Do v. Arizona State University

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 13, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00190
StatusUnknown

This text of Do v. Arizona State University (Do v. Arizona State University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Do v. Arizona State University, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Sara Do, No. CV-22-00190-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Arizona State University, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue is Plaintiff Sara Do’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint 16 (Doc. 84, Mot.), to which Defendant Arizona Board of Regents (“ABOR”) filed a Response 17 (Doc. 87, ABOR Resp.), Defendant Maricopa County Special Health Care District, d/b/a 18 Valleywise Health (“Valleywise”) filed a Response (Doc. 86, Valleywise Resp.), and 19 Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 88, Reply). In this Order, the Court will also address the Joint 20 Summary of Discovery Dispute filed by Defendants and Plaintiff (Docs. 92, 93).1 The 21 Court will resolve the Motion and Discovery Dispute without oral argument. LRCiv 7.2(f). 22 I. Motion to File Supplemental Complaint 23 In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed April 5, 2022, Plaintiff alleged in 24 relevant part that ABOR violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 25 42 U.S.C. § 12132, by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability in her efforts to 26 complete the Arizona State University (“ASU”) Master of Nursing program. (Doc. 13, 27 FAC Count 1.) Plaintiff also alleged in relevant part that ABOR and Valleywise violated 28 1 The parties filed the same Joint Summary of Discovery Dispute twice. (Docs. 92, 93.) 1 Title II of the ADA by coercing, interfering with, and/or intimidating Plaintiff in her 2 attempt to exercise her protected rights. (FAC Count 3.) ASU removed her from the Master 3 of Nursing program in the summer of 2021. 4 Plaintiff now proposes to supplement the FAC with allegations regarding ABOR 5 and Valleywise’s conduct after Plaintiff returned to the Master of Nursing program in 6 January 2023, from which she graduated on an unalleged date in 2023 before filing the 7 proposed Supplemental Complaint. (Doc. 84 at 13-22, proposed Supplemental Complaint 8 (“PSC”).) Plaintiff argues that the new allegations demonstrate further violations of Title 9 II of the ADA in Counts 1 and 3 of the FAC. 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that the Court may, “on motion and 11 reasonable notice” as well as “just terms,” permit a plaintiff to supplement a complaint to 12 set out “any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading 13 to be supplemented.” The goal of Rule 15(d) is “judicial efficiency,” determined by 14 assessing “whether the entire controversy between the parties could be settled in one 15 action.” Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) 16 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “While leave to permit supplemental pleading is 17 favored, it cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action.” Id. 18 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 19 The Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 40) in this case provided that the deadline for 20 the parties to file motions to amend the complaint was November 18, 2022, and Plaintiff 21 filed the present Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint well after that deadline. 22 Under the Rule 16 “good cause” standard, “[t]he district court may modify the pretrial 23 schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the 24 extension.” Johnson v. Mammoth Rec., Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 25 quotation omitted). And “[a]lthough the existence or degree of prejudice to the party 26 opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of 27 the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. Here, Plaintiff 28 could not have filed her request for leave to supplement the FAC before the Scheduling 1 Order deadline because the alleged conduct Plaintiff requests to add to the FAC occurred 2 after the deadline. Plaintiff has thus shown good cause for the Court to extend the 3 Scheduling Order deadline to supplement the FAC. 4 A motion to supplement is akin to a motion to amend to the extent that leave to 5 amend is not appropriate if the amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is 6 sought in bad faith, is futile, is the result of a repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 7 amendments previously allowed, or creates undue delay. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 8 182 (1962). “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the 9 greatest weight,” and “absent prejudice or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman 10 factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” 11 Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). The party 12 opposing the amendment bears the burden of demonstrating that leave to amend is 13 inappropriate in light of the Foman factors. Id. 14 “A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately subject to 15 dismissal. Thus, the proper test to be applied when determining the legal sufficiency of a 16 proposed amendment is identical to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a 17 pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).” Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 788 n.12 (9th 18 Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted), aff’d on reh’g en banc on other grounds, 681 19 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege 20 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 21 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based 22 on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a 23 cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 24 1990). 25 Here, Valleywise argues that Count 3 of the PSC fails to meet Rule 8’s requirement 26 that a pleading provide a “short and plain statement” of a claim because Count 3 employs 27 group pleading against the two Defendants, Valleywise and ABOR, and does not specify 28 what conduct Valleywise allegedly engaged in. (Valleywise Resp. at 4-5; PSC ¶¶ 38-40.) 1 In her Reply, Plaintiff states, “As is clear from the pleadings and discovery, Valleywise’s 2 involvement with Do ended in July 2021. As such, none of the additional facts alleged in 3 the Supplemental Complaint about events in 2023 are directed against Valleywise.” (Reply 4 at 3 n.2.) A plain reading of the PSC reveals otherwise. Plaintiff repeatedly alleges facts 5 directed at Valleywise in the PSC, including that Plaintiff was denied shorter clinical shifts 6 even though “Valleywise personnel testified unambiguously that it makes no difference to 7 them how long the students are there or if they leave early.” (PSC ¶ 19.) And, “As a result 8 of Plaintiff’s attempt to exercise her rights, as guaranteed under Title II as to ASU and 9 Valleywise, Plaintiff was coerced, interfered with, and intimidated by Defendants and their 10 agents,” including when “ASU and Valleywise actively placed her on clinical duty in areas 11 unsuitable for Plaintiff . . .

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Do v. Arizona State University, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/do-v-arizona-state-university-azd-2023.