NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 9, 2025
S26A0052. DIXON v. THE STATE.
WARREN, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Brandi Dixon was convicted of felony murder in
connection with the stabbing death of Ebony Smith. 1 Dixon
contends that the evidence presented at her trial was legally
insufficient and that the trial court erred by denying her motion for
a directed verdict of acquittal. She also claims that her trial counsel
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling her objection during the
1 Smith was killed on July 15, 2018. In October 2018, a Bibb County grand jury indicted Dixon for malice murder and felony murder based on aggravated assault. At a trial from March 29 to 31, 2022, the jury found Dixon not guilty of malice murder and guilty of felony murder, and the trial court sentenced her to serve life in prison. Dixon, through new counsel, filed a timely motion for new trial, which she later amended. In June 2025, the trial court denied the motion. Dixon filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. State’s redirect examination of a witness and by failing to strike
certain testimony. As explained below, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence presented at Dixon’s trial showed the following. In 2017
and 2018, both Smith and Dixon were dating George Duehart, who
was known as “Little Man”; Duehart testified that neither woman
knew about the other’s relationship with him. In the fall of 2017,
however, Smith and her sister encountered Dixon at a ballfield and
noticed that Dixon was “pointing” at them. And during the summer
of 2018, Dixon came to Smith’s house and asked Smith’s son if “Little
Man” was staying there. When the son said that he was not, Dixon
left.
On July 15, 2018, Duehart hosted a party at a house in Macon,
which Smith and Dixon both attended. A friend of Duehart’s who
was also at the party saw Dixon standing at the top of a hill near the
house, while Smith and her friend Ashley Oliver were standing near
the bottom of the hill. Dixon was “twirling [a] knife” and “loudly”
and “aggressively” saying: “[W]here the f**k … Little Man at, b**ch
2 will think I’m done, they got me f**ked up, I’ll kill me a b**ch
tonight.”
Oliver testified as follows. Although she did not see Dixon with
a knife, she did see Dixon near the top of the hill and overheard a
man say to Dixon, “[O]h, you’re going to cut me?” Smith and Oliver
then went to a store. When they returned, Dixon was near the area
where Smith parked her car. Dixon approached them and said,
“[A]re you here for Little Man[?]” and Smith responded, “[T]hat’s my
man.” Two men then held Oliver back to prevent her from
intervening while Dixon got “in [Smith’s] face” and was being
“aggressive.” Smith told Dixon to “get out [of her] face.” Smith then
reached inside the open passenger-side window of her car and into
the glove compartment, grabbed her pistol, loaded the pistol, and
“fired in the air.” Dixon said, “[O]h, so you’re going to shoot me over
an F’ing man” and then stabbed Smith in the chest with a large
kitchen knife. Smith fell to the ground as Dixon fled. The men who
were holding Oliver released her; Oliver tried to grab the pistol, but
the men grabbed it first and removed the magazine. Oliver put the
3 pistol and the knife in Smith’s car and called 911.
Footage from body cameras worn by responding investigators,
which the State introduced into evidence, showed the following.
Investigators found Smith, who had died, on the ground near her
car. They interviewed Oliver, who was crying and very “distraught,”
at the scene. Oliver said that during the altercation, Dixon “kept
saying she had a knife” and she “pulled a knife on [Smith] and
[Smith] was defending herself and she shot [Dixon] and then [Dixon]
stabbed [Smith].” Dixon was leaning against a nearby building; her
forehead was bleeding; and she was crying, saying, “She just shot a
gun at me.” When emergency responders asked where she was hurt,
she said she did not know. One of the responders described the
wound on Dixon’s forehead as “a nick,” and an investigator
mentioned that it seemed like a “minor cut.”
Another investigator testified that he found a pistol and a
kitchen knife in Smith’s car, a shell casing near the car, and a
magazine in the grass nearby. He also testified that there was a
bullet defect above the passenger-side door of the car. The
4 investigator photographed Dixon’s forehead injury, and the photos
were admitted into evidence. The investigator opined that, based on
his training and experience, the injury was a cut, not a bullet wound.
The medical examiner who performed Smith’s autopsy testified that
Smith had a four-inch long, four-inch deep stab wound in her chest,
which caused her death.
