Dodd v. Middletown Lodge

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Dodd v. Middletown Lodge

251 A.D.2d 534, 673 N.Y.S.2d 924, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7545

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 22, 1998

DocketNo. 1097

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 251 A.D.2d 534 (Dodd v. Middletown Lodge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dodd v. Middletown Lodge, 251 A.D.2d 534, 673 N.Y.S.2d 924, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7545 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

—In an action, [535]*535inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated September 25, 1997, which, upon an order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from the order dated September 9, 1997, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, since the plaintiff failed to present proof sufficient to establish the existence of any triable material questions of fact which would preclude such relief (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557). Rosenblatt, J. P., Sullivan, Joy, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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—In an action, [535]*535inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Owen, J.), dated September 25, 1997, which, upon an order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from the order dated September 9, 1997, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, since the plaintiff failed to present proof sufficient to establish the existence of any triable material questions of fact which would preclude such relief (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557). Rosenblatt, J. P., Sullivan, Joy, Altman and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

251 A.D.2d 534, 673 N.Y.S.2d 924, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7545, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dodd-v-middletown-lodge-nyappdiv-1998.

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