Dixon v. City of Nashville

203 S.W.2d 178, 29 Tenn. App. 282, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMarch 30, 1946
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 203 S.W.2d 178 (Dixon v. City of Nashville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dixon v. City of Nashville, 203 S.W.2d 178, 29 Tenn. App. 282, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

Opinion

McAMIS, J.

This case involves the right of a municipality in the construction and drainage of its streets to interfere with the natural drainage of surface water to the injury of lower lying lands.

*284 The bill, filed by property owners on Albion Street in the City of Nashville, was dismissed because (1) the work was done in strict compliance with a plan of the city engineer, (2) the water flowing upon complainants’ lands after the improvements were made by the city was found to be "no more, or only very slightly more than before the construction of Eden Street” and (3) the acts complained of in the bill did not amount to a nuisance.

The area in question, as we understand, is located in Northwest Nashville on the side of a hill sloping from the top of the hill south of Eden Street and of complainants ’ properties to a point north of their properties.

Eden Street is 150 feet south of, and is parallel to, an alley across the rear of their properties. Both Eden Street and Albion Street run east and west between 24th Avenue at their eastern end to 25th Avenue at the west. South of complainants’ properties the general slope, as before indicated, is to the north and, in addition, the slope is such that before the construction of Eden Street water drained west from 24th Avenue and east from 25th Avenue, converging in a natural drainage area between the alley and Eden Street. The result was to make complainants’ properties servient to' all of the water falling on the area from the alley southward between 24th Avenue and 25th Avenue. Erosion had caused three gullies to fonn above Eden Street each running generally toward a point in the alley at the rear of complainants’’properties. The area between the alley and Eden Street was an open and unimproved'“common.”

About two years before the bill was filed a number of houses were constructed fronting on the north side of Eden Street and about the same time, by resolution of the Board of Public Works, the Superintendent of Streets was directed to grade and hardsurface Eden Street in *285 compliance with a plan on lile in the office of the City .Engineer.

Eden Street was so graded and constructed that all of the surface water falling on higher ground to the south and formerly passing through the three gullies mentioned was brought to a single drain in Eden Street approximately midway between 24th Avenue and 25th Avenue where it all now enters a 12 inch metal culvert running from the mouth of the drain in Eden Street down the hill to a point in the alley immediately to the rear of complainant Dixon’s property.

While complainants were not permitted to fully develop the proof as to the extent of the damage resulting from the installation of the drainage system, the proof is undisputed that complainants’ properties, or at least two of them, have been materially damaged. The proof is all to the effect that before the improvement of Eden Street surface water was not a serious problem but that thereafter the basement of one of the properties was continually being flooded and the foundation under another was seriously undermined. While the learned Special Chancellor held that the amount of water, flowing onto these properties was at most only slightly more than before the improvements were made, it seems clear that the water was more concentrated and flowed at a more rapid speed through the metal drain than before, resulting in the injuries shown by the proof. In any event there can be ho question that damage resulted and the only question for determination is the liability of the city for the condition created.

•Unless a different rule applies to a municipality for acts done in the improvement of its' streets, a question hereinafter considered, it is' clear that complainants are entitled to some form of relief under the facts outlined.

*286 We think the facts of this case are in every material respect the same as in Tyrus v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Railroad Co., 114 Tenn. 579, 86 S. W. 1074. There, as in this case, the plaintiff owned a lot naturally servient to surface water falling on higher ground. The defendant Railroad Company elevated its roadbed in such a way as tp concentrate the water at the lowest point above plaintiff’s lot where it constructed a culvert under a fill causing the water to run through the culvert into an alley, as in this case, and thence upon plaintiff’s lot. Before the culvert was constructed, water from the surrounding- lands passed over the lot but, as the opinion states, “more slowly, and not in such concentrated volume.” The culvert was properly constructed as a work of mechanical art and, as stated, was placed at the lowest level of the land, for purposes of surface drainage.

The holding is thus summarized in the opinion (114 Tenn. at page 595, 86 S. W. at page 1078): “The facts . stated in the beginning of this opinion show that the defendant gathered the surface water that came upon its property into a body in its culvert, and sent it, in greater volume and with greater force than it was accustomed . to flow, upon the land of the plaintiff, and thereby injured ..it. The defendant had no right to do this, and for so doing became liable in damages for the infliction of the injury. See authorities cited in note 3, p. 595, 21 L. R. A.”

In Burton v. Chattanooga, 7 Lea, 739, 741, 742, the general rule is stated as follows: ‘ ‘ The general rule is stated to be, that the owner of the higher land for instance, has no right, even in the course of use and improvement of his land, to collect the surface water into a drain or ditch, increasing it in quantity or in a manner different from the natural flow upon the lower lands of another, to the 'injury of such lands.”

*287 In Garland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S. W. 940, 941, 48 L. R. A. 862, 76 Am. St. Rep. 699, although the case involved an obstruction by the owner of the servient estate, the Court quoted- from Addison on Torts in part as follows: “So that if the proprietor of the higher lands alters the natural condition of his property, and collects the surface and rainwater together at the bottom of his estate and pours it in a concentrated form and in unnatural quantities upon the land below, he will be responsible for all damages thereof caused to the possessor of the lower lands.”

In the more recent case of Slatten v. Mitchell, 22 Tenn. App. 547, 124 S. W. (2d) 310, it is held in a learned opinion by Presiding Judge Paw that the “common enemy” doctrine that each landowner may fight off surface water and dispose of it as best he can does not obtain in this State, citing numerous Tennessee cases, and that in disposing of surface water the rights of adjoining owners must be respected.

That case involved the right of the owner of the higher land to build a wall along the line between his property and a public highway to keep surface water off his land and force it to flow on down the highway ditch upon the lands below. It was found that the owner of still higher lands had constructed lateral ditches to drain surface water into the ditch along the highway thus preventing the natural diffusion and absorption of water into the soil above defendant’s lands.

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Bluebook (online)
203 S.W.2d 178, 29 Tenn. App. 282, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dixon-v-city-of-nashville-tennctapp-1946.