Dixon did not testify; her theory of defense was self-defense.
2. Dixon contends that the evidence presented at trial was not
constitutionally sufficient to support her conviction for felony
murder based on aggravated assault. She also argues that the trial
court erred by denying her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
These claims fail.
“The test established in Jackson v. Virginia, [443 US 307
(1979)], is the proper standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process and for evaluating
whether the trial court erred by denying a defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal.” Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 750
(2023). Under that test, we view all of the evidence presented at
5 trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider whether
any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of which she was convicted. See id. at
751. “This limited review leaves to the jury the resolution of
conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the credibility
of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts
to ultimate facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Dixon asserts that the evidence was not sufficient as a matter
of constitutional due process because the State failed to disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt her claim of self-defense. Arguing that
Smith was the aggressor, Dixon points to Oliver’s testimony that
Smith fired her pistol before Dixon pulled out a knife. But the jury
was authorized to disbelieve that testimony and to instead credit
other evidence showing that Dixon did not act in self-defense. In
this respect, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, showed that in the months before the murder, Dixon
initiated encounters with Smith and her family, which authorized
the jury to infer that Dixon suspected that Smith was in a
6 relationship with Duehart. At Duehart’s party, a witness saw Dixon
“twirling” a large kitchen knife, asking where Duehart was, and
threatening to “kill … a b**ch.” And Oliver testified that Dixon later
“aggressive[ly]” confronted Smith about Duehart and got “in
[Smith’s] face,” while two men held Oliver back to prevent her from
helping Smith. Although Oliver also testified that Smith then
grabbed her pistol and “fired in the air” before Dixon pulled out her
knife, Oliver told investigators at the scene that Dixon “pulled a
knife on [Smith] and [Smith] was defending herself and she shot
[Dixon] and then [Dixon] stabbed [Smith].” It was for the jury to
assess Oliver’s credibility (as it also assessed the credibility of other
witnesses) and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Rooks,
317 Ga. at 751. See also Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020)
(“[Q]uestions about the existence of justification are for the jury to
resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a
justification defense and accept evidence that a [killing] was not
done in self-defense.” (quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, the evidence presented at trial and recounted above
7 was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Dixon’s claim of
self-defense and to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
felony murder based on aggravated assault, and the trial court did
not err by denying her motion for a directed verdict. See OCGA
§ 16-3-21(b)(3) (“A person is not justified in using force [in self-
defense] if he ... [w]as the aggressor.”); Gibbs, 309 Ga. at 564
(holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s
conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault where he
shot and killed the armed victim, despite conflicting evidence as to
whether the defendant or the victim drew and fired his weapon
first); Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 562 (2020) (holding that even if
the jury believed the defendant’s assertion that the victim fired first,
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
defendant was the initial aggressor, such that he was not entitled to
a finding of justification).
3. Dixon also argues that her trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by advising her not to testify
at trial. As explained below, Dixon has not met her burden of
8 establishing that trial counsel performed deficiently, so this claim
fails.
To prevail on her ineffectiveness claim, Dixon must establish
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and
that she suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984); Woods v. State, 322 Ga. 365,
367 (2025). To prove deficient performance, Dixon must show that
counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
professional norms.” Woods, 322 Ga. at 367 (quotation marks
omitted). See also Strickland, 466 US at 687–91. To “overcome the
strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance fell within a
wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” Woods, 322 Ga. at
367 (quotation marks omitted), Dixon must show that no reasonable
lawyer would have done what her lawyer did, or would have failed
to do what her lawyer did not, see Warren v. State, 314 Ga. 598, 602
(2022). “[C]ounsel’s decisions about trial tactics and strategy in
particular may not form the basis of an ineffectiveness claim unless
9 they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney
would have followed such a course.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
To prove prejudice, Dixon must establish a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial
would have been different. See Strickland, 466 US at 694. We need
not address both parts of the Strickland test if Dixon does not meet
her burden of establishing one. See Strickland, 466 US at 697;
Woods, 322 Ga. at 367.
Here, Dixon briefly testified at the motion for new trial hearing
that about a week before trial, counsel “wanted [Dixon] to testify,
and [she] was ready to testify”; during the trial, however, “he told
[her] not to get on the stand”; and Dixon “wanted to tell [her] side.”
