Doan v. Phoenix, City of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided September 27, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-01995·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Danny Chu Doan, No. CV-25-01995-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Phoenix, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 At issue are several unresolved motions flooding the docket due to a high volume 17 of filings occurring weekly. To reduce confusion and delay caused by this overactive 18 docket, the Court will now resolve all pending motions related to the sealing and redaction 19 of documents, service upon Defendant Rogers, and miscellaneous filings from Plaintiff. 20 I. Sealing and Redaction of Documents on Docket 21 Plaintiff most recently filed his Notice of Compliance with Doc. 115 and Request 22 for Clarification (Doc. 117), in which he alerts the Court that the original exhibit (Doc. 23 106-1) with sensitive information has not been sealed from public access. Plaintiff is 24 correct, and the Court will make the appropriate orders herein. Importantly, though, docket 25 entry 106-1 includes Defendant Bolin’s second and third exhibit lumped under that same 26 docket entry, not just the offending first exhibit. And the redacted version created by 27 Defendant Bolin and currently filed at docket entry 116 does not include his second and 28 third exhibits. To complete the record, Defendant Bolin must file the unredacted second 1 and third exhibits originally attached to his Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss within 2 seven days of this Order. 3 Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Docket 78 and Substitute Redacted 4 Version (“Motion to Seal”) (Doc. 79). As relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 5.2(a) permits Plaintiff to redact the month and day of an individual’s birthday and a 6 minor’s name except for the initials. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to redact this information 7 from his filings. Failure to do so amounts to a waiver of redaction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(h). 8 Plaintiff has made similar omissions before. (Doc. 45.) Now, Plaintiff has forgotten, once 9 again, to redact personal information from a filing and moves to seal the original document. 10 That personal information includes his birthday, inmate number, the birthday and address 11 of his daughters. (See Doc. 78 at 17-20, 22.) 12 In the Ninth Circuit, courts “start with a strong presumption in favor of access to 13 court records.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 14 2016) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 15 2003)). “In order to overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial 16 record must articulate justifications for sealing that outweigh the historical right of access 17 and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 18 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006). Where a document is “more than tangentially related 19 to the merits” of a case, the party seeking to seal the document must demonstrate 20 “compelling reasons to keep the documents under seal.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 21 1103. 22 The personal information at issue is in exhibits that Plaintiff filed in support of his 23 Motion for Default. (Docs. 76, 78.) Undoubtedly, Plaintiff’s default motion and related 24 exhibits are more than tangentially related to the merits of this matter, and Plaintiff must 25 demonstrate compelling reasons to justify keeping the documents under seal. See 26 Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 347 F. App’x 275, 276 (9th Cir. 27 2009) (stating that default judgment is “case dispositive”); La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 28 Institutional Inv. Dealer, Case No. 09-cv-03529-JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19542, 2013 1 WL 550563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (applying the “compelling reasons” standard 2 to a motion to seal portions of the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment). Compelling 3 reasons exist “when such court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, 4 such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 5 statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citation and internal 6 quotation marks omitted). 7 Plaintiff shows no compelling reasons for sealing the designated information. First, 8 Plaintiff has already listed his daughters’ names and birthdays himself in other filings that 9 are accessible to the public. (See, e.g., Docs. 69, 77.) Plaintiff has also mentioned multiple 10 times that he is his daughters’ sole caretaker and has included his own address in filings on 11 the docket. Second, Plaintiff’s inmate number is a matter of public record and can be 12 accessed on the Arizona Department of Corrections website at any time. The fact that this 13 Court found good cause to redact his inmate number earlier does not mean there is a 14 compelling reason to do so now. (See Doc. 51.) See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (“A ‘good 15 cause’ showing will not, without more, satisfy a ‘compelling reasons’ test.”). Third, 16 Plaintiff’s failure to redact his own birthday amounts to a waiver under the Federal Rules 17 of Civil Procedure, and several documents already filed on the docket by Plaintiff himself 18 contain his birthday. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion. 19 II. Service Upon Defendant Rogers 20 Turning to service issues, Plaintiff has requested that he be permitted to serve 21 Defendant Rogers by alternative means and to extend the time to serve Defendant Rogers. 22 (Docs. 93, 99.) Plaintiff has been unable to locate Defendant Rogers despite contacting 23 GEO Group, a private prison facility that employed Mr. Rogers some years ago. (See 24 Doc. 43 at 5; Doc. 49 at 1–3.) GEO Group informed Plaintiff that they had no contact 25 information for Defendant Rogers. (Doc. 66-1 at 3; see also Doc. 93 at 2.) Plaintiff now 26 requests permission to serve Defendant Rogers by the following alternative methods: (1) 27 service by certified mail or email provided that the Court orders GEO to lodge under seal 28 any last-known address or email for Defendant Rogers; or (2) service by publication. (Doc. 1 93 at 3.) Plaintiff further requests a sixty-day extension of time to serve Defendant Rogers. 2 (Doc. 99 at 3.) 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), an individual may be served in this 4 District by following Arizona state law for service. Under both Federal and Arizona law, 5 the primary means of service are personal delivery, delivery to a person of suitable age and 6 discretion who resides at the defendant’s abode, and delivery upon an authorized agent. 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2), (h)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d), (i). Where service by the means 8 described above is “impracticable,” Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(k)(1) provides 9 that the Court may “order that service may be accomplished in another manner,” including 10 by publication. Any alternative method of service, including by publication, must also 11 comport with constitutional notions of due process. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 12 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).

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