Dixon v. Lee

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 13, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00085
StatusUnknown

This text of Dixon v. Lee (Dixon v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dixon v. Lee, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ FELIX DARRELL DIXON, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-85-pp

DR. ERIC LEE and THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON HOSPITAL,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Felix Darrell Dixon, Jr., who is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On February 14, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.34. Dkt. No. 7. The court received that fee on March 7, 2023. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing

fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants Dr. Eric Lee, who works at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Hospital, and the hospital itself. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2. The complaint alleges that on May 11, 2022, two correctional officers (who are not defendants) escorted the plaintiff to the hospital for an appointment with Dr. Lee. Id. at 2. The appointment was scheduled so Dr. Lee could remove

a hard cast from the plaintiff’s left hand and remove two surgical pins that were in his hand. Id. During the appointment, a nurse removed the cast without incident, but Dr. Lee noticed that one of the surgical pins was protruding from the plaintiff’s hand. Id. He removed the pin and then attempted to locate the second one, but he was unable to find it. Id. A nurse brought a portable x-ray machine to find the second pin, which Dr. Lee discovered was “lodged in the bone” in the plaintiff’s wrist or hand. Id. at 2–3. The plaintiff asked Dr. Lee if he would have to schedule a second surgery to

remove the pin, but Dr. Lee told the plaintiff that “he believed he could retrieve it and was gonna try.” Id. at 3. The complaint alleges that Dr. Lee used a scalpel to make an incision in the plaintiff’s left thumb “and began digging in [his] hand with surgical scissors.” Id. The plaintiff says that “this was extremely painful despite the numbing agent Dr. Lee applied to lessen the pain.” Id. After Dr. Lee spent thirty minutes “digging in [the plaintiff’s] hand blind,” the plaintiff says that “it started to feel like something was ripping in [his] hand.” Id. He told Dr. Lee,

who assured the plaintiff “he was almost done.” Id. A nurse entered the room and asked Dr. Lee if everything was okay while “noticeably cringing.” Id. Dr. Lee “quickly dismissed her and continued to dig in the plaintiff’s] hand.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that both officers who escorted him to the appointment also were cringing and had to look away several times. Id. The plaintiff asked Dr. Lee “could we just call it quits” because of the “excruciating pain,” but Dr. Lee assured him “that he almost had it, and that he knew he could get it.”

Id. at 3–4. The plaintiff alleges that after an hour, he “began to beg Dr.

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