1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 12 CHEYANNE DIXSON, 13
Plaintiff, 14 Case No. 2:22-cv-1771 RAJ v. 15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CITY OF ISSAQUAH POLICE 16 DEPARTMENT, et al., 17 Defendants. 18
19 20 I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary 21 judgment. Dkt. # 21. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 22 23 II. BACKGROUND In September 2021, the City of Issaquah (“City”) imposed a vaccination 24 requirement for City employees in response to a spike during the COVID-19 pandemic. 25 Dkt. # 23-1 at 17. Plaintiff Cheyanne Dixson, a patrol officer in the City’s Police 26 Department, requested a religious exemption from the requirement. Id. at 27. Dixson 27 1 believes in the Christian religion. Id. She sought a religion exemption based on: (1) the 2 betrayal of faith as God as her ultimate healer; (2) the corruption of blood with unnatural 3 components not created by God; and (3) the use of aborted fetal tissue in the manufacture 4 of COVID-19 vaccine in disregard of the sanctity of life. Id. 5 On October 1, 2021, the City informed Dixson that it was granting her exemption 6 request, but it would need more time to evaluate whether a reasonable accommodation 7 was available and whether that accommodation posed an undue hardship. Id. at 32-33. 8 Several weeks later, the City sent Dixson a letter explaining that it would not be able to 9 accommodate her in performing her police officer duties unvaccinated without imposing 10 an undue hardship on the City. Id. at 35. In analyzing whether an accommodation could 11 be made, the City explained that it would evaluate the duties, responsibilities and 12 working conditions of the police officer position. Id. at 33. Relevant factors included: the 13 daily direct contact that police officers have with the public when delivering services, the 14 workplace environment where police offers are subject to close contact with other 15 employees and developments with the virus that have made COVID-19 more contagious 16 and easier to transmit. Id. at 33. Although the City determined that it would impose an 17 undue hardship to allow Dixson to continue performing her duties unvaccinated on an 18 ongoing basis, the City offered to accommodate her for a limited period through 19 December 15, 2021. Id. at 36. During this intermediate period, Dixson was required to 20 take a COVID-19 test two times a week at the beginning of her shift under the 21 supervision of her supervisor. Id. at 34-36. She was also required to wear an N-95 mask 22 at all times and eat in her vehicle, outside, or off site. Id 23 Dixson received a Notice of Intent to Separate on February 2, 2022, after which 24 she requested, and received, a Loudermill hearing. Id. at 43. At the expiration of the 25 extended MOU period, Dixson had not become fully vaccinated. Dixson was separated 26 from the City effective February 16, 2022. 27 On December 15, 2022, Dixson filed her complaint in federal court against “the 1 City of Issaquah Police Department, Mayor Mary Lou Pauly, Wally Bobkiewicz, and 2 DOES 1-25.” Dkt. # 1. She asserted three causes of action: (1) a failure to accommodate 3 her religious beliefs as required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (2) a parallel claim under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, 5 RCW 49.60; and (3) a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged 6 violations of RCW 41.12.050 and the Issaquah Civil Service. Id. Dixson subsequently 7 stipulated to the dismissal of Defendants Pauly and Bobkiewicz. Dkt. # 14. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 On a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences from the 10 admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Addisu v. Fred 11 Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate where 12 there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 13 a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must initially show the absence 14 of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 15 The opposing party must then show a genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elect. 16 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must 17 present probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident 18 & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). The court defers to neither party in 19 resolving purely legal questions. See Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 942 20 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 IV. DISCUSSION 22 I. The Issaquah Police Department Cannot Be Sued 23 The Issaquah Police Department is the only remaining defendant and argues that it 24 is not an entity that can sue or be sued. Dkt. # 21 at 15. “The capacity of a governmental 25 body to be sued in the federal courts is governed by the law of the state in which the 26 district court is held.” Bondurant v. City of Battleground, 2016 WL 6973267, at *7 (W.D. 27 Wash. Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting Avery v. Cnty. of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1 1981)). The Court agrees with the Issaquah Police Department that it is not a proper 2 defendant and that Washington courts have reached this conclusion on several occasions. 3 Lumsden v. City of Bremerton Police Dep’t, 2020 WL 2512880, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 4 15, .2020); Bondurant, 2016 WL 6973267, at *7; Runnels v. City of Vancouver, 2011 WL 5 1584442, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2011) (citing Nolan v. Snohomish Cty., 59 6 Wn. App. 876, 883 (1990)) (“because current Washington case law indicates that a police 7 department is not a legal entity with the capacity to be sued, Defendants are entitled to 8 summary judgment of [the plaintiff’s] claims against [the police department].”) 9 Dixson responds that she named the City of Issaquah as a party within her 10 Complaint and referred to “the City” within the body of the complaint and other 11 pleadings. Dkt. # 26 at 15. She also argues that the Issaquah Police Department has not 12 claimed a failure of service against the City and that this defect is curable through 13 amendment. Id. at 15-16. 14 However, Dixson has not created a dispute of fact as to whether she has named or 15 served a proper defendant. First, Dixson did not include the City of Issaquah in her 16 complaint caption, and the docket in this matter shows the City is not listed as a party to 17 this case. Second, Dixson also did not obtain or serve a summons that named the City of 18 Issaquah, and thus, she did not properly serve the City with process.1 See Dkt. # 3. Under 19 Rule 4(a), the summons must bear the name of the party to whom it is directed. Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 4(a).
