UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 24-3570
CHARLOTTE A. BURROWS, CHAIR, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this pro se lawsuit, Plaintiff John Doe apparently seeks to sue the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Department of Homeland Security for allegedly failing to
fulfill his Freedom of Information Act requests that relate to an employment-discrimination
claim he raised against the United States Coast Guard. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 4. Plaintiff
twice filed Motions to proceed pseudonymously that did not address the proper factors. See ECF
Nos. 3 (Mot.); 9 (Renewed Mot.). His third Motion addressed all the required factors but still
fell short of the detailed showing required to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure.
See ECF No. 11 (Second Renewed Mot.); 14 (First Mem. Op. & Order). The Court reached that
same conclusion when addressing Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. See ECF No. 15
(Recon. Mot.); 20 (Second Mem. Op. & Order).
Doe forged ahead and filed a Motion for Clarification claiming that the Court had
misconstrued his Complaint. See ECF No. 22 (Clarification Mot.). Acknowledging that
Plaintiff’s Complaint had failed to clearly articulate his claims, the Court granted him leave to
1 file an Amended Complaint and another Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously. See Minute Order
of July 11, 2025. Plaintiff has now filed both. See ECF Nos. 29 (Am. Compl.); 30 (Third
Renewed Mot.). His Amended Complaint raises the same FOIA claims as before, and his
renewed motion offers only arguments already considered and rejected. The Court will therefore
deny the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to
whom this case is randomly assigned. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall “hear
and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”).
I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);
LCVR 5.1(c)(1), 11.1. That requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to
proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need
for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed
in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court
must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in
full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
[1] whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;
[2] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
2 [3] the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
[4] whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly,
[5] the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).
II. Analysis
As before, factors four and five favor Plaintiff: he sues the Government for individualized
relief and has offered to disclose his identity to Defendants under seal. See First Mem. Op. &
Order at 5; Third Renewed Mot. at 6. Those two factors remain insufficient to carry the day, as
the first three continue to weigh against pseudonymity.
The first factor, once more, weighs in favor of disclosure. Under this factor, the Court
considers whether the lawsuit implicates “sensitive and highly personal” information, such as
“sexual activities,” “medical concerns,” or the “identity of abused minors.” In re Sealed Case,
971 F.3d at 326–27. Plaintiff contends that the EEO and EEOC materials he intends to file —
intake statements, counselor narratives, investigation, and the like — constitute a “new category
of sensitive and highly personal information” not previously before the Court. See Third
Renewed Mot. at 4. Those materials, however, have yet to be filed with the Court, and
speculation about future filings cannot support a present grant of anonymity. Even setting that
aside, Plaintiff’s insistence that these materials constitute “personal narratives” rather than
“workplace dynamics” does not advance his cause. Id. at 3. Swapping one label for another
does not transform an employment dispute into the kind of sensitive and highly personal matter
pseudonymity is meant to protect. See First Mem. Op. & Order at 4. To the extent his medical
records implicate such sensitive information, they are already under seal. Id. at 4, 9. With that
protection in place, this factor continues to favor disclosure.
3 As to the second factor, Plaintiff fares no better than before. He again recounts being
removed from training, placed on “Discharge Hold,” given degrading tasks, and threatened with
“brig time” if he refused to sign discharge papers. See Third Renewed Mot. at 4. These
allegations were squarely before the Court on reconsideration, where they were addressed and
found insufficient. See First Mem. Op. & Order at 4–5; Second Mem. Op. & Order at 4. His
referenced private-investigation report documenting alleged coercion was likewise in the record.
