Dixie Millburn Selby v. Landon Selby
This text of Dixie Millburn Selby v. Landon Selby (Dixie Millburn Selby v. Landon Selby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
DIXIE MILLBURN SELBY, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9604-CH-00159 v. ) ) Rutherford Chancery LANDON SELBY, ) No. 94DR-775 ) Defendant/Appellant. ) FILED COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE December 6, 1996
Cecil W. Crowson MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR RUTHERFORD COUNTY
AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE DON R. ASH, CHANCELLOR
DAVID W. GARRETT 214 Second Avenue, North Suite 103 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
TERRY A. FANN Waldron and Fann 202 West Main Street Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Landon Selby, from
a decision of the chancery court which granted appellant and
plaintiff/appellee, Dixie Millburn Selby, a divorce and distributed
the parties' marital and separate assets. The facts out of which
this case arose are as follows.
The parties married on 17 July 1987. At the time of the
marriage, appellant was forty-nine and appellee was forty-seven.
Both parties entered the marriage with separate property. Appellee
owned six duplexes on Glaze Court and five lots in Dixieland
Estates ("the lots"). The duplexes were encumbered by a
$140,000.00 debt. Appellant owned a house, a truck, and a boat and
trailer all of which were free of debt.
Three years after the wedding, appellant lost his job. He
began managing the Glaze Court duplexes and the lots instead of
obtaining outside employment. Appellant claimed that his
management increased the property values. In addition, he pointed
out that at the time of the divorce the parties had reduced the
debt on the duplexes to $29,365.00 and claimed that this was due,
in part, to his management.
During the marriage, appellee accumulated retirement
benefits of $14,809.15 and appellant accumulated retirement
benefits of $8,538.30. The parties maintained joint banking
1 Co u r t o f Ap p e a l s Ru l e 1 0 ( b ) : Th e Co u r t , wi t h t h e c o n c u r r e n c e o f a l l j u d g e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e c a s e , ma y a f f i r m, r e v e r s e o r mo d i f y t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t b y me mo r a n d u m o p i n i o n wh e n a f o r ma l o p i n i o n wo u l d h a v e n o pr e c e de nt i a l val ue . W e n a c a s e i s d e c i d e d b y me mo r a n d u m o p i n i o n h i t s h a l l b e d e s i g n a t e d " M ORANDUM OP I NI ON, " s h a l l n o t b e EM publ i s he d, and s ha l l not be c i t e d or r e l i e d on f or any r e a s on i n a s u bs e q ue nt unr e l a t e d c a s e .
2 accounts. In addition, they had two certificates of deposit worth
$10,000.00 each. The parties also purchased a seventh duplex at
1026-28 Glaze Court.
The parties separated on 11 July 1994. On that date,
appellee withdrew a total of $44,000.00 from the parties' joint
account and the duplex account. Appellee filed her complaint for
divorce on 15 July 1994. On 11 August 1995, the parties filed a
Joint Stipulation and Statement in Compliance with Rule 12.02 of
the local rules. Two of the items left blank in the stipulation
were the agreed values of the appreciation of the properties
brought into the marriage by appellee.
The court entered its final decree of divorce on 7 September
1995. The court awarded the parties a divorce and distributed the
marital and separate property. Appellant received: 1) one
$10,000.00 certificate of deposit; 2) equity in the Thompson
Mechanic retirement account ($8,593.29); 3) appreciation in the
house on Holston Drive ($7,000.00); 4) duplex at 1031-33 Glaze
Court ($40,000.00); 5) John Deere tractor ($1,750.00); 6) funds in
cash investment account ($16,259.50); 7) checking account
($13,500.00); 8) home on Holston Drive, his truck, and his boat and
trailer; and 9) furniture and other personal items. In addition,
the court held that the Thompson Mechanic retirement account equity
was a marital asset and that the home on Holston Drive, the truck,
and the boat and trailer were separate assets. Appellee received:
1) appreciation on the 6 Glaze Court duplexes brought into the
marriage by appellee ($50,000.00); 2) duplex at 1026-28 Glaze
Court; 3) appreciation on the lots ($20,000.00); 4) one $10,000.00
certificate of deposit; 5) responsibility for the note on the
duplexes ($29,265.91); 6) the Glaze Court duplexes; 7) duplex
account ($28,702.00); 8) 1992 Caprice Classic ($12,500.00); 9) VA
thrift savings plan ($9,641.27); 10) SEP account ($5,167.88); 11)
3 the lots; 12) furniture and other personal items; and 13) Calvary
Bank checking account. Moreover, the court specifically held that
the appreciation in the properties owned by appellee prior to the
marriage was a marital asset as well as the duplex located at 1026-
28 Glaze Court. As to appellee's separate property, the court held
that the properties brought into the marriage by appellee and her
Calvary Bank checking account were separate assets. Although the
court did not clearly identify each asset as marital or separate or
value each asset, it found that it had awarded appellant $97,102.79
in marital assets and appellee $106,644.09 in marital assets.
On 19 September 1995, appellant filed a motion to alter or
amend. Appellant argued that the court failed to consider the
$44,000.00 in withdrawals made by appellee and the reduction in the
debt on the Glaze Court properties. On 29 December 1995, the court
entered an order on appellant's motion. The court found that it
should have considered $26,000.00 of the $44,000.00 which appellee
had withdrawn from the parties' joint account. Thus, the court
adjusted the parties' cash awards by ordering appellee to pay
appellant $5,520.00. The court held that appellant's claim as to
the reduction in debt was without merit.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 5 January 1996 and
presented the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in its valuation and distribution of the separate and marital property of the parties? 2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to value the equity gained in the duplex properties as marital property, and to include as the equity position of the duplex properties debt reduction which was paid during the marriage, as well as the appreciation in said real property?
In her reply brief, appellee responded to these issues and
requested attorney's fees on appeal.
4 We have reviewed this record and are of the opinion that the
evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's division
of the marital property or of the separate property. The evidence
further does not preponderate against the trial court's evaluation
of the equity in the duplex properties.
We are of the opinion that appellee is entitled to an award
of attorney's fees on appeal. On remand, the trial court shall
determine a reasonable fee for the attorney's representation of
appellee on appeal.
Therefore, it results that the judgment of the trial court
is in all things affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial
court for any further necessary proceedings. Costs on appeal are
taxed to the defendant/appellant, Landon Selby.
__________________________________ SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
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