Dockery v. Miller

28 Tenn. 731
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1849
StatusPublished

This text of 28 Tenn. 731 (Dockery v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dockery v. Miller, 28 Tenn. 731 (Tenn. 1849).

Opinion

Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of debt upon two bills single executed to the Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of Memphis, the one for three thousand eight hundred and sixty-six dollars [732]*732sixty-seven cents, payable two years after date; and the other for four thousand one hundred and thirty-three dollars thirty-three cents, payable three years after date, which bills single were assigned to the plaintiff.

To the plaintiff’s declaration the defendant pleaded three pleas, containing substantially the same matter of defence, viz, that the said bills single were discounted by the said bank, the 29th day of May, 2844, and that each of said bills single had more than twelve months to run after they were discounted; and that by the fundamental articles of the charter of said bank, it was prohibitéd from discounting any paper which would not fall due within twelve months after the time such paper should be discounted; wherefore, the said bills single were wholly void. To these pleas, the plaintiff replied, that at the time said bills single were discounted by said bank, the defendant was a debtor to the bank in the sum of ten thousand dollars, and that for the better ■security thereof the said bank deemed it advisable to take paper from the. defendant, having longer time to run to maturity, than twelve months; and therefore said bank did discount said bills single having a longer time to run than twelve months. To the replications the ■defendant demurred.

These pleadings were made up at the February term, 1848, of the Circuit Court, and at the June term thereafter, the defendant filed his affidavit, stating that the two bills single described in the plaintiff’s declaration in this case were discounted by the Farmers’ S¿ Merchants’ Bank of Memphis, at a rate of discount of a fraction over seven per centum per annum, making the discount equal to eight per centum per annum of interest; and that the said notes when discounted by the bank [733]*733bad, both of them over one year to run to maturity, that is, until they fell due, to wit, one of them nearly two' years, and the other nearly three years. Upon this affidavit the defendant moved the court for leave to amend his second and third pleas, by inserting the averment that the notes in question were discounted at the Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, “ at the rate of a fraction over seven per centum per annum, making the discount equal to eight per centum per annum interest,” which motion was overruled by the court; and thereupon the defendant’s demurrers to the plaintiff’s replications were overruled and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the debt in the declaration mentioned. From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court.

The only question in this case that has presented any difficulty to our minds, is, as to the application of the defendant in the court below, to be permitted to amend two of his "pleas. The fact disclosed in the defendant’s affidavit, if properly pleaded, would have been a good defence to the action, at least in part, and as the attainment of justice ought to be the object of all courts, it would seem that a Circuit Court with such a fact thus presented should have been inclined to permit this matter of defence to be brought before it, by a proper plea.

The act of 1809, ch. 49, sec. 21, authorises the court to permit the parties from time to time to amend any defect, omission or imperfection upon such terms, as the said courts shall in their discretion, and by their rules prescribe. This court has gone very far in sustaining the action of the Circuit Court in allowing - amendments to process and pleadings; and certainly, would have given its sanction to the leave to amend asked for in this case, if the Circuit Court had allowed the amendment, and the [734]*734objection had come from the other side. But we know of no case, in which this court has reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, for refusing to give a party leave to amend his plea or declaration.

The right of a party to amend is addressed to the discretion of the court. The Circuit Court, according to the act of 1809, allows amendments according to the rules it may prescribe, and upon such terms, as in its discretion, it may impose. With such latitude of discretion, allowed by law, it must be seen that it would be difficult, if not impossible for this court to undertake to control that discretion. In regulating their rules of practice, in the nature of things, the Circuit Courts must be left to their own sense of propriety and to their responsibility, so as to exercise their discretion that right and justice shall be done. For upon this exercise of discretion in matters over which this court can exercise no control, the very fate of a cause may often depend. In applications for continuance, and for leave to take depositions, exemplifications of this remark are constantly occurring. And so in applications for leave to amend. But, difficult as it may be, for this court to control the discretion of the Circuit Court, still we do not intend to say that in no case will it be done. On the contrary, we think, that where a plea is drawn out in proper form, containing a good defence to the action, and the truth of it is verified by affidavit, it would be error not to permit such plea to be filed, provided the motion was made before the demurrer came on for argument. But on the other hand, if the amended plea is not offered, so that the court can see that it would, as amended be a good defence, this court has decided in the case of Rainey and Henderson vs. Sanders, (4 Hum. R. 447-8,) it [735]*735is no error to refuse it. We cannot, therefore, say that the court erred in this case, in refusing to permit the proposed amendment. As an averment in the pleas in -which it was proposed to be inserted, it would have been insensible and incongruous. Those pleas allege, that the charter of the Bank prohibited the discount of any paper having more than twelve months to run; and that the bills single sued on, had more than twelve months to run after they were discounted; wherefore, they were void. The amendment proposed is an averment that the bills single were discounted at a fraction over seven per eentum per annum, equal to eight per centum interest. This averment has no connection with the other matter of the pleas, and would only tend to confuse and obscure their meaning. If the matter of the pleas be a defence to the action, and the averment proposed to be inserted, by way of amendment, be also a defence to the action, these different defences, thus stated in the same plea, would make it bad for duplicity. And if the matter of these pleas be no good defence to the action, the insertion of the proposed averment in pleas averring entirely, •different matters of defence, would tend to confuse the plaintiff as to the mode of treating the plea so amended, and, therefore should not have been allowed.

As the affidavit disclosed proper matter for a plea, the court might have suggested the impropriety of introducing it into the pleas already filed, and have indulged the party to draw out a proper plea. But the court was not bound to do this, and we cannot say that his Honor erred for failing to do so. To put the court in the wrong, it is necessary in such cases, that the proposed amendment be drawn out in form and offered properly verified.

[736]*7362. The next enquiry is, did the court err in overruling the defendant’s demurrers to the plaintiff’s replications?

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 Tenn. 731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dockery-v-miller-tenn-1849.