See Third Renewed Mot. at 4; ECF No. 15-3 (Priv. Investigator Rep.). Similarly, Plaintiff’s
concern about “reenter[ing] service,” Third Renewed Mot. at 4, is a mere repackaging of the
“professional blacklisting” and “life-threatening misjudgment in future public safety contexts”
that this Court has already considered and rejected under the second factor. See Recon. Mot. at
4; Second Mem. Op. & Order at 4. His “claim[] of impending retribution” therefore remains “far
too bare and attenuated” to tip this factor in his favor. See Second Mem. Op. & Order (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s newer arguments do not change the calculus. He now emphasizes severe
emotional distress and anxiety stemming from his Coast Guard experience and fears that public
exposure will traumatize him. See Third Renewed Mot. at 4. Courts in this district recognize
that risks to mental health can satisfy factor two, particularly where a plaintiff suffers from a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 24-3570
CHARLOTTE A. BURROWS, CHAIR, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this pro se lawsuit, Plaintiff John Doe apparently seeks to sue the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Department of Homeland Security for allegedly failing to
fulfill his Freedom of Information Act requests that relate to an employment-discrimination
claim he raised against the United States Coast Guard. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 4. Plaintiff
twice filed Motions to proceed pseudonymously that did not address the proper factors. See ECF
Nos. 3 (Mot.); 9 (Renewed Mot.). His third Motion addressed all the required factors but still
fell short of the detailed showing required to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure.
See ECF No. 11 (Second Renewed Mot.); 14 (First Mem. Op. & Order). The Court reached that
same conclusion when addressing Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. See ECF No. 15
(Recon. Mot.); 20 (Second Mem. Op. & Order).
Doe forged ahead and filed a Motion for Clarification claiming that the Court had
misconstrued his Complaint. See ECF No. 22 (Clarification Mot.). Acknowledging that
Plaintiff’s Complaint had failed to clearly articulate his claims, the Court granted him leave to
1 file an Amended Complaint and another Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously. See Minute Order
of July 11, 2025. Plaintiff has now filed both. See ECF Nos. 29 (Am. Compl.); 30 (Third
Renewed Mot.). His Amended Complaint raises the same FOIA claims as before, and his
renewed motion offers only arguments already considered and rejected. The Court will therefore
deny the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to
whom this case is randomly assigned. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall “hear
and determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”).
I. Legal Standard
Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);
LCVR 5.1(c)(1), 11.1. That requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of
litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of
governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial
proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to
proceed pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need
for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed
in its own name.” In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court
must “‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in
full disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d at 96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:
[1] whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;
[2] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;
2 [3] the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
[4] whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and relatedly,
[5] the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (first alteration in original).
II. Analysis
As before, factors four and five favor Plaintiff: he sues the Government for individualized
relief and has offered to disclose his identity to Defendants under seal. See First Mem. Op. &
Order at 5; Third Renewed Mot. at 6. Those two factors remain insufficient to carry the day, as
the first three continue to weigh against pseudonymity.
The first factor, once more, weighs in favor of disclosure. Under this factor, the Court
considers whether the lawsuit implicates “sensitive and highly personal” information, such as
“sexual activities,” “medical concerns,” or the “identity of abused minors.” In re Sealed Case,
971 F.3d at 326–27. Plaintiff contends that the EEO and EEOC materials he intends to file —
intake statements, counselor narratives, investigation, and the like — constitute a “new category
of sensitive and highly personal information” not previously before the Court. See Third
Renewed Mot. at 4. Those materials, however, have yet to be filed with the Court, and
speculation about future filings cannot support a present grant of anonymity. Even setting that
aside, Plaintiff’s insistence that these materials constitute “personal narratives” rather than
“workplace dynamics” does not advance his cause. Id. at 3. Swapping one label for another
does not transform an employment dispute into the kind of sensitive and highly personal matter
pseudonymity is meant to protect. See First Mem. Op. & Order at 4. To the extent his medical
records implicate such sensitive information, they are already under seal. Id. at 4, 9. With that
protection in place, this factor continues to favor disclosure.
