Dixon v. Kijakazi

District Court, S.D. California·Decided March 7, 2022·No. 3:22-cv-00258·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 22CV258-BLM 11 MARQUIS PEIRMEN DIXON,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 13 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 [ECF NO. 7] Defendant. 16

17 18 The instant matter was initiated on February 25, 2022 when Plaintiff filed a complaint “to 19 review a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's application for Social 20 Security Disability [and Supplemental Security Income disability] benefits for lack of disability.” 21 ECF No. 1 at 1. That same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District Court without 22 Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF No. at 2. On March 1, 2022, the Court issued an Order Denying 23 Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Of Fees 24 or Costs and Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend. ECF No. 5. 25 On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and on March 3, 2022, refiled his 26 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF Nos. 6-7. Having 27 reviewed the amended complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient 1 to survive screening. 2 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 4 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if 6 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 7 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 8 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or 9 security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or 10 give security therefor. 11 12 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 13 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 14 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 15 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 16 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 17 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his 19 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents 20 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 21 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 22 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 23 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 24 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 25 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 26 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 27 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 1 fee). Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 2 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 3 Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to IFP status. 4 According to his affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff is not employed, has no income 5 except for the $33 per month that his mother provides him, and receives $195 per month in 6 food stamps. ECF No. 2 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not have a checking or savings account and does 7 not own a home or car. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff spends approximately $300 per month in rent, $194 8 per month on food, $15 per month on laundry and/or dry cleaning1, and $47 per month on 9 utilities2. Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not expect any major changes to his monthly income, expenses, 10 assets, or liabilities over the next twelve months. Id. at 5. Based on the foregoing, the Court 11 finds that Plaintiff has established that he is unable to pay the $402 filing fee without impairing 12 his ability to pay for life’s necessities. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is 13 GRANTED. 14 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 15 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 16 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 17 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 19 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 20 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 21 1126–27. 22 To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 23 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 24 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 25 26 1 Plaintiff notes that his mother pays the $15.00 per month. ECF No. 1 at 4. 27 2 Plaintiff notes that his mother pays the $47.00 per month. ECF No. 1 at 4. 1 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 2 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 3 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 4 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 5 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 6 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 7 at 556, 570)).

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
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550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ali v. Cuyler
547 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1982)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)