Dixon v. Fillmore Cemetery

608 S.W.2d 84, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 3006
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 7, 1980
DocketNo. WD 30506
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 608 S.W.2d 84 (Dixon v. Fillmore Cemetery) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dixon v. Fillmore Cemetery, 608 S.W.2d 84, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 3006 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

PRITCHARD, Judge.

An original appeal in this case resulted in a reversal and remand for new trial upon the principal ground that there was insufficient evidence to show that at the time testatrix’s will was executed she was suffering from an insane delusion. It was also held that the evidence was insufficient to show testatrix’s general lack of testamentary capacity, and the opinion noted, “If, upon new trial, proponents’ evidence is substantially the same, and if contestants should produce no more evidence than herein set forth, the trial court should direct a verdict for proponents.” See Dixon v. Webster, 551 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo.App.1971). A new trial was had, but the issue of testatrix’s insane delusion was not submitted to the jury, and its verdict setting aside the will was based upon a finding of general lack of testamentary capacity. Proponents again appealed which resulted in an opinion reversing the judgment. A motion for rehearing upon that opinion was granted, and the court requested further briefing on the issue of whether testatrix’s statement that she thought the Dixons were stealing from her, and being dissuaded by witness Clovis Williams, bore upon the second trial submission of general lack of testamentary capacity.

Upon rehearing respondents, as they had a right to do, reargued the matter of testatrix’s general lack of testamentary capacity. The entire record will be reexamined to determine if the first opinion (551 S.W.2d 888) was in error on that issue, and whether the judgment upon the jury’s verdict in the second trial should be affirmed upon the same issue.

The preliminary facts as stated at 551 S.W.2d 889, here paraphrased, are: Testatrix, Blanche Robinson, had been married to Kenneth W. Robinson, who died October 21, 1971. His will of September 10, 1970, gave to Blanche a power of appointment over certain bequests, one of which by Item III of Kenneth’s will gave to Richard L. Dixon $25,000 in trust. Blanche affirmed that bequest in a will executed by her on January 26, 1971, but in her will, executed August 31,1972, Blanche appointed (under the power of appointment in Kenneth’s will) the $25,000 trust fund to her own estate. This latter will is the one now in contest.

The second trial began on July 19, 1978, with this evidence, which is here detailed from that record: J. W. Roberts testified that he was a lawyer with Strop, Roberts and Hale, in St. Joseph. In 1972, Obie Watkins and Tom Watkins were members of that firm. J. W. became acquainted with Blanche sometime in 1971 in a legal relationship, doing some various things for her, including in January, 1971, talking to her about a will, and about her affairs generally. Before her death, which occurred January 26, 1973, J. W. saw her six to eight times, in addition to conferences with the trustee bank. About a week before the will in question was executed, J. W. received a phone call from the convalescence center, where Blanche was a patient, that Blanche wanted him to come up there. When he did go up shortly after the call, she told him she wanted to change the will and take out all benefits for Richard Dixon, asking “Can I do that?” “I said, ‘Yes, you [86]*86can, if that’s what you have decided to do.’ She said that she did.” Blanche wanted Dixon out of the will because he had spoken impolitely to her and told her he was tired of working for her — “she had in essence had a falling out with him; that she was mad at him.” Blanche stated to J. W. on one occasion that if Richard Dixon knew that he was not getting this (the $25,000) he might kill her. Blanche also stated she had given Dixon some personal objects, treasures, which he had been keeping for her, “and he now says that I’ll never see them again, or that he will take them and keep them.” Blanche refused to let J. W. do anything about recovering this property. Tom Watkins went with J. W. to execute the will he had prepared. At that time Blanche asked J. W. if the will was written the way she stated, and he answered that he had done so. He sat next to her and explained the legal effect of each provision. J. W. was of the opinion that Blanche was able to understand the ordinary affairs of life; the nature and extent of her property which she was disposing of; she knew the persons who were the natural objects of her bounty, and her natural obligations to those persons. On cross-examination, J. W. testified that the first time he handled business for Blanche was in January 1971 (when he prepared a will for her, which she executed, affirming the trust provision for the Dixons made by Kenneth), and he saw her about a half dozen times thereafter. Thomas D. Watkins, attorney, practiced with J. W. in 1972. He had known Blanche since he was a child. He was a witness on her August 31, 1972, will. Proponents’ evidence is substantially the same as that detailed in the original opinion, Dixon v. Webster, supra, and, of course, proponents made a case in favor of the will. It should be noted, however, that Doctor Wilbur McDonald, Blanche’s attending physician, testified in this trial that she would have been able to understand the nature of her property and the objects of her bounty when he saw her on August 30, 1972. Doctor McDonald did testify again that Blanche was a schizophrenic, a split personality, which according to him was defined as “a psychiatric disorder that is characterized by progressive withdrawal from the environment or surroundings, with regression or slow deterioration of the emotional responses to those surroundings.” Schizophrenia means you can’t face reality at times, and persons afflicted with it have hallucinations; they dream; they fantasize; then they withdraw. Blanche thought she had sex relations with Nelson Eddy, and had a guilt complex about it. She told Doctor McDonald that she had that sexual relation “and that no one else was ever going to get to her again.” She kept her legs together until they solidified in that position and never spread them — “that was one of her hang-ups.” She was 81 years old, and had delusions for at least ten years. “[Bjecause she was schizophrenic she wouldn’t move; she was negativistic. You couldn’t get her to do the things that you wanted her to do.” And “A Well, schizophrenia does not — the deterioration there is in the control of the emotions, or the splitting. The deterioration is not in the intellect. Schizophrenics can be very smart and stay smart. If there was any deterioration in her intellect, it would be on an arteriosclerotic basis. Q That would be normal for anyone her age? A * * * She was intelligent. The deterioration would not be due to the schizophrenia.” On cross-examination: “Q Doctor McDonald, a person that is a schizophrenic, if I’m pronouncing that correctly, can be alert one day and demented the next? A Yes. Q Isn’t that correct? A Yes, sir. Q I think you so testified in virtually those very same words when you testified before. In other words, when you saw Blanche Robinson on August 30, she could have been demented on the 29th, felt good on the 30th, been demented on the 31st, felt good on the 1st, and so forth, isn’t that certainly a possibility? A That is possible but not probable, because she didn’t change that rapidly. Usually, at that time, if they get demented, they stay demented for a while. It’s not a day-to-day basis. Q I understand, but what I’m saying, you have no way of knowing on the 31st of August whether or not she would have been demented because you did not see her that [87]*87day? A That’s right.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
608 S.W.2d 84, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 3006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dixon-v-fillmore-cemetery-moctapp-1980.