Doe on the Dem. of Lassiter v. Davis

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Doe on the Dem. of Lassiter v. Davis

64 N.C. 498

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJune 5, 1870

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 64 N.C. 498 (Doe on the Dem. of Lassiter v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Doe on the Dem. of Lassiter v. Davis, 64 N.C. 498 (N.C. 1870).

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Opinion

Eeade, J.

His Honor instructed the jury, “thatif, at the time the deed to the defendant was executed by Merry-man, he, Merryman, had the intent thereby to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff who was his creditor, or any other of his creditors, the deed was void.”

His Honor did not allow the character of the contract to govern, but simply the intent of one of the parties. If this were the law, then it would never be safe to purchase any thing — certainly not without inquiring into the intent of the vendor: and even then he might declare a good intent, and yet be induced by a bad one, and then the bad one would govern. In the case of Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 64, his Honor below had charged that “ if the conveyance were to pay a Iona fide debt, it will be upheld, although the debtor made it with a fraudulent intent.” This Court overruled his Honor, and said; “ This charge is so broad we cannot sustain it.” That might seem to sustain the charge in this case: but a charge must be understood with reference to the facts in the particular case; and in Devries v. Phillips, supra, there were badges of fraud upon the conveyance itself, and of course whatever was apparent upon the face of the deed be *500 tween the parties, both parties were cognizant, of and participated in. In Rose v. Coble, Phil. 517, this Court said: “ To render a contract void for fraud, the fraud must affect the contract. A contract is not the purpose of one, but the agreement of two minds;” and of course both parties must intend the fraud: see also Hafner v. Irwin, 1 Ire. 490; Stone v. Marshal, 7 Jon. 300.

The distinction seems to be this.-' 1. A “voluntary gift or settlement” is void, if it was the intent of the maker to hinder, delay or defraud, whether the party who takes the gift, participated in the fraudulent intent or not. 2. An absolute conveyance for a valuable consideration, is good, notwithstanding the intent of the maker to defraud, unless the other party participated. The fraud must enter into and affect the contract.

There was error.

Per Curiam. Venire de novo.

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Eeade, J.

His Honor instructed the jury, “thatif, at the time the deed to the defendant was executed by Merry-man, he, Merryman, had the intent thereby to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff who was his creditor, or any other of his creditors, the deed was void.”

His Honor did not allow the character of the contract to govern, but simply the intent of one of the parties. If this were the law, then it would never be safe to purchase any thing — certainly not without inquiring into the intent of the vendor: and even then he might declare a good intent, and yet be induced by a bad one, and then the bad one would govern. In the case of Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 64, his Honor below had charged that “ if the conveyance were to pay a Iona fide debt, it will be upheld, although the debtor made it with a fraudulent intent.” This Court overruled his Honor, and said; “ This charge is so broad we cannot sustain it.” That might seem to sustain the charge in this case: but a charge must be understood with reference to the facts in the particular case; and in Devries v. Phillips, supra, there were badges of fraud upon the conveyance itself, and of course whatever was apparent upon the face of the deed be *500 tween the parties, both parties were cognizant, of and participated in. In Rose v. Coble, Phil. 517, this Court said: “ To render a contract void for fraud, the fraud must affect the contract. A contract is not the purpose of one, but the agreement of two minds;” and of course both parties must intend the fraud: see also Hafner v. Irwin, 1 Ire. 490; Stone v. Marshal, 7 Jon. 300.

The distinction seems to be this.-' 1. A “voluntary gift or settlement” is void, if it was the intent of the maker to hinder, delay or defraud, whether the party who takes the gift, participated in the fraudulent intent or not. 2. An absolute conveyance for a valuable consideration, is good, notwithstanding the intent of the maker to defraud, unless the other party participated. The fraud must enter into and affect the contract.

There was error.

Per Curiam. Venire de novo.

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64 N.C. 498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doe-on-the-dem-of-lassiter-v-davis-nc-1870.

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