Dobrushkin, Jacob and Galina v. Davenport Meadows, LP

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 5, 2013
Docket05-12-01285-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Dobrushkin, Jacob and Galina v. Davenport Meadows, LP (Dobrushkin, Jacob and Galina v. Davenport Meadows, LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dobrushkin, Jacob and Galina v. Davenport Meadows, LP, (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 5, 2013.

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-12-01285-CV

JACOB AND GALINA DOBRUSHKIN, Appellants V. DAVENPORT MEADOWS, LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006-00645-2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Lang, and Brown Opinion by Justice Moseley

Appellants Jacob and Galina Dobrushkin (Buyers) appeal from a combined no-evidence

and traditional summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Davenport Meadows, LP (Seller)

on Buyers’ fraud and abuse of process claims. Buyers raise two issues on appeal challenging the

summary judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced below are well

known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are

settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

After Buyers failed to close on a contract to purchase a townhome, they were sued by

Seller. Buyers counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The trial court severed Buyers’ fraud counterclaim into a separate case; this is the case on appeal

before us. After the severance Buyers added a claim for abuse of process.

Seller then filed a combined no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment

on both causes of action. Seller’s no-evidence motion challenged the following elements of

Buyers’ fraud claim: Seller made representations; the representations were false; Seller knew the

representations were false; Buyers reasonably relied on the representations; and Buyers suffered

damages as a result of that reliance. The no-evidence motion challenged the following elements

of Buyers’ abuse of process claim: Seller made improper use of process after issuance; Seller had

an ulterior motive or purpose in using the process; and Buyers suffered injury or damages as a

result. The traditional motion for summary judgment argued Buyers suffered no actual damages

and that Buyers sought to recover attorney’s fees as damages contrary to Texas law.

Buyers responded by arguing only that the no-evidence motion was premature and that

attorney’s fees were recoverable as damages. The trial court granted summary judgment without

specifying the grounds for the ruling. Buyers appeal the trial court’s judgment in the severed

action.

In their first issue, Buyers argue the trial court granted the no-evidence summary

judgment before there was an adequate time for discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). This

Court has refused to read into the rule a bright-line requirement that the discovery period be

completed before a no-evidence motion for summary judgment can be filed. Dishner v. Huitt-

Zollars, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). We have stressed,

instead, that whether a nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery under TEX. R. CIV.

P. 166(i) is case specific. See Rest. Teams Int’l., Inc. v. MG Secs. Corp., 95 S.W.3d 336, 339

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.).

–2– However, Buyers did not file an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a

verified motion for continuance. Accordingly, Buyers did not preserve their complaint that the

no-evidence summary judgment was premature. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); Willms v.

Americas Tire Co., 190 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); Dishner, 162

S.W.3d at 376; Yokogawa Corp. of Am. v. Skye Int'l Holdings, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 266, 271–72

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2004, pet. denied).

We overrule Buyers’ first issue.

Buyers’ second issue states, “[a]ttorney’s fees are recoverable as damages and

[a]ppellants pled damages in addition to attorney’s fees.” It is unclear from Buyers’ argument

whether this issue challenges both the no-evidence and traditional portions of the motion for

summary judgment. However, even if the issue responds to the no-evidence motion, it only

addresses the element of damages. Seller’s no-evidence motion challenged other elements of

each cause of action and Buyers’ issue does not challenge the summary judgment on those

elements.

Because Buyers fail to challenge all grounds raised below that could support the

summary judgment, we overrule Buyers’ second issue. See Berthelot v. Brinkmann, 322 S.W.3d

365, 370 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (appellate court will affirm summary judgment

if appellant does not present argument challenging all grounds on which the summary judgment

could have been granted); see also Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 199, 121 (Tex.

1970); Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied)

(summary judgment affirmed because it may have been granted on a ground not challenged by

appellant on appeal). We conclude the summary judgment can be affirmed on no-evidence

grounds, therefore we need not address the traditional motion for summary judgment. See TEX.

–3– R. APP. P. 47.1; Plunkett v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 106, 112 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2009, pet. denied).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Jim Moseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE

121285F.P05

–4– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

JACOB AND GALINA DOBRUSHKIN, On Appeal from the County Court at Law Appellants No. 6, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006-00645-2012. No. 05-12-01285-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley. Justices Lang and Brown participating. DAVENPORT MEADOWS, LP, Appellee

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellee DAVENPORT MEADOWS, LP recover its costs of this appeal from appellants JACOB AND GALINA DOBRUSHKIN.

Judgment entered this 5th day of November, 2013.

/JimMoseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE

–5–

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Related

Brown v. Brown
145 S.W.3d 745 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Willms v. Americas Tire Co., Inc.
190 S.W.3d 796 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Holloway v. Starnes
840 S.W.2d 14 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Plunkett v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
285 S.W.3d 106 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Dishner v. Huitt-Zollars, Inc.
162 S.W.3d 370 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Berthelot v. Brinkmann
322 S.W.3d 365 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Restaurant Teams International, Inc. v. MG Securities Corp.
95 S.W.3d 336 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Yokogawa Corp. of America v. Skye International Holdings, Inc.
159 S.W.3d 266 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Johnson v. McDaniel
461 S.W.2d 198 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1970)

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