F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 23 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JAMES ELMER DOBSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-8063 (D.C. No. 97-CV-0069-B) NATHAN A. McNALLY, JR., in his (D. Wyo.) official capacity as Crook County Jailer; BRIAN MOORHOUSE, in his official capacity as Crook County Sheriff; TY STUTZMAN, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; JOSEPH M. BARON, in his official capacity as Crook County Attorney; BILL RICE, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Attorney; DALE SANDER, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; APRIL GLICK, in her official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; DOUGLAS DESKIN, in his official capacity as Wyoming Department of Transportation Highway Patrol Office,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the
case is ordered submitted without oral argument.
James Elmer Dobson, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Dobson was allegedly arrested on or about September 5, 1996, and charged
the following day with two counts of attempting to obtain property from another
person by false pretense and with intent to defraud. Although the record is
unclear, it appears he was detained in county jail for a brief period of time until
he made bail. It also appears a search warrant was issued for his residence. The
record does not indicate the outcome of the criminal proceedings.
Dobson filed his complaint on March 20, 1997, against various officials
involved in his arrest and detainment, claiming he was entitled to $17 million in
damages due to various violations of his constitutional rights. The three
defendants who were members of the Wyoming judiciary moved to dismiss,
asserting absolute judicial immunity. The district court granted their motion and
-2- dismissed the causes of action against them without prejudice. Dobson attempted
to appeal the dismissal, but this court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding the order was not a final appealable order. Dobson v. Waugh , 131
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) (table). The remaining defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim. Dobson responded with a motion for
summary judgment against all of the defendants, including those who were
dismissed. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment and
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating:
The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Simply put, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state the facts that form the basis of his claims. This renders the complaint largely incomprehensible and leaves the Court without means to assess Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of constitutional violations. Because Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court will allow Plaintiff twenty (20) days from the date of the hearing (May 21, 1998), in which to amend his complaint by stating concisely and with specificity the underlying facts out of which his claims arise .
Record, Doc. 42 at 1-2. Dobson filed an amended complaint against all of the
original defendants on June 9, 1998. The district court dismissed the action on
June 29, 1998, with prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure “to amend his complaint as
instructed by the Court.” Record, Doc. 53 at 1.
We construe the district court’s dismissal of Dobson’s amended complaint
as a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and review the dismissal de novo, taking all of the
-3- plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. See Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc. , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997). Although we must liberally construe a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint, we may not accept as true those allegations that are
conclusory in nature. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient
to state a claim on which relief can be based.”). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district
court may dismiss a complaint that does not contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), if there appears to be no set
of facts on which plaintiff may state a claim for relief. See Monument Builders
of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n , 891 F.2d 1473, 1480
(10th Cir. 1989).
At the outset, we note Dobson’s amended complaint, though somewhat
more specific than his original complaint, substantially fails to describe the
grounds upon which his claim rests. The amended complaint (like the original
complaint) is largely comprised of conclusory allegations of constitutional
deprivations apparently arising out of Dobson’s arrest and subsequent
confinement. Even taking into account information contained in supporting
exhibits attached to the amended complaint, we are left with serious questions
about the claims Dobson is attempting to assert.
-4- Even assuming, arguendo, that Dobson’s amended complaint satisfies the
requirements of Rule 8(a), we conclude he has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against any of the named defendants. The three members of
the Wyoming judiciary are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Stump v.
Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). The two county prosecutors involved in
the prosecution of Dobson’s criminal case are entitled to immunity from suit
under § 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976).
The amended complaint fails to demonstrate that Dobson is entitled to any
legal relief arising from the actions of the highway patrol officer who allegedly
arrested Dobson. Although Dobson alleges the officer arrested him “without the
proper and lawful paperwork,” there is no assertion the officer lacked probable
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 23 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JAMES ELMER DOBSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-8063 (D.C. No. 97-CV-0069-B) NATHAN A. McNALLY, JR., in his (D. Wyo.) official capacity as Crook County Jailer; BRIAN MOORHOUSE, in his official capacity as Crook County Sheriff; TY STUTZMAN, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; JOSEPH M. BARON, in his official capacity as Crook County Attorney; BILL RICE, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Attorney; DALE SANDER, in his official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; APRIL GLICK, in her official capacity as Crook County Deputy Sheriff; DOUGLAS DESKIN, in his official capacity as Wyoming Department of Transportation Highway Patrol Office,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the
case is ordered submitted without oral argument.