Dixon offered no testimony about the reasons why trial counsel
advised her not to testify after the trial began, and she did not call
counsel to testify at the hearing. Nor did Dixon testify as to what
she would have said, had she decided to testify at trial.
“Whether to testify in one’s own defense is a tactical choice to
be made by the defendant after consultation with h[er] lawyer, and
10 trial counsel’s advice to a defendant not to testify is a strategic
decision.” Morgan v. State, 321 Ga. 495, 504 (2025). In the absence
of evidence showing that counsel’s advice not to testify was patently
unreasonable, we presume that such advice was reasonably
strategic. See Woods, 322 Ga. at 369; Newman v. State, 309 Ga. 171,
176 (2020). Even assuming that the trial court credited Dixon’s
testimony that trial counsel advised her not to testify at trial, Dixon
has presented no evidence showing that counsel’s advice was so
patently unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have given
it. And we see nothing in the record indicating that such advice was
unreasonable, under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly,
Dixon has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s advice
fell within the range of reasonable professional conduct, so she has
not established that counsel performed deficiently, and her claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Woods, 322 Ga. at 369
(holding that the appellant failed to show that trial counsel
performed deficiently by allegedly advising him not to testify at trial
because the record was “silent as to what advice, if any, counsel gave
11 [the appellant] on that topic”); Newman, 309 Ga. at 175–76
(“[B]ecause [the appellant] did not ask his trial counsel any
questions at the motion for new trial hearing about the reasons why
[the appellant] decided to testify, we presume that any reason
relating to trial counsel’s advice to [the appellant] about testifying
was strategic and would not amount to ineffective assistance.”).2
4. Dixon asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling her objection to testimony from Smith’s sister during the
State’s redirect examination of her. We conclude that any such error
was harmless.
By way of background, the prosecutor elicited the sister’s
2 Dixon does not appear to contend that she was not adequately informed
of her right to testify. But we note on that point that the trial court advised Dixon, among other things, that she had the right to testify, “nobody c[ould] stop [her] or prevent [her] from testifying,” and Dixon “and not [her] lawyer [was] the one who decides whether or not” she would testify. The trial transcript shows that Dixon confirmed that she understood and that she “personally” did not want to testify. Dixon also mentions in passing in her appellate brief that she testified at the motion for new trial hearing that trial counsel met with her only a handful of times before trial and “refused to consider evidence she believed was exculpatory.” To the extent she seeks to raise claims of ineffectiveness on these grounds, she offers no argument to support them. Thus, any such claims are deemed abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 321 Ga. 222, 225–27 (2025). 12 testimony on direct examination that she and Smith encountered
Dixon at a ballfield and noticed that Dixon was “pointing” at them;
the sister also said that she took a baseball bat to the ballfield “[i]n
case [Dixon] came up there and tried to jump on [Smith].” On cross-
examination, Dixon’s counsel asked Smith’s sister about the
timeframe during which she and Smith encountered Dixon; counsel
also elicited the sister’s testimony that she had never heard Dixon
threaten Smith and that Smith carried a gun because the
neighborhood where she lived was dangerous. On redirect, the
prosecutor said that the sister “mentioned being [at the ballfield] for
protection,” i.e., to protect Smith from Dixon, and asked, “Between
the two of you [the sister and Smith], who would have been the one
to respond to any kind of aggression?” Dixon’s counsel objected on
the ground that the question went beyond the scope of his cross-
examination; the trial court overruled the objection. The sister
replied, “Me.”
Assuming without deciding whether the trial court abused its
discretion by overruling Dixon’s objection, we conclude that any such
13 error was harmless. “A non-constitutional error is harmless if it is
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”
Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 799, 806 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).
The sister’s answer to the prosecutor’s question was brief, and she
conveyed only that Smith was less likely than her to respond to some
sort of aggressive conduct. That point was essentially cumulative of
other evidence (admitted without objection and unchallenged on
appeal) that Smith did not have a reputation for violence, including
the sister’s testimony on direct examination that Smith did not have
a reputation for being aggressive and Duehart’s similar testimony
that he had never known Smith to be aggressive or violent. Thus, it
is highly probable that the sister’s one-word answer to the
prosecutor’s question did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., id.
(assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting certain testimony and concluding that any error was
harmless because the testimony was cumulative of other evidence at
trial); Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 779 (2023) (assuming without
deciding that the admission of certain testimony was erroneous and
14 holding that any error was harmless because the testimony was
brief and cumulative of other evidence).
5. Finally, Dixon claims that the trial court abused its
discretion by overruling her request to strike certain testimony from
the medical examiner on the ground that the prosecutor did not
comply with OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4), which provides, as pertinent
here, that the prosecutor shall permit the defense to inspect and
copy an expert witness’s “report of any physical or mental
examinations and of scientific tests or experiments,” or “[i]f the
report is oral or partially oral,” the prosecutor “shall reduce all
relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and
shall serve opposing counsel with such portions.” As explained
below, this claim fails.
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of the medical
examiner, who was qualified as an expert witness, the prosecutor
sought to elicit the examiner’s testimony about her review of the
photographs of the injury to Dixon’s forehead after the stabbing and
whether that injury was a gunshot wound. Dixon’s trial counsel
15 objected, arguing that although the State had provided the defense
with the medical examiner’s autopsy report, the State had not
provided a report regarding the examiner’s opinion about the cause
of Dixon’s forehead injury. See OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4). Outside of
the presence of the jury, the prosecutor conceded that no such report
was provided, and the trial court sustained the objection and
excluded the medical examiner’s opinion about Dixon’s injury.
The jury was then brought back into the courtroom, and the
prosecutor asked the medical examiner about the differences
between stab wounds and gunshot wounds. The examiner testified
that stab wounds are “usually linear in shape” while gunshot
wounds are “round or ovoid in shape” and “have a marginal
abrasion.” The prosecutor also elicited the medical examiner’s
testimony that a “graze gunshot wound” is often “an elongated kind
of oval shape” and is “very superficial” because “it just scrapes along
the skin surface.” When the prosecutor then asked whether a graze
gunshot wound would look different than a cut, Dixon’s counsel
objected and moved “to strike this testimony.” The trial court
16 sustained the objection and said that it was “not going to strike
anything.” The prosecutor then ended her direct examination.
Notably, the trial court sustained Dixon’s objection to the
medical examiner’s testimony about her examination of the
photographs of Dixon’s injury and whether that injury was a
gunshot wound, and the prosecutor did not ask any further
questions about the examiner’s review of the photos or her opinion
about the cause of Dixon’s injury. 3 Rather, the prosecutor asked
only about the general differences between stab wounds and
gunshot wounds, and the medical examiner testified about some of
the typical characteristics of those wounds and how they are usually
shaped. The medical examiner’s testimony on those points was
based entirely upon her own experience studying and observing the
general features of various stab wounds and gunshot wounds. Thus,
the testimony did not convey the results of a “physical or mental
examination[]” or “scientific test[] or experiment[]” within the
3 We express no opinion as to the trial court’s ruling sustaining Dixon’s
objection to, and thus excluding, the medical examiner’s testimony about the photos of Dixon’s injury and the cause of the injury. 17 meaning of OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4), such that disclosure was not
required. See Green v. State, 307 Ga. 171, 176–77 (2019) (explaining
that an expert witness’s opinion that was based “almost entirely
upon his own observations and measurements of the available
evidence, as well as application of established principles of
mathematics and physics to those measurements,” “did not
constitute a ‘scientific test or experiment’ requiring disclosure”
under OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4)). Because the testimony that Dixon
challenges was not subject to the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-
4(a)(4), the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding not to
strike the testimony on the ground that the prosecutor failed to
comply with the statute. See Green, 307 Ga. at 176–77. 4
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
4 Dixon also mentions in her brief in this Court that the trial court should
have given “some type of limiting instruction” regarding the medical examiner’s testimony. Dixon did not ask for a limiting instruction at trial. And she makes no argument in her brief about what any such instruction should have said or why the trial court should have given it. Accordingly, this claim is deemed abandoned under Supreme Court Rule 22. See, e.g., Byrd, 321 Ga. at 225–27. 18