3 As to the second factor, Plaintiff fares no better than before. He again recounts being
removed from training, placed on “Discharge Hold,” given degrading tasks, and threatened with
“brig time” if he refused to sign discharge papers. See Third Renewed Mot. at 4. These
allegations were squarely before the Court on reconsideration, where they were addressed and
found insufficient. See First Mem. Op. & Order at 4–5; Second Mem. Op. & Order at 4. His
referenced private-investigation report documenting alleged coercion was likewise in the record.
See Third Renewed Mot. at 4; ECF No. 15-3 (Priv. Investigator Rep.). Similarly, Plaintiff’s
concern about “reenter[ing] service,” Third Renewed Mot. at 4, is a mere repackaging of the
“professional blacklisting” and “life-threatening misjudgment in future public safety contexts”
that this Court has already considered and rejected under the second factor. See Recon. Mot. at
4; Second Mem. Op. & Order at 4. His “claim[] of impending retribution” therefore remains “far
too bare and attenuated” to tip this factor in his favor. See Second Mem. Op. & Order (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s newer arguments do not change the calculus. He now emphasizes severe
emotional distress and anxiety stemming from his Coast Guard experience and fears that public
exposure will traumatize him. See Third Renewed Mot. at 4. Courts in this district recognize
that risks to mental health can satisfy factor two, particularly where a plaintiff suffers from a
documented mental illness or psychological condition that public disclosure would exacerbate.
See Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2014); Doe v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4637014, at *4
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (“Courts generally find a risk of retaliatory harm in cases where the
moving party provides evidence that psychological damage is anticipated if a party’s identity is
disclosed.”) (cleaned up). While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s distress, he does not
allege any such condition. General emotional distress tied to past events and a fear of trauma
4 from litigation fall short of the kind of concrete psychological harm that factor two contemplates.
See Doe v. Rubio, 2025 WL 1676007, at *3 (D.D.C. June 13, 2025) (“[G]eneralized claims of
mental hardship that are unconnected to any substantial threats of psychological damage are
insufficient to support pseudonymity.”). The second factor therefore continues to weigh against
pseudonymity.
The third factor similarly supports disclosure. Plaintiff initially conceded this point
outright, explaining that “[n]o minors are implicated by this litigation, so Factor Three does not
favor pseudonymity.” Third Renewed Mot. at 5. He subsequently filed a supplemental
document featuring a declaration from a family member who is a minor and whose privacy
interests, he now argues, would be jeopardized by disclosure. See ECF No. 34 (Suppl. Mot.) at
2. This belated pivot is unpersuasive for several reasons. Courts have permitted pseudonymity
under factor three where adult plaintiffs share “common privacy interests with their minor child
due to their intractably linked relationship.” J. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 23-1279, ECF No. 3
(Mem. Op. & Order) at 4 (D.D.C. May 9, 2023). Unlike the parent-child relationship courts
have credited, the minor here is not Plaintiff’s child, and it is difficult to discern how a FOIA
case concerning Plaintiff’s Coast Guard separation would implicate the minor’s privacy interests
at all. Any resulting privacy concern is more appropriately addressed through redaction than
through anonymity for Plaintiff. This factor therefore continues to support disclosure.
Despite five attempts in total, Plaintiff has not bridged the gap. Though factors four and
five remain in his favor, they alone cannot rebut “the public’s presumptive and substantial
interest in knowing” the identity of litigants. Doe v. DHS, 2022 WL 1210689, at *3 (D.D.C.
Mar. 14, 2022).
5 III. Conclusion
The Court accordingly ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiff’s [30] and [34] Motions for Leave to File Under Pseudonym are
DENIED;
2. Within fourteen days of the Court’s Order, Plaintiff shall file a Notice
advising the Clerk of the Court whether he wishes to proceed with filing the
Complaint on the public docket using his real name, and, if so, shall also file
his [30] Motion on the public docket; and
3. If Plaintiff does not file such Notice within fourteen days, the Clerk is directed
to terminate the case.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: March 31, 2026