James Elmer Dobson, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Dobson was allegedly arrested on or about September 5, 1996, and charged
the following day with two counts of attempting to obtain property from another
person by false pretense and with intent to defraud. Although the record is
unclear, it appears he was detained in county jail for a brief period of time until
he made bail. It also appears a search warrant was issued for his residence. The
record does not indicate the outcome of the criminal proceedings.
Dobson filed his complaint on March 20, 1997, against various officials
involved in his arrest and detainment, claiming he was entitled to $17 million in
damages due to various violations of his constitutional rights. The three
defendants who were members of the Wyoming judiciary moved to dismiss,
asserting absolute judicial immunity. The district court granted their motion and
-2- dismissed the causes of action against them without prejudice. Dobson attempted
to appeal the dismissal, but this court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding the order was not a final appealable order. Dobson v. Waugh , 131
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) (table). The remaining defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim. Dobson responded with a motion for
summary judgment against all of the defendants, including those who were
dismissed. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment and
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating:
The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Simply put, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state the facts that form the basis of his claims. This renders the complaint largely incomprehensible and leaves the Court without means to assess Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of constitutional violations. Because Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court will allow Plaintiff twenty (20) days from the date of the hearing (May 21, 1998), in which to amend his complaint by stating concisely and with specificity the underlying facts out of which his claims arise .
Record, Doc. 42 at 1-2. Dobson filed an amended complaint against all of the
original defendants on June 9, 1998. The district court dismissed the action on
June 29, 1998, with prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure “to amend his complaint as
instructed by the Court.” Record, Doc. 53 at 1.
We construe the district court’s dismissal of Dobson’s amended complaint
as a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and review the dismissal de novo, taking all of the
-3- plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. See Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc. , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997). Although we must liberally construe a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint, we may not accept as true those allegations that are
conclusory in nature. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient
to state a claim on which relief can be based.”). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district
court may dismiss a complaint that does not contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), if there appears to be no set
of facts on which plaintiff may state a claim for relief. See Monument Builders
of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n , 891 F.2d 1473, 1480
(10th Cir. 1989).
At the outset, we note Dobson’s amended complaint, though somewhat
more specific than his original complaint, substantially fails to describe the
grounds upon which his claim rests. The amended complaint (like the original
complaint) is largely comprised of conclusory allegations of constitutional
deprivations apparently arising out of Dobson’s arrest and subsequent
confinement. Even taking into account information contained in supporting
exhibits attached to the amended complaint, we are left with serious questions
about the claims Dobson is attempting to assert.
-4- Even assuming, arguendo, that Dobson’s amended complaint satisfies the
requirements of Rule 8(a), we conclude he has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against any of the named defendants. The three members of
the Wyoming judiciary are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Stump v.
Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). The two county prosecutors involved in
the prosecution of Dobson’s criminal case are entitled to immunity from suit
under § 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976).
The amended complaint fails to demonstrate that Dobson is entitled to any
legal relief arising from the actions of the highway patrol officer who allegedly
arrested Dobson. Although Dobson alleges the officer arrested him “without the
proper and lawful paperwork,” there is no assertion the officer lacked probable
cause to arrest Dobson, as would be necessary to prevail under § 1983 on a claim
of unlawful arrest. See Thompson v. City of Lawrence , 58 F.3d 1511, 1515 (10th
Cir. 1995); Karr v. Smith , 774 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Beck v.
Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (warrantless arrest permissible if probable cause
exists to believe person has committed crime).
With respect to the three county law enforcement officers who were
allegedly involved in execution of a search warrant at Dobson’s residence, the
amended complaint contains only conclusory allegations of constitutional
violations. The complaint asserts they “violated Plaintiff’s GOD Given rights,
-5- and Constitutionally Secured Rights by Search and Seizing the property of the
Plaintiff, which denied Plaintiff Due Process of Law.” Record, Doc. 44 at 3. The
amended complaint does not assert the search warrant (a copy of which is
attached to the amended complaint) was not supported by probable cause or that
the officers failed to comply with the terms of the warrant. See generally United
States v. Kennedy , 131 F.3d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 119 S. Ct.
151 (1998); United States v. Medlin , 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988).
Finally, as to the two remaining defendants who were allegedly involved in
Dobson’s post-arrest detainment in the county jail, there is no basis for
concluding they violated Dobson’s constitutional rights. Even assuming, as
alleged by Dobson, they refused to allow him to use various herbal teas (allegedly
for self-medication) and required that he sign his name on a fingerprint card, we
conclude this is insufficient to demonstrate Dobson was subjected to any
constitutional deprivations. See , e.g. , White v. State of Colo. , 157 F.3d 1226,
1233-34 (10th Cir. 1998) (to state cognizable claim under Eighth Amendment,
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs).
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
-6-