Doan v. Metcalf

46 Iowa 120
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJune 7, 1877
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 46 Iowa 120 (Doan v. Metcalf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doan v. Metcalf, 46 Iowa 120 (iowa 1877).

Opinion

Beck, J.

i. water tition.' pai" I. The relief sought in the petition is the settlement of the interest of each party in the water conducted by the flume from plaintiff’s dam, and a partition of the water allotting to each his just share. In cases of this kind when parties have rights to determinable portions of water used for propelling machinery, their interests may be partitioned when it is practicable to do so. Cooper v. The Cedar Rapids Water Power Co., 42 Iowa, 398.

_.__. conveyance. II. In this case the first thing to be determined is the interest of the respective parties in the water appropriated, by means of plaintiff’s dam and flume, to the purp0ses 0f propelling machinery. The plaintiff is entitled to all the water except that part granted under the deed and agreement between the parties. We will proceed to determine the interest of defendants under these instruments. The grant to defendants is, in the language of the deed, the right to use water to the amount of the issue of the wheel now in said saw mill, supposed to be six hundred inches, more or less, of water.” This and another clause of the instrument must determine the extent of defendants’ rights. It is obvious that it was intended to convey sufficient water to propel the wheel described, when used in driving the machinery which it had the capacity to run. The dimension and structure of the wheel were such that, with a sufficient supply of water, it had capacity to propel a known quantity of machinery, or rather a quantity that may be determined under the laws of dynamics. It was not the intention of the parties that the wheel should be run without machinery attached thereto, nor that it should be run with less machinery than it had capacity to propel, when used to the extent of the right conveyed by the deed. The defendants, then, took by the grant the right to a stream of water sufficient to propel the quantity of machinery which could, in its proper operation, be moved by the wheel in use at the date of the deed. The wheel thus becomes the instrument for measuring the quantity of water to which defendants are entitled.

It is very plain that this quantity is not to be limited to 690 inches, for the very language of the instrument exhibits [126]*126uncertainty in the minds of the contracting parties as to that number, which was used simply in description of the wheel which was to be the measure of the water granted. If this description be incorrect or fail, the thing meant, the wheel, if it can be identified, will control as to its capacity, rather than words clearly used with the understanding and admission, on the part of both parties, of their uncertainty.

We are not required here to determine upon the methods and formulas of machinists whereby they measure waterpower by superficial inches, or to make any inquiry upon that subject. Such methods and formulas, it appears by the evidence, are used. It is quite apparent that a water wheel of given dimension, propelling its proper quantity of machinery, will use a determinable quantity of water, all necessary conditions, as the height of the head of water, etc., being known. This water issues from the wheel, and is, therefore, aptly called in the deed “the issue of the wheel.” A great deal of learning and experience were exhibited by the witnesses at the trial, upon the subject of the methods and formulas to be adopted in determining the quantity of water used by wheels of different constructions. We may be permitted to say that some of the methods explained in the testimony were rather arbitrary than based upon scientific principles. This remark, we think, will be justified when we call attention to the fact that, by some of them, the quantity is indicated by superficial inches without taking note of time, or the velocity of the water. But we are satisfied, and this conclusion is drawn from the evidence in this case, that the issue of water from a wheel may be determined, proximately at least, with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. Experience and mechanical skill, aided by the laws of hydraulics, may reach such result. We are not required, in view of the disposition we shall make of the case, to determine now the manner or methods to be adopted in ascertaining the issue of the wheel which is made the measure of the quantity of water granted to defendants. Those charged with the duty of setting apart, or otherwise prescribing, the quantity of water to which defendants are entitled will do this. We make one suggestion that readily occurs to the [127]*127mind in considering the provisions of the grant. The defendants, as we have said, are entitled to a sufficient supply of water to run the wheel with the proper quantity of machinery attached thereto. This quantity may vary with the head of water in the flume or dam, and, consequently, with the variation of water in the stream. If this be so, due account must be made of the fact, so that defendants, at all times, when under the contract they are entitled to the full quantity of water, may use the amount necessary to propel the machinery. If, therefore, the water for defendants’ mill be set apart by gates or bulkheads, in the'flume, due arrangements must be provided to meet this condition. But in our judgment, the just and more simple manner of partitioning the water is by means of the water wheels used by defendants. Let the quantity of water issued by the old wheel be determined; the water issued by the wheels in use by defendants must be no more, and the wheels to be used by defendants must require no more water than did the old wheel. Defendants may desire to use machinery which would require the construction of other water wheels than those he is now using. There can be no objection to his doing so, but he can use at no time a greater quantity of water than indicated. Therefore, he will not be permitted to run wheels at the same time which actually use a greater quantity, Wheels may be idle when not used as directed by those rules.

3. —:--: power!6 ° III. We have seen that the measure of defendants’ rights is found in the' old wheel, and that such measure may be applied to the present and future use of the water conveyed by the grant. This conclusion was reached by the District Court, but we are of the opinion that the result of the application of the rules adopted was not justided by the evidence; in other words, there was an error in applying practically the rules.

By the decision of .the District Court the defendants were permitted to run two sets of buhrs and the necessary machinery for bolting. It may be that the power to propel the machinery in ordinary use is approximately equal to that imparted by the old wheel. But the dimensions of the buhrs and the quantity of grain to be ground upon them within a given time [128]*128will, of course, vary the quantity of water demanded. These conditions should be settled in order that this manner of controling the use of the water may operate justly and uniformly. But in our opinion there may be other methods, among them the one last mentioned above, that would more equitably apportion the water.

IY. The District Court failed to make any provision in the decree for setting apart, or securing to defendants, one-sixth of the water of the flume in very low water, under the clause of the contract providing for such a contingency. Whatever may be the importance of the rights of the parties under this clause, they ought to be determined by the decree and their enforcement provided for, as full relief cannot otherwise be given to the parties.

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Ficklen v. Fredericksburg Power Co.
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Bluebook (online)
46 Iowa 120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doan-v-metcalf-iowa-1877.