a party to remain anonymous is within this Court’s discretion. See Kamehameha Sch., 596 F.3d at 1042. III. Discussion. A. Ninth Circuit authority applies to this case. Although Plaintiff asks this Court to apply California law, the case he cites does not support his position. Plaintiff uses Maldonado v. Sec’y of Cal. Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab, for the proposition that this court should apply California law to seal his case. However, Maldonado is distinguishable because it involved an ongoing case with mixed questions of state and federal law. See Maldonado v. Sec’y of Cal. Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., No. 2:06-cv-0269-MCE/GGH, 2007 WL 4249811, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 207). Here, however, Plaintiff’s case has been closed for fifteen years. Even when it was active, it involved only questions of federal and Nevada law, not California law. California law does not apply here, rather, this Court applies Ninth Circuit rules governing the use of fictitious names and sealing cases. B. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to seal the entire case. To the extent that Plaintiff asks the Court to seal the entire case, the Court declines. Courts to a particular proceeding or document: (1) whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public; and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. United States v. Doe, 870 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2017). Even when this test is satisfied, however, the public’s First Amendment right of access establishes only a strong presumption of openness, and “the public still can be denied access if closure ‘is necessitated by a compelling government interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. (citing Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1211 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989)). United States v. Doe stands for the proposition that sealing docket entries requires a connection between the threat and the docket entries. Doe, 870 F.3d at 998-1001. There, a criminal defendant moved to seal docket entries that showed that he had provided the government information about an international drug cartel in exchange for a lowered sentence. Doe, 870 F.3d at 994. Although the defendant had not received specific threats to him or his family, the Ninth Circuit found that sealing was necessary because: (1) the risks to Doe and his family were extreme due to the amount of information Doe had provided, the wealth of the international cartel with which he dealt, and the fact that inmates are routinely required to produce dockets and case documents to prove they didn’t cooperate; (2) the government had an interest in preserving its ongoing investigation; and (3) there were no adequate alternatives to closure because redacted docket entries would immediately look different than those in non-cooperators cases, readily signaling Doe’s cooperation. See id. at 998-1001 Here, Plaintiff does not overcome the First Amendment right of public access to the case docket. Under the Ninth Circuit test: (1) court’s dockets have historically been open to the press and general public; and (2) public access plays a positive role in the function of preserving case records. Plaintiff does not overcome this right because the remedy of sealing the entire docket is not narrowly tailored to achieving the goal of protecting information covered by the Safe at Home Program. Plaintiff has also not sufficiently connected the threats he has received to the docket to seal entries, here Plaintiff asks the entire case to be sealed. However, less than the criminal defendant in Doe—who had verified involvement with an international drug cartel—Plaintiff speculates that a criminal enterprise is the source of threats against him. The docket also contains very few references to Plaintiff’s address or email. On balance, however, Plaintiff has provided evidence of a serious threat. Under the Doe factors: (1) Plaintiff has alleged that the risks are extreme but has not directly connected them with the docket like the defendant in Doe who could show that the docket would form the basis for others to threaten him and his family; (2) the California government has shown an interest in protecting its citizens through the Safe at Home Program; and (3) there are adequate alternatives to sealing the entire record. Although the second factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, the first and second weigh in favor of a narrower remedy. The Court thus denies Plaintiff’s motion insofar as it asks for his entire case to be sealed. C. The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to redact his personal information. Plaintiff has shown sufficient reasons to redact his personal information from the record. While the Safe at Home Program is not able to delete information that already exists in public records, it does provide that “participants should request that confidential information on public records be replaced

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Doe v. Collectco, (D. Nev. 2021).

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