Doe, John v. Gonzales, Alberto R.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 17, 2007
Docket03-3671
StatusPublished

This text of Doe, John v. Gonzales, Alberto R. (Doe, John v. Gonzales, Alberto R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doe, John v. Gonzales, Alberto R., (7th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 03-3671 JOHN DOE, Petitioner, v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________ Petition to Review an Order by the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. 72 414 062 ____________ ARGUED FEBRUARY 23, 2007—DECIDED APRIL 17, 2007 ____________

Before POSNER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges. POSNER, Circuit Judge. John Doe is the pseudonym of a former lieutenant in El Salvador’s army who has sought asylum in the United States. He has been permitted to litigate his claim pseudonymously because of his fear that if he is returned to El Salvador he will be killed. An immigration judge denied his claim for asylum and other relief back in 2001, and despite the novelty and im- portance of the case the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision without opinion. 2 No. 03-3671

The roots of the case are in a notorious episode in El Salvador’s vicious civil war, which raged from 1980 to 1992 and included such atrocities as the murder of a Catholic archbishop while he was celebrating mass, the rape and murder of four American nuns, and the Jesuit murders out of which this case arises. Doe in 1989 was an army lieutenant assigned as an instructor at the military academy in San Salvador. The head of the academy, a colonel named Benavides, one evening convened a meeting that he ordered Doe to attend. At the meeting Benavides announced that he had been ordered to kill Father Ellacuria, a Jesuit who was the president of a university in San Salvador and was regarded as an ally of the rebels. Another colonel, Hernandez, ordered Doe to accompany the members of the Atlacatl Battalion (which in 1981 had massacred the entire popula- tion—men, women, and children—more than 200 in all, of the village of El Mozote) who would conduct the opera- tion under the command of a lieutenant named Espinoza, a member of the battalion. Doe expressed to Hernandez misgivings about the mission. The two agreed that the order to kill the Jesuit was immoral, but that to object would risk their being killed. Doe prepared for the mission by donning battle fatigues, painting camouflage on his face, and fetching his rifle and ammunition. He then accompanied the 30 to 40 mem- bers of the Atlacatl Battalion assigned to the mission. When they arrived at the university, around midnight, Doe walked about the university grounds (with which he was not familiar—unlike the members of the Atlacatl Battalion, who had reconnoitered the site several days before the attack), saw two women in a room, heard shots, and later saw bodies on the ground. Six Jesuits, including No. 03-3671 3

the university’s president, were killed, along with a female cook and her daughter. There were no survivors. Doe did not give orders, fire his gun, seize anyone, or block anyone’s attempted escape. But when he returned to the base, he assisted in destroying log books identify- ing the soldiers who had participated in the raid. All this is according to Doe’s testimony, which the immigration judge credited. The Salvadoran ministry of defense appointed an “Honor Commission” of military officers to investigate the mur- ders. The commission ordered Doe’s arrest. He was tried for the murders along with Benavides. Both were con- victed and given prison sentences. Seven others—members of the Atlacatl Battalion who had participated in the mission, including the commander, Espinoza—were also tried, but they were acquitted, though several of them had confessed to participating in the murders. The trial took place in 1991. The following year, as part of the accord that ended the civil war, the United Nations appointed a “Truth Commission” for El Salvador to investigate “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently de- mands that the public should know the truth.” United Nations Truth Commission, From Madness to Hope: The 12- Year War in El Salvador 18 (1993). High-ranking officers ordered Doe not to cooperate with the commission. But he did cooperate, revealing not only to the commission but also to Father Tojeira, a leading Jesuit, what he knew about the murders at the university. The commission issued its report the following year. The report condemned the high command of the Salvadoran armed forces, criticized the 1991 trial in which Doe had 4 No. 03-3671

been convicted, and recommended that he be pardoned. Id. at 54. Within a week the government amnestied every- one—including members of the high command, Benavides, and Doe—who had been accused of or implicated in the murders. On April 1, 1993, Doe was released from prison. Four days later, having learned that members of the high command suspected that it was he who had spilled the beans to the Truth Commission and Father Tojeira, and believing that he would be killed if he remained in El Salvador, Doe fled the country with the assistance of Jesuits, first to Mexico and then to the United States. The immigration judge denied Doe’s application for asylum and related relief on three independent grounds: that Doe had “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu- lar social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(B), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); that he had been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), namely murder, and that he lacked a well-founded fear of persecution should he be returned to El Salvador, since the political situation in that country had improved since 1993. The murder of the Jesuit priests was persecution on account of political opinion. In contrast, the murder of the two women, if unrelated to their political opinions and thus motivated solely by a desire to eliminate wit- nesses to the murder of the priests, would not be persecu- tion within the meaning of the asylum statute because it would not be on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); Vasquez v. INS, 177 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (per No. 03-3671 5

curiam); In re McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 95-97 (B.I.A. 1984). It would be different had the women been murdered because they were believed to be involved in the Jesuits’ political activities, Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 512- 14, 521-22 (3d Cir. 2006), or, as we’ll see, had the murders been a necessary step in the persecution, as they would have been had the women been shot trying to shield the priests with their bodies. But neither point is argued, or bears on the issues in this case; it is enough that the murdered priests were victims of persecution. Whether Doe “assisted” or otherwise “participated” in the persecution of the Jesuits who were killed is a close question. His mere presence does not seem like assistance. He was brought in under odd circumstances that do not suggest that he played any role in making the mission more likely to succeed. In contrast to the members of the Atlacatl Battalion, he was given no intelligence about the mission, no particular assignment to fulfill, did not help plan the mission, and did not know any of its details or even the layout of the university. His subsequent con- viction in the face of the acquittals of the culpable defen- dants is consistent with his having been included on the mission because they might need a scapegoat. True, his presence bulked up the attacking force from 30 to 40 to 31 to 41, and in other circumstances that could be significant assistance.

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