Doe ex dem. Clements v. Roe

4 Ga. 148
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided January 15, 1848·No. No. 15·Published·Cited by 25 cases

Opinion

By the Court.

Warner, J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] On the trial of this cause, it was objected, that the order to-sell all the real estate of the-decedent, was not sufficient authority to the administrators to sell the particular Ibis of land described' in the deed. Perhaps it would have been more regular, and the better practice undoubtedly is, to have the lands described by number and district, in the order of the Court of Ordinary granting leave to sell, so that it may distinctly appear, what lands of the intestate the administrator has leave of the Court to sell, for the payment of debts. The order here, however, was to sell all the real estate of the intestate, which necessarily includes all the lands of which he was seized, at the time of'his death, embracing the premises in controversy; therefore, this exception was properly overruled by the court below.

The other objections to the deed being read in evidence, and the exceptions to the charge of the Court being substantially the. same, will be considered together.

In this State, on the death of the ancestor intestate, his lands-descend to his heirs at law, the title to which, is subject to be divested for the payment of debts, in the manner prescribed by the General Assembly.

On the death of John Clements, the intestate, the title to his lands was cast upon his heh-s, one of whom is now the lessor of the plaintiff. The title of the heir is sought to be divested' by an administrator’s sale of the premises in dispute.

The Act of 1816 provides, that on the application of the administrator, it shall be lawful for the - Inferior Courts in the several counties in this State, when sitting for Ordinary purposes, to order a sale of a part or the whole-of the real estate of the intes[153] tate, where it is mad % fully, and plainly appear, that the same wilt he for the benefit of the heirs and creditors of such estate. The Act requires that a notice of such application for sale, shall he first made in one of the public gazettes of this State, at least four months before any order absolute shall be made thereupon. And. further directs, that the sale shall be at public auction, Cn the first Tuesday of the month, between the usual hours of sale, at the place of public sales in the county where such real estate majf lay; first giving sixty days’ notice thereof, in one of the public gazettes of this State, and at the door of the court-house, in the county where such sales are to be had. Prince’s Dig. 248. By virtue of this Statute, the administrator is clothed with "a naked power to sell the real estate of his intestate, and whenever it is maAe fully, wA plainly to appear to the Court of Ordinary, that such sale will be for the benefit of the heirs and creditors of such estate. In the execution of this power, conferred upon the administrator, the legislature have thought proper to impose cer* tain conditions and restrictions. First, the administrator must obtain the order of the Court of Ordinary, granting him license to make the sale, which order must be preceded by a four months’ notice, in one of the gazettes of this State, of his intended application for such order. Second, the sale must be made .at public auction, on the first Tuesday in the month, between the usual hours of sale. Third, the land must be sold at the place of pub* lie sales, in the county where the same lies. Fourth, the administrator is required to give sixty days notice of the time and place of such sale, in one of the gazettes of this State, and at the door of the court house in the county where such sale is to he had. The title of the heirs to the lands of their ancestor, cannot be divested by a sale, made by the administrator, until in the judgment of the Court of Ordinary, there is a manifest necessity for such sale, or that such sale will be “ fully and plainly for the benefit of the heirs and creditors.”

"Whenever, in the judgment of the Court of Ordinary, it fully and plainly appears, to be for the benefit of the heirs and creditors of the intestate’s estate, that the real estate of the decedent should be sold, then and not otherwise, is .the administrator empowered to make sale thereof, and divest the heirs of their title.

[2.] It is a general rule, that whenever a title to ¡property is sought to be divested, by the authority of -the law, all the requisites, [154] which the law prescribes to effect that object, must be complied with. The agent of the law, when he seeks to divest one of his property, and pass the title thereto to another, must show he has ample authority to make such transfer. And he must not only show his authority for so doing, but he must execute his authority, in the manner prescribed by the law which confers the authority upon him. It was urged on the argument by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that in the case of a naked power, not coupled with an interest, the law requires that every prerequisite to the exercise of that power, should precede it. This, as a general proposition, is undoubtedly true, and although the courts cannot dispense with th & form prescribed, in the execution of a power, yet they may be allowed to put a liberal construction on the1 words of the power. Sugden on Powers, 214.

An administrator in this State, as we have seen, derives his power and authority to convey the real estate of his intestate, from the statute. Does the record before us disclose that the requisitions of the statute were complied with by the administrator, in making sale of his intestate’s real estate %

The authority to make the sale is shown, and we presume the' Court of Ordinary required all the law requires to have been done, before granting the order to sell, and we shall not go behind-that judgment.

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