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1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 12 CHEYANNE DIXSON, 13
Plaintiff, 14 Case No. 2:22-cv-1771 RAJ v. 15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CITY OF ISSAQUAH POLICE 16 DEPARTMENT, et al., 17 Defendants. 18
19 20 I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary 21 judgment. Dkt. # 21. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 22 23 II. BACKGROUND In September 2021, the City of Issaquah (“City”) imposed a vaccination 24 requirement for City employees in response to a spike during the COVID-19 pandemic. 25 Dkt. # 23-1 at 17. Plaintiff Cheyanne Dixson, a patrol officer in the City’s Police 26 Department, requested a religious exemption from the requirement. Id. at 27. Dixson 27 1 believes in the Christian religion. Id. She sought a religion exemption based on: (1) the 2 betrayal of faith as God as her ultimate healer; (2) the corruption of blood with unnatural 3 components not created by God; and (3) the use of aborted fetal tissue in the manufacture 4 of COVID-19 vaccine in disregard of the sanctity of life. Id. 5 On October 1, 2021, the City informed Dixson that it was granting her exemption 6 request, but it would need more time to evaluate whether a reasonable accommodation 7 was available and whether that accommodation posed an undue hardship. Id. at 32-33. 8 Several weeks later, the City sent Dixson a letter explaining that it would not be able to 9 accommodate her in performing her police officer duties unvaccinated without imposing 10 an undue hardship on the City. Id. at 35. In analyzing whether an accommodation could 11 be made, the City explained that it would evaluate the duties, responsibilities and 12 working conditions of the police officer position. Id. at 33. Relevant factors included: the 13 daily direct contact that police officers have with the public when delivering services, the 14 workplace environment where police offers are subject to close contact with other 15 employees and developments with the virus that have made COVID-19 more contagious 16 and easier to transmit. Id. at 33. Although the City determined that it would impose an 17 undue hardship to allow Dixson to continue performing her duties unvaccinated on an 18 ongoing basis, the City offered to accommodate her for a limited period through 19 December 15, 2021. Id. at 36. During this intermediate period, Dixson was required to 20 take a COVID-19 test two times a week at the beginning of her shift under the 21 supervision of her supervisor. Id. at 34-36. She was also required to wear an N-95 mask 22 at all times and eat in her vehicle, outside, or off site. Id 23 Dixson received a Notice of Intent to Separate on February 2, 2022, after which 24 she requested, and received, a Loudermill hearing. Id. at 43. At the expiration of the 25 extended MOU period, Dixson had not become fully vaccinated. Dixson was separated 26 from the City effective February 16, 2022. 27 On December 15, 2022, Dixson filed her complaint in federal court against “the 1 City of Issaquah Police Department, Mayor Mary Lou Pauly, Wally Bobkiewicz, and 2 DOES 1-25.” Dkt. # 1. She asserted three causes of action: (1) a failure to accommodate 3 her religious beliefs as required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (2) a parallel claim under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, 5 RCW 49.60; and (3) a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged 6 violations of RCW 41.12.050 and the Issaquah Civil Service. Id. Dixson subsequently 7 stipulated to the dismissal of Defendants Pauly and Bobkiewicz. Dkt. # 14. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 On a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences from the 10 admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Addisu v. Fred 11 Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate where 12 there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 13 a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must initially show the absence 14 of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 15 The opposing party must then show a genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elect. 16 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must 17 present probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident 18 & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). The court defers to neither party in 19 resolving purely legal questions. See Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 942 20 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 IV. DISCUSSION 22 I. The Issaquah Police Department Cannot Be Sued 23 The Issaquah Police Department is the only remaining defendant and argues that it 24 is not an entity that can sue or be sued. Dkt. # 21 at 15. “The capacity of a governmental 25 body to be sued in the federal courts is governed by the law of the state in which the 26 district court is held.” Bondurant v. City of Battleground, 2016 WL 6973267, at *7 (W.D. 27 Wash. Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting Avery v. Cnty. of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1 1981)). The Court agrees with the Issaquah Police Department that it is not a proper 2 defendant and that Washington courts have reached this conclusion on several occasions. 3 Lumsden v. City of Bremerton Police Dep’t, 2020 WL 2512880, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 4 15, .2020); Bondurant, 2016 WL 6973267, at *7; Runnels v. City of Vancouver, 2011 WL 5 1584442, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2011) (citing Nolan v. Snohomish Cty., 59 6 Wn. App. 876, 883 (1990)) (“because current Washington case law indicates that a police 7 department is not a legal entity with the capacity to be sued, Defendants are entitled to 8 summary judgment of [the plaintiff’s] claims against [the police department].”) 9 Dixson responds that she named the City of Issaquah as a party within her 10 Complaint and referred to “the City” within the body of the complaint and other 11 pleadings. Dkt. # 26 at 15. She also argues that the Issaquah Police Department has not 12 claimed a failure of service against the City and that this defect is curable through 13 amendment. Id. at 15-16. 14 However, Dixson has not created a dispute of fact as to whether she has named or 15 served a proper defendant. First, Dixson did not include the City of Issaquah in her 16 complaint caption, and the docket in this matter shows the City is not listed as a party to 17 this case. Second, Dixson also did not obtain or serve a summons that named the City of 18 Issaquah, and thus, she did not properly serve the City with process.1 See Dkt. # 3. Under 19 Rule 4(a), the summons must bear the name of the party to whom it is directed. Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 4(a). Finally, the issue was specifically raised in Defendant’s amended answer 21 which states that “[p]laintiff has failed to name the proper party as defendant, as the 22 Issaquah Police Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued.” Dkt. # 10 at 6. 23 Because the City of Issaquah Police Department lacks the capacity to be sued, it 24 must be dismissed from this action. See Shaw v. City of Bremerton Police Dep’t, 2020 25
26 1 Although Dixson did serve the Mayor, the summons makes clear that the Mayor was sued and served as an individual, and not on behalf of the City of Issaquah. Dkt. # 3. 27 Dixson then dismissed her claims against the Mayor with prejudice. Dkt. # 14. 1 WL 816046, *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2020) (stating that the corrective for the failure to 2 name the correct party is the dismissal of the wrongly-named party). 3 II. Leave to Amend 4 In her response to the City of Issaquah Police Department’s motion for summary 5 judgment, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend to substitute the City of Issaquah. Dkt. # 26 at 6 16. 7 “[W]hen a party seeks to amend a pleading after the pretrial scheduling order’s 8 deadline for amending the pleadings has expired, the moving party must satisfy the ‘good 9 cause’ standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which provides that ‘[a] 10 schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent,’ rather than 11 the liberal standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).” In re W. States Wholesale 12 Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). This good cause standard 13 “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 14 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “If the moving party ‘was 15 not diligent, the inquiry should end.’ ” Neidermeyer v. Caldwell, 718 F. App’x 485, 489 16 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 17-1490, 2018 WL 2046246 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018) 17 (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). 18 As noted, the City of Issaquah Police Department filed its amended answer to 19 Dixson’s complaint on February 9, 2023 asserting affirmative defenses including failure 20 to name a proper party as a defendant. Dkt. # 10 at 6. The deadline to amend pleadings 21 was August 2, 2023. Dkt. # 12. However, Dixson only now seeks to amend the pleading 22 in response to the motion for summary judgment and has offered no explanation for the 23 undue delay. Therefore, the Court finds that Dixson has not been diligent in seeking 24 amendment and the inquiry ends there. Neidermeyer, 718 F. App’x at 489. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the City of Issaquah Police Department’s 27 motion for summary judgment, Dkt. # 21, is GRANTED. 1 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case.
2 DATED this 9th day of January, 2024. 3 A 4 5 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27